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Using Marxist critique, this book explores manifestations of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) in Higher Education and demonstrates how it contrib-
utes to the functioning and existence of the capitalist university.
Challenging the idea that AI is a break from previous capitalist tech-
nologies, the book offers nuanced examination of the impacts of AI 
on the control and regulation of academic work and labour, on digital 
learning and remote teaching, and on the value of learning and knowl-
edge. Applying a Marxist perspective, Preston argues that commodity 
fetishism, surveillance, and increasing productivity ushered in by the 
growth of AI, further alienates and exploits academic labour and com-
modifies learning and research. The text puts forward a solid theoretical 
framework and methodology for thinking about AI to inform critical 
and revolutionary pedagogies.
Offering an impactful and timely analysis, this book provides a criti-
cal engagement and application of key Marxist concepts in the study of 
AI’s role in Higher Education. It will be of interest to those working or 
researching in Higher Education.
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Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the most nebulous technologies in 
contemporary capitalism. It has come to stand for a wide variety of 
machines, automations, simulations, and speculations. Intelligent assis-
tants such as Alexa and Cortana, Machine Learning (ML), cyborgs, 
robots, expert systems, downloaded minds, automata, self-driving 
cars, pattern recognition, transhumanists, post-humanists, semantic 
nets, neural nets, natural language processing, godlike consciousnesses, 
and future automated existential threats are all parts of what might be 
called AI. In many ways there is nothing new about AI. Humans have 
always imagined enchanted objects and mechanical devices that might 
approximate some form of consciousness. Cave, Dihal and Dillon (2020) 
span human history in bringing together fictional and non-fictional 
accounts, of ‘AI Narratives’. Several chapters in their collected volume 
identify pre-capitalist accounts of AI from Greek philosophy and the 
Middle Ages. Although these are not AI as we might understand it, these 
conceptions of intelligent, reasoning, or conscious ‘things’ are already 
embedded in a historical mode of production (slavery or feudalism). In 
contrast, contemporary AI is largely a capitalist technology and (as I 
argue in Chapter 6) we often look at advanced AI not as a slave or a 
serf but as an owned machine (as part of capital) and speculatively as a 
future conscious, or even ‘labouring’, entity.
The contemporary history of AI (Woolbridge, 2020) makes clear that 
it is an over-burdened and contested concept. From the work of Turing 
until the development of semantic AI in what Woolbridge (2020, p.47) 
refers to the ‘Golden Age’ (from 1956 to 1974), there was an emphasis 
on ‘General AI’ with the prioritisation of general skills across a wide 
range of domains including perception, problem-solving, planning, 
and understanding. The perceived failures of this ‘Golden Age’, as 
these higher-order problems proved to be extremely challenging, led to 
a narrowing of the focus of AI (‘narrow AI’). AI technologies such as 
expert systems (which combined AI with human reasoning to address 
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problems in a specific domain), behavioural AI (that focussed on AI and 
robot behaviour, rather than reasoning), and AI assistants (that worked 
alongside humans to solve problems) were more successful but still not 
a step towards more general AI, AGI (Artificial General Intelligence).
Contemporary AI is often associated with ML that is based on sta-
tistical techniques, big data, and massively increased computing power 
to build ‘neural nets’ that can be taught to solve specific problems. The 
‘neural nets’ involved are not synonymous with neurons in a human, or 
even a computational brain, but allow practical gains in terms of pattern 
recognition and strategy (particularly in terms of games such as Chess, 
Go, or video games). ‘Narrow AI’ and ML are particularly important in 
terms of military, business, and government (especially policing) appli-
cations. Woolbridge (2020, p.210) explains that there is now a schism 
between ML and AI so wide that some researchers in ML do not con-
sider themselves to be AI researchers at all. Although AI was never a 
‘pure’ discipline, the move from AGI to narrow, specific, applications 
resonate with commercial imperatives in terms of increasing business 
profitability, imperialist prowess, and state control and repression. This 
tendency reflects the development and appropriation of science and tech-
nology for capitalism.
From the outset, it is important that we understand the multiplicity 
of AI technologies, and that AI is not synonymous with an electronic 
‘mind’ or ‘brain’, although conceptions of these are also a part of cap-
italist expression and understanding of AI. Dyer-Whiteford, Kjøsen 
and Steinhoff (2019) argue that ‘…it is only through some familiarity 
with the science of technology of AI that an effective critique can be 
mounted’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.9), but it is increasingly diffi-
cult to identify a consistent AI scientific project. AI is obviously distinct 
from forms of mechanisation or computation but might include many 
different techniques and approaches. Following AI theory more gener-
ally, Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, p.10) distinguish between (narrow) AI, 
AGI, and Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI). Narrow AI would be able 
to undertake well-defined, bounded tasks and demonstrate intelligence 
in a constrained domain, AGI would be able to undertake a broad range 
of generalisable tasks across broad domains, and ASI would surpass 
human intelligence across many areas. There have been a number of 
fictional representations of ASI such as HAL 9000 (2001), Skynet (The 
Terminator), The Matrix, and San Junipero (Black Mirror). The ASI 
existential threat has been a persistent one in fiction whether it is from a 
psychotic ASI in space, one purposively starting a nuclear war, or an AI 
creating a simulated universe for human pain or pleasure. These threats 
seem far from our current experience of an automated utopia. We don’t 
look like cyborgs, even though our hands are glued to tiny cellphone 
screens at work or home. We are not going into cyberspace, even though 
we will spend most of our day on the internet. At home we do talk to an 
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AI to find out the weather tomorrow, but nothing substantively changes. 
Things are always moving and shifting as technology constantly changes, 
but the repetition of work and consumption continues.
The impact of AI on our lives, and what AI ‘is’ are, of course, subjects 
of AI ethics (Coeckelbergh, 2020). Although AI ethics concerns itself 
with social impacts, redistribution, transhumanism and post-human-
ism, environmentalism, racism, gender, and discrimination, it often does 
so within frameworks where there is no alternative to capitalism. AI can 
only be understood as capitalist AI. In the workplace, particularly in the 
factory, AI is just another form of technology which eliminates workers 
and skills whilst not necessarily creating new jobs or alternative forms of 
vocation. It is often acting to privatise existing skills into expert systems. 
As we live in a capitalist society, it is impossible to even think about AI 
outside of capitalism. We conceive of the ultimate AI (ASI) as a cunning, 
learning superintelligence. As with human labour before it, the first task 
of capitalism appears to be primitive accumulation to attempt to contain 
AI and turn it into a commodity which can be sold. Our views of AI 
are shaped by this capitalist schema. This schema is not some idealist 
thought about AI that can be debated through counterargument but a 
real, material, circumstance of our lives. Again, there is little that is new 
about this. As labourers, we have always had to adopt prosthetics at 
work. We wear glasses and hearing aids. Our ability to work is gauged 
in terms of whether a prosthetic might help us to do so. At work we wear 
uniforms, suits, welding masks, exoskeletons, and carry phones. Our 
brains have developed neurochemical pathways that are triggered by the 
thought of money. We have a symbiotic relationship with knowledge and 
the cyber-physical. We are not becoming ‘cyborgian’, capitalism brought 
us into that tightening relationship with machinery since day one.
There have been recent attempts to consider AI within Marxist 
theories. Significantly, Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, p.15) refer to the cen-
trality of AI as machinery in Marx’s work, in terms of a supplement 
to human labour and as fixed capital as compared to the variable cap-
ital of labour. Whilst it is human labour that creates value, machines 
are ultimately only a ‘…supplement or force-amplifier’ (p.16) transfer-
ring their own value to the product. Their ‘social function’ is to reduce 
Socially Necessary Labour Time (SNLT) to produce ‘…relative surplus 
value’ (p.16) but this leads to greater competition between capitals and 
an increase in the ‘organic composition’ of capital (p.17). Machinery 
confronts and absorbs the worker, bending the task to its requirements 
and drawing in labour. Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, p.17) interpret the 
impact of machinery on crisis as being both through the imbalance 
between machine driven production, falling wages, and the falling rate 
of profit (p.17). Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, p.19) also considers that 
capital will mobilise the ‘general intellect’ relegating human labour to 
the supervisory process but also ‘undermining value’ and ‘abolishing 
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work’, thereby foreshadowing capitalist collapse. This is part of for-
mal and real subsumption under capitalism in terms of the changing of 
labour’s social form (under formal subsumption) to where the ‘…content 
of labour changes’ (p.20), moving from the extension of the working 
day and an increase in absolute surplus value to the production of rel-
ative surplus value. The dawning of AI-Capital brings about a further 
stage of ‘hyper-subsumption’ (p.21) where ‘capital’s autonomizing force 
manifests as AI’ (p.21). This is not a process that continues indefinitely. 
Increases in relative surplus value over time results in a lowering of the 
total surplus value (and hence profit), unless there is constantly expand-
ing accumulation. AI represents a way out for capitalism as it will try 
‘…with all force to maintain the value of value’ (Kurz, 2014, p.54). 
However, to consider that machines can produce value is part of what 
Kurz (2014, p.41) calls an ‘immortalization of value’ a ‘failure to escape 
the value fetish’. AI is best seen, then, as the continuation of capitalism 
in decline rather than prefigurative of a new and expansive mode, and 
this perspective sets the tone for this book.
AI and Bias
As it is concerned with capitalism, this book takes an unusual angle in 
not being overly concerned with tracking the impact of specific aspects of 
AI on equity or social justice. Obviously, within capitalism, AI inevitably 
reproduces and produces massive inequalities, but it does not particu-
larly matter to the argument presented here whether AI can, or should, 
be reformed to produce equitable outcomes, if AI is fair, or whether it is 
even accurate. By its nature capitalist work (whether it uses AI or not) 
results in inequalities between capitalists and labourers (and between 
groups of workers) and exploits and immiserates labour. This book is 
not primarily based on the moral case for addressing such inequalities as 
notions of injustice are primary to capitalism and obscured by principles 
such as ‘fair exchange’ (of course this does not prevent the use of moral 
language to describe the brutality, horror, and misery of capitalism). This 
is distinct from the approach taken in much of the critical work on AI, 
which considers the impacts of ML algorithms on social justice. In this 
work, social justice is taken to be a judgement on the equitable function-
ing of already existing capitalist processes such as the criminal justice 
system, autonomous technologies (such as driverless cars or autonomous 
weapons), or the allocation of benefit payments. AI is considered to rein-
force existing biases, or to create new biases, but the capitalist system is 
not called into question. For example, Benjamin (2019a) shows how AI 
exacerbates existing racial biases in society in the criminal justice sys-
tem, health, and education. Although this literature on bias is useful in 
mounting a critique of AI in Higher Education, the response that it elicits 
is largely affirmative in that it recommends better or different systems of 
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AI, or the abolition of AI, inside an existing order (capitalism). The ques-
tion then becomes how AI can act as a tool in social-democratic societies 
rather than addressing how AI supports the maintenance of systems 
(particularly capitalism). It also leads to critiques that sometimes involve 
simply listing the ‘bad things’ about AI in a particular area. For example, 
the argument concerning the decolonisation of Higher Education (HE) is 
an active debate at present on both sides of the Atlantic. Within this dis-
course, there is much current work considering the ways in which AI is 
in some sense racist, white, or colonialist in nature supported by work on 
‘race’ and educational technology (Benjamin, 2019a, 2019b). Although 
there is a political and moral imperative to consider the social justice 
impacts of HE, sometimes arguments based on the socially just aspects 
of technology are prone to commodity fetishism because this work is 
based on the material features of the commodity form. This could be 
in terms of the appearance of AI (in terms of, perhaps, whiteness or its 
gendered nature), the nature of the algorithm, and the principles of AI 
in terms of logic which are thought somehow to be connected with rac-
ism or particular Eurocentric perspectives. Even in its own terms, this 
literature is sometimes based on Anglo-European and American percep-
tions and depictions of AI rather than considering Asian, Afrocentric, 
or Afrofuturist perspectives on AI (Benjamin’s 2019b collection is an 
exception to this as it does consider non-Eurocentric contributions to 
the bias literature). In contrast, it is possible to take a Marxist view on 
humanism, in terms of the human species and species being, which is 
not necessarily based on essentialist conceptions of human nature, 
instead being grounded in a theorisation of human labour in capitalism. 
Through primitive accumulation, a labouring subject (collectively, the 
working class) is brutally separated from the property needed to pro-
duce commodities, from nature and from the means to sustain life. Only 
through capitalist labour (selling labour power as abstract labour) can 
the worker survive, and this is only through an inhuman system of really 
existing abstractions that validate abstract labour through commodity 
exchange (Pitts, 2018). This is not to deny the important work that is 
being done on race, gender, sexuality, and disability and AI in HE but to 
signal from the start the approach taken in this book is not particularly 
concerned with the accuracy (bias) or the equity of AI.
Structure of the Book
In this book I take a broad perspective on the different manifestations of 
AI in the capitalist university. To take a comprehensive view of approaches 
to AI, I consider AI in terms of hardware and software, ML, narrow AI, 
AGI, ASI, and optimisation. I examine the impact of AI on the con-
trol and regulation of academic work, its impact on digital learning, 
holography and remote teaching, the creation of digital commodities, its 
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status as an academic field, ethical considerations, digital platforms, and 
existential threats to the university. The influence of AI on the capitalist 
university is not just in terms of its impact on replacing and subsuming 
academic labour but also in terms of commodity production, circula-
tion, exchange, and the ‘abstract domination’ of capital. This includes 
the ways in which the social universe of capital acts back on each indi-
vidual capitalist university through artefacts such as fatigue functions 
for workers and academic league tables that are the concrete forms of a 
‘real abstraction’ that imposes increasingly pressurised work conditions 
on academic labourers. AI within the capitalist university is part of the 
totality of capital and capitalism. Despite this, what seem to be totalising 
capital relations are paradoxical, incomplete, and contested and in every 
moment that production and exploitation advance capitalism, it finds 
itself challenged, and it weakens, exposing alternatives that are prefigu-
rative within itself. The critique presented here is, therefore, a negative 
critique, one that does not seek to reform the capitalist university, or 
reimpose a new model of political economy, but considers prefigurative 
possibilities beyond capitalism, including whether there are possibilities 
for AI in communism, beyond class and the ‘law of value’.
The empirical work on which the book is based emerged not from uni-
versities, but from research on the future of ‘digital manufacturing’ which 
involved examining the trajectories of AI, robotics, and advanced pro-
duction through a variety of case studies. In this work, which involved 
‘manufacturing as a service’ and digitisation the ways in which service 
industries were increasingly adopting the methods of ‘digital manufac-
turing’ became apparent. Digitisation, AI and ML, and optimisation 
are modular technologies that can be inserted into any business opera-
tion, and where differentiation between industry sectors is becoming less 
marked. Similar systems to those used by Uber, Amazon, and Netflix 
are also employed in manufacturing and universities, and models can be 
transferred between firms and industries. The university is increasingly 
concerned with commodity production in which digitisation and AI shape 
the form of the commodity produced and influence all aspects of activity 
(production, academic work, and time). Whatever was special about the 
university when compared to any industry or commercial sector is becom-
ing a trace memory, erased by capitalisation, and dissolved by digitisation.
In Chapter 2, I argue that all global universities are capitalist univer-
sities. Whether the economic system is classified as a market, state, or 
hybrid form, the social relations and social forms in which universities 
exist are capitalist ones. Even those universities (which are often not 
formally recognised in national institutional systems) that are explic-
itly anti-capitalist are subject to the ‘vortex’ of the law of value (Neary 
and Winn, 2017). The capitalist nature and status of universities means 
that their attempts to visualise a more humanising, or even a more tech-
nical, vision of education, are consistently subject to the reduction of 
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all entities and expressions to economic valuation and profit. Marx’s 
work on value, its expression as ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’, and 
the social forms of its existence (particularly in the commodity and in 
its objective form as money), provides the foundation for a consider-
ation of the New Reading of Marx (Pitts, 2018) and value critique in 
the analysis of AI and HE. The New Reading of Marx (NRM) takes a 
historical perspective on work, labour (particularly abstract labour), and 
regards capitalism as (necessarily) a class system that imposes a mode 
of ‘abstract domination’, creating capitalist society that is purely con-
cerned with commodity production and the accumulation of money (the 
objective form of value). Labour, as a specific historical form (our labour 
power, abstract labour, being a form that only exists in capitalism), is 
only socially validated (valued in capitalist society) if it is producing value 
in a purely quantitative determination (which is realised by the capital-
ist as profit or surplus). Although it may appear that this abstraction is 
brought into being when the product of labour is validated in exchange 
(when a commodity is sold for money), it is also posited in the advance-
ment of capital in production, waged labour, and the production of value 
only under strict conditions (at, or below, the SNLT, for a commodity 
that is sold in the market at the average level of skill). This is not only 
the manifestation of a class relation (between capital and labour, involv-
ing class struggle and class war) but is also a form of social domination 
unique to capitalism. Abstract labour, as part of capital, is tragically 
the basis on which capital itself is accumulated. Through investment in 
technology and organisational processes (both of which include AI), this 
process destroys workers’ jobs, increases the intensity and subsumption 
of work (control and domination by capital), and (as the level of technol-
ogy, capital, and organisation increases) makes it increasingly difficult 
to produce value itself. This is a key perspective of ‘value critique’ (Kurz, 
2012, 2014) which considers the existence of value in all capitalist forms, 
including the ‘state form’. We can’t see the ‘social forms’ of capitalism 
but project these onto real objects, including AI. AI in the capitalist uni-
versity is the material form then, of what is really a ‘social form’ in 
capitalism. Its growth and expansion across all domains of academic life 
is the material appearance of a process of value production and accumu-
lation. These perspectives – NRM, value critique, negative critique, and 
class war and struggle – frame the arguments of the whole book. AI can 
be seen not only in terms of increasing productivity in the university, dis-
placing and subsuming labour, but also within the valorisation process 
(the ‘social validation’ of a commodity), extending the ‘mind’ of the cap-
italist as AI, validating the idea that commodities should be produced 
in a bounded time, and presenting itself as an object for future primitive 
accumulation after human destruction. This theoretical chapter sets the 
scene for subsequent chapters which examine aspects of AI in the capi-
talist university in terms of its relationship to abstract labour and labour 
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power (Chapter 3), the commodity (Chapter 4), disaster capitalism and 
capitalist time (Chapter 5), the end of capitalism, existential threat and 
ethics in the capitalist university (Chapter 6), and prefigurative alterna-
tives, pedagogy, and communism (Chapter 7). These aspects should not 
be seen to be separate elements of AI and capitalism but part of a uni-
fied ‘social domination’ by capital of humanity and nature in HE. They 
should also not be seen to be teleological. Each of these relationships is 
resisted, contested, contingent, and fragile at every point.
The emphasis on value in this book is because Marx’s formulation 
of value, his rejection of it as an objective economic category, and later 
elaborations of value through value critique are so ontologically distinc-
tive from all other social theories of capitalism as to allow for (along 
with Marx’s associated critiques of class, wage labour, exploitation, 
subsumption, and immiseration) the pursuit of a negative critique of cap-
italism, and hence the capitalist university, as distinctive from all other 
preceding social formations. In terms of AI, it enables us to demystify 
AI and the existential threat of AI as part of the continuity and meta-
physical reality of capitalism rather than a break or an exception. It is 
not that ‘if we don’t’ do something capitalism will result in the end of 
humanity (through AI), that is capitalism. This is not a teleology that 
ascends to particular social realities or empirical predictions. Skills and 
jobs might go (and others will be created), but we cannot (even for a 
moment) suggest which ones. Human labour power as the substance of 
value (and hence capitalism) may come to an end (desubstantialise itself), 
but we cannot predict when or how. Indeed, the agony may continue 
indefinitely and infinitely through mechanisms such as AI that allow 
production of commodities in virtual realms.
Chapter 3 examines the meaning of ‘academic labour’ and how this 
is being affected by AI in the capitalist university. Any discussion of 
labour must include acknowledgement of its specific form in capitalism, 
as abstract (and concrete) labour, as well as its location in commodity 
production in capitalism. With reference to the commodity, HE pro-
duces commodities under the same material conditions as any other 
capital, whether state or privately owned. It is this final commodity 
(exchanged for money) that represents the ultimate destination of com-
modity production in the university rather than ‘commodity stock’ (such 
as individual lectures or academic papers). An understanding of aca-
demic labour is underpinned by class struggle, and I use autonomist 
perspectives on labour power to make clear the necessity of a class per-
spective. Processes of quantification and optimisation, accelerated by AI, 
make academic labour commensurable and measurable. League tables 
and other means of global comparison, alienate academics from their 
peers and normalise a global social standard for commodity produc-
tion. AI tools allow capitalist universities to discover how to maximise 
their relative position, and these technologies have enabled processes of 
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commodification, capitalisation, and marketisation. Automation is an 
inherent component of capitalist production (Sohn-Rethel, 1978) but 
despite this, even AI cannot ultimately prevent the stagnation of value 
and profit as technology and standards of productivity become univer-
sal. Capitalist universities constantly need to accelerate technologies and 
productivity, and further exhaust ‘human resources’ just to stand still in 
global league tables. This is the ‘treadmill effect’ of capitalism and the 
perceived speeding up of life and activity in capitalist time described by 
Postone (2003). AI is similar to other forms of tool, machine, technol-
ogy, or organisational structure in capitalism. It is unexceptional as a 
machine that has the net effect of returning capitalism back to where it 
started in terms of the production of value, but at a higher level of pro-
duction intensity under ever stricter boundaries of a globally set SNLT. 
Like other machines, AI is parasitical of labour and labour time, turning 
living into dead labour (including more machines and AI) and is part 
of a greater process through the capitalist control and monitoring of 
work. AI also has some distinctive features in the capitalist university, 
including the seeming extension of the capitalist ‘mind’ into the work 
environment, and its function as a ‘social synthesis’ in bringing together 
(alongside league tables and performance indicators) measures of global 
academic productivity. AI is part of the formal (the establishment of cap-
italist social relations in universities) and real subsumption (the melding 
of academic labour into value production and its confrontation by its 
own products in terms of commodities and science) of academic labour. 
AI also opens up universities to marketisation and financialisation 
(hybrid subsumption), and to imagine future possibilities for capitali-
sation (ideal subsumption) (Szadkowski, 2016). Dyer-Whiteford et al 
(2019) contend that AI is part of a process of ‘hyper-subsumption’ where 
AI becomes part of the ‘means of cognition’, but I argue this process 
best depicts a new round of ‘primitive accumulation’ whereby AI might 
become a new labouring subject. In these processes of subsumption, cap-
italist universities are increasingly borrowing techniques from the use of 
AI in other industries, particularly digital manufacturing, where ‘plat-
form manufacturing’ and AI techniques that ‘scrape skills’ from workers 
are used. In the capitalist university, academic labour increasingly serves 
mechanic processes, optimised by AI, on various data ‘platforms’ which 
make various forms of academic labour commensurable, shaping and 
socially validating the commodity which is exchanged for its objective 
form (money) as universities become ‘data universities’ (UCU, 2020). 
In relation to collective labour, the chapter also considers Marx’s ‘tran-
shumanism’ in terms of how money, as the objectified form of value 
in capitalism, comes to stand for all human essences and capabilities, 
and how capital gains possession of science and the collective powers of 
labour with particular attention to the role of AI and technology in this 
process (Hall, 2018). I further discuss conceptions of the ‘social brain’ 
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and the ‘general intellect’ arguing that ideas of ‘immaterial labour’, 
and the formation of a ‘general intellect’ within capitalism (rather than 
opposed to it) are utopian and idealistic. AI is an instrument of class war 
from above, in terms of an attempt to privatise the general and social in 
production, including academic labour. This is not just a technological, 
but also a pedagogical, adaptation of capital, whereby workers learn to 
labour in ways that are ‘machine readable’ to AI. Despite these pessimis-
tic tendencies, I conclude by stating that capitalism is never totalising 
and in every moment of production, and in the recognition of the social 
powers of labour, academic labour invariably and repeatedly fails to act 
in step with capital.
Chapter 4 considers commodities in Higher Education, and how 
they are driven by AI and datafication, in terms of what I refer to as 
‘Pixarfication’. Commodities in HE are part of the general class of com-
modities in capitalism and, in a particular manifestation of commodity 
fetishism (enabled by AI), I analyse how commodities are increasingly 
recognised as having personalities and sentience. I describe this as a 
process of Pixarfication involving both production and consumption, 
following paradigms of McDonaldisation and Disneyization. Pixar is 
a company that produces animations in which consumer products (such 
as toys, cars, and planes) are ascribed a form of sentience and animism. 
Using the idea of ‘real abstraction’ I argue that Pixar’s films, in particu-
lar the Toy Story franchise, present a literal depiction of the commodity 
in capitalism. Some commodities in capitalism are becoming ‘enliv-
ened’ by AI, particularly digital assistants such as Alexa and mobile 
telephones, but Pixarfication can also be applied to services including 
those supplied by universities particularly as these are shaped into tangi-
ble commodities through processes of datafication. In political economy 
(both classical and heterodox) there is often confusion and misattribu-
tion concerning the nature of the HE commodity. Lectures, students, 
and degrees are referred to as ‘commodified’ when in reality these are 
examples of what might be called ‘commodity stock’. The nature of a 
commodity, and its relation to abstract labour, has to be brutally shaped 
by capital (primitive accumulation) and in the final stage of exchange 
is traded for money. The Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the 
United Kingdom, through which research outputs and other research 
products are commodified, is used as an example of the process through 
which the boundaries of commodity stock are formed. In this process 
academic labour is made commensurable and becomes labour in general 
(with both abstract and concrete elements). Even the individual products 
of research are not commodities (they are commodity stock) which are 
shaped into a collective commodity (the University REF submission, a 
stream of data representing the products of labour) that is exchanged for 
money from the UK Government. In this process, Pixarfication involves 
creating a persona for the commodity through animation (boundary 
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formation around the commodity), characterisation (the fetishisation 
of the commodity and the creation of its ‘personality’), and production 
(the use of the ‘Pixified’ commodity to drive labour processes). AI and 
datafication are tools through which the capitalist university enables 
these processes and literally make the commodity real, and a seeming 
driver of what (in actuality) is the drive for value production and profit. 
Pixarfication appears to be ‘sentient, super-sensuous, autopoietic com-
modity production’, not an ideological construction, but the reality of 
production in the capitalist university, to produce commodities (material-
ised but social in form) that appear to be sentient (through Pixarfication 
and enabled by AI) that are seemingly autopoietic (masking the reality 
of capitalist production). This commodity is a ‘thing’ of labour. As such 
it is a further perversion of labour, in that the labour power of academic 
workers is ultimately used to make commodities that (seemingly) have 
cognition of their own production, and which command more labour of 
increased intensity to be used in the production process. It is also a point 
of fragility as value becomes less substantial as production accelerates.
Chapter 5 theorises how time is constructed in capitalism with relation 
to a recent crisis (the 2020 wave of the COVID-19 pandemic), and how 
this has led to the use of technological means for distance teaching and 
learning, mediated and accelerated by AI. Postone’s (2003) conceptions 
of concrete, abstract, and historical time are used to examine different 
time orders. The specificity of abstract (empty) time in capitalism shapes 
concrete time (time mediated by external events, such as sunrise) and 
empties historical time (the time of historical events). The COVID-19 
pandemic, mediated using AI and digital platforms, increased the den-
sity of events and labour in abstract time, shaping the experience of time 
by academics and continuing the mundanity of capitalist history (rather 
than representing any kind of break). Ontologically, dead labour, includ-
ing the portion of the labourer’s life already spent (including academic 
workers) and the labour of generations of workers before them (includ-
ing previous academic workers) act, when transformed into capital, as 
a form of social domination. Given AI and digital tools the recording 
of lectures can extend the ‘life’ of the academic labourer (as the com-
modified, recorded, product of their labour) indefinitely and in new, AI 
mediated, combinations to produce new forms of subsumption. Through 
a discussion of disaster capitalism, the idea of ontological breaks and the 
‘new normal’ is critiqued as capitalism continues (in its own sense of 
historical time, there is no alternative), even as each moment becomes 
increasingly anguished as the time-density of work increases.
Chapter 6 examines key writers on AI and existential threat as the 
basis for a commentary on the ethics of AI research in the capitalist 
university focussing on two ‘Nicks’ (Bostrom and Land). The first (Nick 
Bostrom) is known for his work on the existential threat of AI, the dif-
ficulties of containing such threats, and the need to work on ingenious 
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solutions in the present to prevent an ‘intelligence explosion’. Bostrom 
situates his philosophy in conventional domains of utilitarianism 
whereas Nick Land, a ‘neo-reactionary’ philosopher, adopts an accelera-
tionist approach where an AI takeover is an existential treat, rather than 
a threat. Although both philosophers are bold, edgy, and (it is argued in 
the case of Land) dangerous thinkers, I discuss the conventional nature 
of the categories they use in terms of political economy. For Bostrom, AI 
is treated almost as a metaphorical (and mystified) chaotic form of cap-
ital with inevitable profusion and accumulation which must (although 
he does not use this term) be primitively accumulated to become wage 
labour. For Land, AI is a monad, as self-reproducing capital, which is an 
impossibility given the relational and antagonistic nature of capitalism. 
Land takes a classical political economy understanding of capital as a 
‘fixed asset’ and as a ‘source of value’. In relation to the ethics of AI in 
the capitalist university, I argue that there is, similarly, little comprehen-
sion of the specifically capitalist nature of AI, and its development. The 
ultimate ethic is the enabling of the ‘law of value’, but the existential 
threat of capitalism is the most horrific of all.
In the concluding chapter (Chapter 7), I look at planned and prefigu-
rative alternatives to capitalism, and the role of ‘revolutionary pedagogy’ 
and co-operative universities, for a future communist society with 
particular attention to the significance (or not) of AI. One current pop-
ulist and programmatic strategy, Fully Automated Luxury Communism 
(FALC) (Bastani, 2019) ascribes a major role to AI in producing a world 
where, due to advanced technology, work is no longer necessary (and 
the working class will ‘live’ in luxury). Although there are tendencies 
in Marx that suggest that technology and the ‘general intellect’ are nec-
essary features in the transition to communism, I argue that FALC is 
utopian and misguided. FALC does not address questions of sufficient 
levels of technology, the necessity of abolition of capitalist categories 
(including money), and neglects the centrality of value and accumula-
tion (rather than materiality) being the principle of wealth in capitalism. 
The FALCu (FALC university) is equally unlikely to enable anti-capitalist 
outcomes. I also address the idea that post-humanist, pedagogical, vari-
ants of Marxism that (perhaps in a post-human university) might provide 
some kind of hybrid forms (that could involve AI) that could allow us 
to transcend or abolish capitalism. As with FALC, humanity has been 
‘post-human’ since the origins of capitalism, and there is a distinction 
between form and social form that is not addressed. Rather than these 
affirmative alternatives, I argue that a negative critique of capitalism 
is necessary. This is not just a pedagogical project (and there are good 
reasons for suggesting that critical pedagogy is far from revolutionary), 
but a project of building alternatives and experiments that are against 
capitalism and prefigurative of communism. In these projects, the posi-
tion of AI is at best ambiguous (and the Humanist-Marxist tradition 
Introduction 13
of Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy would suggest that there are good 
reasons for suspecting that unmediated praxis, face-to-face, is neces-
sary), but they must involve a concretisation of forms that both reject 
capitalism (negative critique) and are based on communist social prin-
ciples (such as co-operative universities). In the capitalist university our 
(abstract) labour is ironically the phony source of ‘artificial intelligence’ 
(abstract domination) and we are, ironically, the existential threat to cap-
italism (it is certainly the existential threat to us). As capitalism cracks 
and decays, these alternatives are most likely found in rejection of the 
capitalist university and embracing concrete possibilities in the present.
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Introduction: The Capitalist University
The depiction of the university in this book is the capitalist university. The 
capitalist university is entirely different from pre-capitalist forms of uni-
versity. The defining feature of the capitalist university is that it produces 
commodities that are sold (valorised) for money in a capitalist society. 
As an organisational form, these commodities are frequently educational 
whether they are direct payments by students (funded by loans or private 
income), state payments for services provided (for education or research, 
for example), or the purchase of intellectual property by a private com-
pany. When universities are private, public-private, or charitable the 
production of commodities and the exchange of commodities for money 
is reasonably transparent. Even when the university is completely owned 
and run by governments, the activities of these universities take place in 
a capitalist mode of production. In this broad sense, then, all universities 
are capitalist in that they conduct their activities where social forms and 
social relations are capitalist ones. The distinction between universities 
which are private and have an ideological affinity with profit and the 
capitalist class and those universities which are charities, or public sec-
tor organisations, and have an ideological affinity with social justice, 
is not a distinctive feature of being a capitalist university. The social 
forms of capital, labour, and forms of value, even in the state form, are 
identical. It is only in those universities that are defiantly anti-capitalist 
that the possibility of breaking with the capital relation and the value 
form exists. At the same time, within capitalism at every moment, in 
every action and in every crack and fissure there is the possibility not 
only of resistance but also of a world other than capitalism. Although 
any space, time, or body is open to primitive accumulation or commod-
ification by capitalism, and the capitalist university, as the universe of 
capitalism expands it becomes inevitably weaker and more vulnerable. 
Hence the capitalist university is part of capitalism but is not eternal. 
Within every moment of our individual and collective academic labour, 
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capital there is the possibility of negation. Labour, including academic 
labour, in the capitalist university is precarious, but universities them-
selves are increasingly precarious as the production and valorisation of 
educational commodities becomes ever more uncertain. The capitalist 
university is contingent and uncertain, in constant crisis (as capitalism is 
crisis, as will be explained) and where resistances are inevitable.
It is telling that notions of escape from capitalism, or from the nation 
state, are never included, in the purposes of the capitalist university. 
Occasionally a commitment to anti-capitalism, or even a form of com-
munism, may be included in those universities that are co-operatives or 
‘free universities’ but these are exceptions. University mission statements 
often include things such as humanistic values, the importance of edu-
cation for its own sake, service learning, and even educating students to 
change society. Despite some universities claiming radical origins, and 
the socialist leanings of many academics, universities produce commodi-
ties, invest and borrow, enhance labour power to perpetuate and expand 
commodity production, progress science, technology, and organisational 
forms to increase productivity and provide the ideological basis for the 
capitalist class (including the exercise of bourgeoise critiques of society, 
environment, and economy). These productive activities are not ideolog-
ically determined but are real and material if universities want to survive 
in the market or to receive state subsidy. The status of academics is seen 
to be part of the delivery of a public good, or having a wider social pur-
pose but in reality, academics (and other university workers) are selling 
their labour power to produce commodities (Hall, 2018, p.136) in what 
is topologically a factory. Any radical notion in the capitalist university 
can be recuperated in terms of instrumental goals such as increasing 
student numbers or maximising research income. In this respect, capi-
talist universities have shown themselves to be masters of recuperation. 
They are hubs of social innovation in terms of absorbing and transmit-
ting radical ideas of decolonisation, feminism, queer theory socialism, 
and post-humanism and turning them into educational commodities, 
research outputs, or reputational assets. It is no paradox that capital-
ist universities are the predominant cultural institutions responsible for 
anti-capitalist thought if those ideas can be materialised and commodi-
fied. Of course, the history of universities (and the future of some) shows 
that they can also be comfortable with eugenics and fascist ideas, again 
if they can be packaged and sold. Should the potential for the valorisa-
tion of these commodities change, or if certain ideas become a threat 
to (real or imagined) university profitability, then they can be divested.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a technology, an organisational form, and 
an ideology that has impacted the mission of many universities. For exam-
ple, many universities have invested in the growth of certain disciplines 
in terms of STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) 
and associated fields such as data science. They have adapted degrees, 
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learning outcomes, student skills, research, and knowledge exchange to 
the needs of an AI economy. This is not motivated by any real belief in a 
technological system, rather AI is providing a signal (often incentivised 
by the state) as to the type of educational commodity that universities 
should produce. At the same time, they have adopted AI and data sci-
ence as methods of controlling and monitoring academic workers (see 
Chapter 3), and their outputs as well as giving form to the educational 
commodities that they produce (see Chapter 4). This is not without risk 
for universities as AI, alongside other technologies such as remote learn-
ing and platform capitalist organisational forms, has the potential to 
challenge the very nature of a university education. It can disrupt its 
physical and current organisational forms, and as a result there have been 
some efforts to reclaim humanist and educational values. Aoun (2018) 
imagines a new disciplinary area, humanics, to counter the existential 
threat from AI to jobs, human skills, and education itself. Humanics will 
allegedly enable students to expand their distinctly creative and cogni-
tive abilities to work alongside AI and retain the purpose of universities 
as the prime developers of humanic capabilities. Humanics sounds like 
a discipline that could be pulled from the Science Fiction novels of Isaac 
Asimov. The reality is more earthy. It is simply about teaching students to 
embrace the new literacies that they will need to survive in the digital age 
(called data literacy, technological literacy, and human literacy), along-
side changing mindsets and ways of thinking about the world. These are, 
in an analogy with AI, referred to as cognitive capacities (Aoun, 2018, 
p.xix). The implications of humanics are that a customised, personalised 
model of education is necessary with the use of virtual environments 
and multi-university networks (Aoun, 2018, p.135). Rather than seeing 
humanics as a retreat into the notion of the human, it is really a further 
development of labour power and the creation of new micro-education 
commodities to be sold through platform capitalist networks. The moral 
purpose of humanics, as a humanist discipline, is paradoxically anti- 
humanist in providing more resource to an alien force (capital).
There is no certain direction of travel in terms of AI. Universities 
might move towards or against AI in their missions and incorporate 
new notions of the ‘human’ in doing so. This might increase their profits 
(or surpluses) or add to their losses. They might never know what the 
impact of their investment decisions is on their bottom line as the crea-
tion of new AI mediated processes and commodities is uncertain.
The theme of this chapter is that in the capitalist university we need 
to focus less on the distinctiveness of missions and the deployment of 
corporate verbal abstractions (including ‘Artificial Intelligence’) as of 
consequence. The unhealthy obsessions both with AI and in saving the 
humanistic purposes of the university are ultimately meaningless unless 
they are considered within a negative critique of capitalism itself, its social 
domination, and what is referred to as its ‘social forms’. This is often 
Capitalist Universities, AI, and Value 17
absent in what is deemed to be critical analysis of Higher Education (HE). 
Of course, comparative HE and studies of HE markets and marketisation 
produce consequential knowledge, particularly in terms of how capitalism 
might manifest itself through discrete entities and ideologies, but high-
lighting the differences in state or market forms ignores capitalism as a 
form of social domination. As an analogy, if universities were ships being 
sucked into a monstrous giant whirlpool, we can explore the features of 
each ship, group of ships, or the distance to travel from a ship to the cen-
tre (perhaps calling it ‘marketisation’), and that might be useful but to 
truly understand, and resist, what is happening we need to understand the 
whirlpool (what Neary and Winn, 2017, refer to as the ‘vortex’) of capi-
talism. Universities are swirling eddies in this vortex which is fuelled by 
labour power (Rikowski, 2000) and ‘really existing’ abstractions formed 
from abstract labour but appearing as commodities and fixed capital 
that act back on, and subsume, us. To some this may appear as economic 
reductionism, in that there is no room for nuance or agency. In contrast, 
this approach is economic rejectionism in terms of rejecting the conven-
tional categories of political economy (and against the imposition of a 
new political economy based on a state or authoritarian re-establishing of 
value). It reinserts agency, both individual and collective, as although cap-
italism is crisis in every moment of production, it is uncertain and fragile. 
In opposition to this position, some theorists reject the very idea that HE 
is capitalist. For Marginson (2013) the idea of capitalist markets in HE is 
impossible, but it should be noted that markets are neither necessary nor 
sufficient criteria for capitalism. Markets pre-existed capitalism and many 
capitalist processes involve the transfer of commodities between universi-
ties and the state without a market. The capitalist nature of HE includes 
the commodification of outcomes which are exchanged for money, state 
support for value production to increase national competitiveness and 
labour power enhancement, and the scope for financialisation and datafi-
cation to open up the public and positional goods of HE for profit through 
reification into private assets. Critique of these processes is insufficient. 
Marx provides a ‘negative critique’ of capital and capitalism, that is, cap-
italism has no alternative other than itself in terms of its acceleration and 
destruction of all entities as part of value production or, alternatively, its 
destruction into either communism, or morphing into something worse 
than capitalism. This is not just a matter of morality as to survive daily we 
(if we are working class) must labour for a wage to survive.
The theoretical framing of this chapter, and the book, is that the rela-
tionship between AI and the capitalist university can only be understood 
through a Marxist negation being the Marxist conception of value, 
which unlike other forms of political economy definitively means a cri-
tique of value (value critique). This means pursuing a negative critique, a 
rejection of capitalism, the value form, other social forms (including the 
state), and acknowledging the specificity of labour in capitalism (labour 
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power). This involves emphasising the importance of capitalist forms 
of labour, particularly abstract labour, in an understanding of technol-
ogy (including AI) and our relationship to it as humans. To understand 
AI, we need to move and abstract away from it, and enter the domain 
of abstract labour and other phantoms (particularly the commodity, 
machinery, and capital) that act as vampires on living labour. This is 
not to place value above other concepts in Marxist theory. As will be 
explained in Chapter 3, value is meaningless without a conception of 
class struggle and, in terms of HE, the relation between class struggle 
and academic labour where AI now plays its part in the enhancement 
and disciplining of academic labour towards commodity production. It 
is also meaningless as a concept outside of capitalism as are the com-
modity, labour, and capital.
Rethinking Value
A critique of value and capitalism enables us to move beyond a simplistic 
material understanding of AI and its role in the university. AI is, at one 
level, a technological amalgam made by human labour that has all sorts 
of influences on work processes and in ethical determinations of the 
human, but it is so much less than that. AI is simply just another social 
form in which value finds its expression, a form of capital and a simple 
machine. For the capitalist university, it is just as beneficial if it were an 
empty box that enabled all sorts of organisational processes and data 
analytics to justify increased productivity or worker redundancies. To 
borrow a metaphor, it is ‘…a velvet glove cast in iron’ (Clowes, 1993), the 
supposedly hard science of data analytics masking the capitalist univer-
sity’s appeal to the invisible hand of the market to justify redundancies 
and efficiencies. Of course, there are all sorts of complexities within this 
relationship between AI and capitalism, not least in terms of relation-
ships between AI and concrete and abstract labour, the commodity, and 
the continuity of capitalism. Value critique can unlock the science fiction 
stylings, hardware, software, organisational forms, and ideology of AI 
exposing it as a mere form of capital. This involves returning to what 
is sometimes caricatured as a primeval conception of what is Marxist 
anti-political economy in terms of the critique of value.
What value is (and isn’t) and how it moves, changes, and finds exist-
ence and appearance in terms of social forms has become perhaps the 
most important concept in contemporary Marxist theory. Despite this, 
it remains the most contentious. Marx’s primary and almost complete 
text on capitalism, the three volumes of Capital (Marx, 1990, 1991, 
1992) begins with the concept of value, and its manifestation in forms 
such as exchange value and use value but the texts consistently return 
to issues of value. Throughout Capital value appears in many guises, 
as the seemingly self-valorising ‘automatic subject’, as surplus value, as 
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relative surplus value, as somehow manifested in the commodity and in 
its objective form of appearance (money). What is most important is that 
Marx does not seek to replace the conventional categories of political 
economy with value but rather critiques political economy, including the 
idea of value itself, as the social substance that (in motion) is capital, and 
whose motions and appearances are reifications of capitalism. Despite 
this conceptual power, readings of Marx with value as the primary 
(what is sometimes called the esoteric Marx) as opposed to a Marxism 
premised on class struggle (the classic reading of Marx, although the 
two readings are not as distinct as their advocates might think) are still 
uncommon. It is only with the New Reading of Marx (NRM) (Heinrich, 
2012; Pitts, 2018), the work of Postone (2003) and the associated (but 
not synonymous) work of the Krisis collective (particularly Kurz, 2012, 
2014), that the critique of value has again attained a central place within 
Marxism and critical theory. Some may find this return to value frivo-
lous as secondary readings of Marx have often attempted to excise Marx 
of value or to see it secondary to exploitation (Althusser and Balibar, 
2009). However, rather than recasting political economy as a separately 
Marxist or socialist endeavour based somehow on the objective value 
of labour (a labour theory of value), the first chapters of Capital set 
the scene for a negative critique of not only that discipline but also of 
capitalist society. There is nothing instrumental, or economistic, in the 
concept of value in Marx. Value is not an economic or a moral category 
but rather ‘…a social category that points to a form of life determined by 
a specific type of exchange relation’ (Neary and Winn, 2017, my italics). 
Marx was never working towards a theory of value, rather he developed 
a critique of value (Tenkle, 2014, p.13).
This is contrary to the way in which we would usually think of this 
concept. We are so ingrained in thinking of value as tautologically repre-
senting something of worth in modern society, morally or economically 
(as part of what Marx called bourgeoise political economy), that it seems 
impossible to form a perspective which would reject this without mak-
ing use of those conventional categories. In a completely different realm 
(but one that might be tied to capitalist notions of subjectivity and the 
centrality of the individual) in universities, we have ‘values’ that are of 
importance to the educational mission. Values such as academic free-
dom and social justice are repeated as truisms that seemingly have an 
ontologically unquestionable status akin to the subjects of human rights 
theories. In instrumental discourses of HE, we speak of educational 
commodities as being ‘valuable’, ‘adding value’ to students as they move 
along the ‘value chain’. On the other hand, we criticise values, rather 
than critique value itself, in terms of making moral judgements con-
cerning what should be the purposes of the university, how university 
resources should be allocated, or making empirical assessments of how 
valuable different allocations are. These understandings of value are, 
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even in Marx, correct on a surface level as they have an objective, fetish-
ised, reality in capitalist production and for workers. If these bourgeoise 
concepts are hallucinatory (where the real action takes place in the var-
ious motions and appearances of ‘value’ which moves these concretised 
puppets around), then it is hard to separate them from economic reality. 
Workers and capitalists frequently find that their own ‘values’ are com-
promised by the periodic inability to ‘add value’ to products that move 
along the ‘value chain’ hence becoming ‘valueless’ themselves. Hence 
capitalist universities, and even the critique of those universities, are sat-
urated with ‘value talk’, and involve both a moralistic and economistic 
take on what values the university should have, without undertaking a 
negative critique of value itself.
Value in Marx
As a prelude to contemporary value critiques, it is worthwhile to intro-
duce Marx’s work on value (Marx, 1990, 1991, 1992). This provides 
not only a grounding for what is to come, but value critique has a firmer 
relationship with Marx’s original theorisations of value than with 
post-Marxism or with economistic Marxism that attempt to establish 
Marx as adopting a ‘different’ form of political economy. According to 
Sweezy (1970), as the exemplar of an ‘economistic’ Marxist reading, 
Marx was writing the beginnings of a Marxian political economy where 
concepts were better, alternative, conceptualisations of classical and 
neoclassical political economy. This makes the concept of value tran-
shistorical and means that it can be used uniformly across all historical 
periods. As a case in point, abstract labour in Sweezy (1970, pp.31–2) 
is defined as an observation of the way in which labour is employed 
indifferently across the economy in general (as an economic category) 
rather than as a social form and expression of a social relation within 
capitalism. Contrary to this conventional political economy approach, 
in starting with value, Marx is not intending to establish another form 
of political economy where his depiction of value would replace the for-
mulations which have arisen prior in classical political economy. Rather, 
Marx is establishing a negative critique of value (and indeed capital-
ism) viewing it as a social (rather than an economic) form that only 
exists in capitalism. Value, as Marx sees it, is not transhistorical and 
is only established from the dialectically opposing categories (labour 
and capital) that exist in capitalism. This means that from the out-
set Marx is trying to avoid an ontology of value where it arises from 
a transversal physical category whether that is the physics of work 
(energy expended by a human over a time period) or the direct pro-
ductivity of labour, soil, or machinery. Marx’s formulation of value is 
a doubly negative critique, to both criticise the object and to argue for 
its negation.
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Marx (1990) examines the mystifying nature of capitalist categories, 
and the ways in which he uses those categories (commodity, capital, 
labour, value) is unique to the capitalist mode of production. In particu-
lar, Marx is assuming (in Capital) that the capitalist mode of production 
prevails, and that this is a fully formed, totalising system. This means 
that the categories of labour and capital (and class struggle) are already 
established and in existence. Marx, therefore, starts his discussion of 
value assuming the totality of capitalist relations, of labour and capital 
as antagonistic social relationships. It is a ‘…historical social product’ 
(Harvey, 2010, p.46) of class struggle. An ‘entry point’ into Marx, 
whether value, capitalism, or class struggle, is therefore arbitrary as each 
presupposes the other. Machinery is part of this totalising system and 
machines such as AI manifest themselves in every aspect of the social 
relations of capital. This is not just in terms of work, or the relation 
between labour and capital, but also in terms of the commodity, time, 
the continuity of capitalism, and the road to communism.
Marx was not particularly concerned with what things are, or what 
they do – their use values – ‘…the physical body of the commodity itself…
the use-value or useful thing’ (Marx, 1990, p.126) in his dual articula-
tion of value. Although it is important that a commodity (which again is 
a particular category in capitalism) is a ‘useful thing’ for its sale to occur, 
this is assumed to be the case. Capitalists will not produce a commodity 
which cannot be sold, or otherwise utilised to gain a profit (whether 
rented, accessed through a cloud or platform such as Netflix, or bought), 
and they are largely unconcerned with the exact nature of the commod-
ity. However, use value is (like other forms of value) a social form that is 
unique to capitalism. Although all things that people produce have some 
kind of ‘use’ in capitalism, only those objects (commodities) socially rec-
ognised as having use will have ‘use values’. This includes commodities 
for which the primary purpose is to destroy humans such as nuclear 
weapons, landmines, poison and guns as long as they have a ‘use’ for a 
consumer whether that is an individual or a government. Most impor-
tant to ‘use value’ is that the use enables an exchange for money. Marx 
was no utilitarian and not concerned with the utility, or subjective sat-
isfaction, obtained through the consumption of an object. Commodities 
are produced only for profit, the conversion of money into increasing 
stores of money (profit) over time and are the ‘…material bearers of 
exchange value’ (Marx, 1990, p.126). Value, exchange value, and use 
value exist (in a social form as there is no material metaphysics of value) 
simultaneously in the commodity (Aumeeruddy and Tortajada, 2015). 
Of course, the capitalist university is filled with potential use values, 
primarily certifications which are exchanged for money by (in the form 
detested by liberals but increasingly accurate) the student as consumer. 
Use values are not unimportant, but the emphasis by Marx on value and 
exchange value points towards the specificity of capitalist production 
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and against the relevance of ‘thingness’ that constitutes it. If we take the 
form of AI, as a commodity that is sold to universities by corporations, 
its processing power and abilities that make up its ‘sensuous character-
istics’ (Marx, 1990, p.128, which are constructed with concrete labour 
for capitalist profit) are less important than its social form (as a product 
of abstract labour) as it manifests its existence as fixed capital that ena-
bles the further exploitation of labour power for profit. Some physical 
elements of AI are part of its ‘material substratum’ (Marx, 1990, p.133) 
such as the chemicals that are used to make the computer chips or the 
coding for a neural network. However, Marx (1993, p.591) warns of the 
danger of considering the ‘physical attributes’ of ‘instruments of pro-
duction’ rather than their ‘economic form’ (Marx, 1993, p.591). The 
appearance of AI as fixed capital obscures its form as the manifestation 
of labour which was valorised when that AI was exchanged for money. 
Of course, if AI is not of ‘use’ to universities then they will not invest in 
it, but the ‘use’ is primarily in terms of reducing the labour time of aca-
demics employed to produce educational commodities. Hence AI is used 
reciprocally with human labour to reduce the time needed to produce 
reports or generate data, to make predictions and analyse markets, and 
as a research or teaching tool. It, therefore, has some kind of ‘use’ value, 
but use value only exists in capitalism. AI is not used in universities as a 
form of play, entertainment, or to produce articles written for pleasure 
unless those things can be directly or indirectly converted into fixed cap-
ital (play as an organisational form that enables commodity production 
in reduced time), or commodities (such as AI-enabled ‘edutainment’ for 
students that enables greater satisfaction with lectures). In terms of a 
future communist society, Marx never argued that this was concerned 
with the production of alternative ‘commodities’ or ‘use values’ as these 
are forms specific to capitalism.
Exchange value is in appearance a quantitative relation (Marx, 1990 
pp.126–7), but this form of value is ‘…the direct opposite of the coarsely 
sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects’ (Marx, 1990, 
p.138). In terms of exchange value, Marx states that the substance of 
value is the expenditure of identical human labour power, a commodity 
that can produce greater value than was expended in its reproduction. 
Labour power is the ‘…value forming substance’ (Marx, 1990, p.129). 
This initially sounds like a conventional economic category but as will 
be discussed below, Marx is not particularly interested in equating 
human labours in terms of their physiological or mental categorisations 
(or in determining the rate of exchange of commodities), but rather that 
they are socially validated in exchange (through the universal equiva-
lent, money) and incipiently in the labour process. There is no attempt 
to equate human labours in terms of calories expended in each period 
of time, but rather Marx is considering human labour in the abstract 
which is that labour that has an equivalent nature only in terms of its 
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ability to produce value. As exchange values (commodities that have 
the possibility of being exchanged), all commodities appear to contain 
congealed abstract labour time as a social rather than physiological cat-
egory. The world in which capitalism appears, and the world explained 
by classical political economy is one in which exchange values are 
determined directly by hours of congealed (labour) time (price is quite 
separate from this) or other inputs of factors of production. According 
to Marx, the determinant unit of time in capitalist production is the 
Socially Necessary Labour Time (SNLT) (Marx, 1990, p.129) for each 
commodity which is the time required to produce a given commodity 
under the current technological and organisational forms of production 
including skill levels. By classifying labour time in this manner, as SNLT, 
there is an internalisation of the ways in which technology (including AI) 
and the average level of skill is specified. Technology is ascribed a role in 
the labour employed in production (in terms of time) rather than being 
independently characterised as a separate form, or factor, of production. 
Skill is also already embedded in this discussion of SNLT. Hence Marx 
is already demystifying the role of machinery (such as AI) in production, 
which is a social (being a product of a social totality) rather than an 
economic category. He is also demystifying the role of skill by making 
all labourers equivalent in terms of their role as abstract labourers after 
the process of exchange provides the social validation of that labour, in 
terms of its relation to the universal equivalent of money (Pitts, 2018).
Although the commodity itself is an external object and a useful 
thing, value itself cannot be observed. If a commodity is destroyed, or is 
subject to physical or chemical processes, it is not possible to find forms 
of value. This point is substantive for those theorists who attempt to 
ontologically link AI and capital. The idea that capital has become a 
form of AI (developing consciousness or calculative means), or that there 
is a hybridisation of AI-capital or capital-AI is ontologically inconsist-
ent as AI is made of ‘physical stuff’ whereas value (and the seemingly 
‘self-valorising value’ of capitalism as capital) is ‘nothing’ aside from a 
social form which appears to be, in a mystified sense, a concrete form. 
Although AI could be formed of computer code, physical circuitry, or 
a form of physical and neurological hybrid, value is different from any 
of these things. Marx states that if we disregard use value (and as I 
have described, Marx does not afford particular attention to use value) 
then all commodities are products of labour, but they are already trans-
formed. This means that all commodities are abstract from use value, but 
all products of labour are of the same kind, which is human labour in 
the abstract. It may seem trite to say that AI is formed of human labour 
of some kind, but the point is that AI is formed from abstract labour so 
is constructed with the aim of profit when sold as a commodity. It is no 
coincidence that the construction of AI is largely through the efforts of 
private corporations (and occasionally the state) where profitability is 
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the primary criteria. With a few minor exceptions, all planetary intelli-
gence is hence commodified either being sold as a component of human 
labour power, in owned animals or (non-withstanding the hyperbole of 
AI) as ‘artificial’ intelligences which are constructed as commodities.
In capitalism wealth appears as a material form, as commodities 
which represent stores of value, and as money which is the objecti-
fied form of value. Although we do not see value objectively, it has a 
residue in commodities which (metaphorically) is where crystals of a 
‘social substance’ (which is abstract labour) are held. Although com-
modities might appear to be very different, they have value (exchange 
value) independently of their ‘form of appearance’. It does not matter 
what commodities look like (or don’t look like in terms of services), 
they can be realised as exchange values. It must also be noted that value 
is not a simple Hegelian reversal, a material spirit (value), that moves 
through history, but one which is formed from abstract labour power 
which is meaningless without a notion of class struggle, of two forces – 
labour and capital – which require each other for meaning and essence. 
Value (and value critique) is not designed to be another form of political 
economy which was to supersede the work of former political econo-
mies, rather Marx was concerned with the dissolution of capitalism and 
establishing a communist society not on a rhetorical or moral basis (as 
was the case with the utopian socialists) but on a scientific basis. That 
is not to say that morality was not important to Marx. Particularly 
in the first volume of Capital (Marx, 1990), he is concerned with the 
treatment of the working class and consistent calls for better treat-
ment of workers, but this was not the only argument for establishing 
communism.
The movement of the social category value into different social forms 
and through time in circuits of money, production, and finance cap-
ital gives it not only the appearance of autonomy in terms of being 
‘self-valorising value’ (Marx, 1992, p.185) but is a real abstraction 
(Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.20) in that ‘…the movement of industrial capital 
is an abstraction in action. Here value passes through different forms, 
different movements in which it is both preserved and increases, is val-
orised’ (Marx, 1992, p.185). Value is dependent on class relations and 
the existence of wage labour, and is a unique thing, being an actually 
existing abstraction. The phantom of abstract labour and the ghost-like 
realm of exchange value are social forms that are in every commodity 
and currency. Marx foreshadowed the desubstantiation of value (Kurz, 
2012, 2014), that increased labour productivity reduced the portion of 
value which was contained in each commodity (Marx, 1991, p.880) 
which is a key contention of value critique:
The same labour produces the same value for the product created 
in a given time; but the size of amount of this product, and thus the 
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portion of value which falls to a particular aliquot part, depends for 
a given quantity of labour solely on the amount of the product, and 
this in turn on the productivity of the given amount of labour, not 
on its absolute amount.
(Marx, 1991, p.880)
To summarise, Marx does consider that a critique of value was central 
to a critique of capitalism and political economy (he made it the first 
chapter of Capital and there are many references to value in his other 
works). He certainly did not wish to ossify value or to make it the basis 
for an alternative political programme or economic philosophy, and did 
definitely not wish to consider value as some kind of material world 
spirit independent of class struggle. However, he did want to show how 
value, insubstantial and mysterious as it is, was objectified by classical 
economists as the theoretical basis for a system of political economy 
(capitalism) but also how the ‘common sense’ categories in capitalism 
(labour, capital, commodities, machinery) were in fact not transhis-
torical, and had a particular social meaning and appearance within 
capitalism itself. This is only one aspect of Marx’s critique of capitalism 
and there are particular advantages, and pitfalls, in following this path 
as will be seen in the discussion that follows. However, by emphasising 
a critique of value we demystify the role of technology (including AI) 
within capitalism for a focus on abstract labour, the transformation of 
labour in capitalism, and the inhuman universe of social forms and what 
these do to humanity.
Value in the New Reading of Marx and Value Critique
As explained above, Marx was not attempting to institute an alternative 
theoretical framework for political economy. There have been attempts 
to build political-economic models based on Marx’s conception of value 
(and this has often been the basis of planning in socialist countries), and 
to ‘transform’ Marx’s conceptions of value into prices and profits. These 
adaptations are not, though, in line with Marx’s negative critique. More 
productively, the NRM, particularly when allied with more mainstream 
Marxist conceptions of class struggle, and value critique, expand upon 
Marx’s conceptions of value to develop a totalising understanding of 
capitalism, crisis, and communism.
Pitts (2018) expands upon both the theoretical insights of the NRM 
of Heinrich (2012) and Open Marxism to articulate a new construction 
of Marx’s theory of value based on abstract labour which is medi-
ated by commodity exchange, ultimately for money. NRM is both a 
critique of political economy and of society. Following Marx, value 
relates to abstract labour and not to concrete activities, but contro-
versially (for traditional Marxism) the latent value of abstract labour 
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(not as an empirical category, but as a posited potential) is valorised 
in exchange:
Money enables a measure of abstract human labour in general, 
responsible for producing exchangeable things in general. The 
measure – money – brings this abstract labour into existence, in the 
exchange of commodities.
(Pitts, 2018, p.4)
Value is not embodied in a commodity in a physical sense and is not 
entirely located in production or exchange (but Pitts, contrary to some 
understandings of Marx, argues against even the metaphorical idea that 
value is somehow crystallised in a commodity to reveal itself in exchange 
rather that labour power posits, or gives the potential, for this which 
is revealed momentarily in valorisation) but only ‘appears’ in various 
forms to finally manifest in the resolution of a process of social vali-
dation in exchange. There are certain conditions with respect to this 
process as valorisation by exchange is no means assured and abstract 
labour is only valorisable if the time to produce a commodity is equal 
to or below the SNLT. This abstract process, which enables a critique 
of conventional economic categories, is enabled by relations of class 
struggle, domination, and obscured by the monetary form. Labour only 
becomes abstract labour in retrospect, as part of the process of social 
validation in exchange. In many ways, it is already quasi-monetary in 
nature through the advance of money by capital in order to start pro-
duction and the payment of a ‘money wage’ which acts to maintain and 
socially reproduce labour. In arguing this, Pitts (2018) draws on the work 
of Arthur (2013) who considers that labour already displays elements 
of abstraction prior to commodity exchange as it is the sale of labour 
power (potential to labour) that is sold as a commodity so it already has 
a ‘mentally abstract character’ (Pitts, 2018, p.93). It receives a mone-
tary wage in exchange for contracted time and workers move between 
different jobs and unemployment through their lifetimes so there is a 
relationship between the wage and the reproduction of the workers’ lives 
in totality. However, as in Marx, abstract labour is not the process by 
which complex (skilled) labours can be reduced to simple (unskilled) 
forms of labour (Aumeeruddy and Tortajada, 2015). Although concrete 
labour is expended prior to the ex-post validation of abstract labour, it 
is only ‘value’ that is the determinant form of wealth in capitalism, but 
the validation of abstract labour ex-post determines the ex-post SNLT 
which sets the average time in which concrete labour must produce a 
commodity (Postone, 2003, 2017). Labour time is set not through sci-
entific management or other analytical techniques but by the actions 
of a real abstraction back onto the real world of work as synthetic tim-
ing (Sohn-Rethel, 1978). Money, as a universal (seemingly objective) 
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entity, provides the social synthesis through which these abstractions 
become real abstractions and have a concrete existence. Hence Pitts 
develops Marx’s conceptions of value, particularly the conception that 
exchange completes the sociality of capitalism through an objective form 
(money). Money, and its accumulation by capitalists, ‘determines back’ 
the potentially abstract nature of the whole process as a real abstrac-
tion. Competition and concentration of capitals, and the drive for capital 
accumulation, which appears as ‘profit’, is a further expansion of this 
process.
A parallel perspective on abstraction, and particularly abstract 
labour, allied to the NRM, Wertkritik, value-critique, or the critique 
of value (Larsen, Nilges, Robinson and Brown, 2014, p.ix) also takes 
Marx’s formulation of value, with its inherent contradictions and crisis, 
as the basis of a reconstruction of Marx’s work. Usefully, this perspec-
tive is not merely focussed on value, or on the role of abstract labour 
in its production, but allows us to consider issues of technology and 
AI within capitalist crisis. Unlike NRM, this esoteric take on Marxism 
in value-critique considers labour power itself to be a real abstraction 
from its inception (Larsen et al, 2014, x), as an unusual commodity 
that can produce greater value than is necessary for its own production 
and reproduction. In this sense, abstraction is immediately real in pro-
duction, not a process whereby economic factors become dominant as 
social categories through exchange as in the NRM. They are immedi-
ately really existing abstractions that make the world, time, and space of 
capitalism. Abstract labour, through its movement to capital, becomes 
the source of social domination (Postone, 2003). This is a dynamic pro-
cess of social domination as profitability is dependent upon constant 
reductions in the SNLT through new technologies (including AI) and 
methods of organisation (such as increases in the length of the work-
ing day and the speed of work whilst workers are subject to synthetic 
timing), expansion into new markets and ranges of commodities, and 
securing natural resources in a ‘treadmill’ effect (Postone, 2003). Living 
labour increasingly becomes dead labour, and life and nature becomes 
capitalised. AI is an example of a capitalist technology which enables 
these new methods of organisation, the speeding up of production, and 
the creation and sale of new commodities.
Within this perspective (and indeed in NRM), labour is not an anthro-
pological constant which has the same ontology and social relationships 
across all societies. The labour that made the pyramids and medieval 
castles is not the same labour that produces profit for the capitalist in 
the money form. In capitalist society, abstract labour, labour as a ‘com-
mon equivalent’ is not simply an idea, but a ‘…historically established, 
socially powerful, actually existing abstraction that violently brings peo-
ple under its thumb’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.3). This common equivalence is 
not in terms of reducing people’s labour to unskilled work but rather 
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the valorisation of all abstract labour in exchange through a common 
equivalent, being money. The emphasis on violence here is important as 
value is dependent upon the notion of class struggle and the separation 
of labour and capital as we will see in the next chapter. For humans, this 
is a viscerally real abstraction involving the expenditure of a form of 
energy which is a social, rather than a physiological, energy. This is also 
immediately abstract in terms of ‘…a highly specific rule of time that is 
both abstract-linear and homogenous…Each and every minute is valua-
ble as it, in the literal sense, presents potential value’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.5). 
Of course, abstract labour occurs simultaneously with concrete labour, 
the latter creating a material item or service that may be a use value 
whereas abstract labour is the ‘…expenditure of labor as such, regardless 
of any qualitative determination. As such it creates the value presented 
in commodities’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.5). Tenkle defines abstract labour as:
…the reduction of all the different forms of commodity-producing 
labor to a common denominator. It makes them comparable and as 
a result capable of being exchanged for one another, by reducing 
them to the pure abstract, reified quality of elapsed time. As such, it 
forms the substance of value.
(Tenkle, 2014, p.6)
This is not a natural fact or an anthropological law. What workers do 
in capitalism is already a reified, social form which is already a form of 
social domination (Tenkle, 2014, p.6; Postone, 2003) rather than any-
thing that is physiological or physical. People really do come face-to-face 
with the products of their abstract (as well as concrete) labour in terms 
of capital, particularly in its objectified form as money, but also in facing 
machines, such as AI. Following Sohn-Rethel (1978) these are actually 
existing abstractions rather than mental constructs (Tenkle, 2014, p.7). 
It must be noted that these abstractions already exist at the point of pro-
duction and not in the processes of exchange or distribution as in some 
versions of the NRM. Hence, Tenkle criticises Sohn-Rethel (1978) as 
considering that this abstraction is formed in exchange. Rather produc-
tion and exchange are taken to be a unity where production presupposes 
exchange (this is not dissimilar to Pitts, 2018, interpretation, although 
Pitts emphasises exchange). Commodities are produced assuming that 
they can be exchanged on the market whereas Sohn-Rethel (1978), 
similarly to Žižek (2019, p.31), confuses the necessity of the temporal 
distinction between production and exchange with the ‘…social unity of 
the processes of valorisation and exchange’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.8). Value is 
an objectivity (albeit an abstract, alien one) at all stages of the process 
of production, circulation, and exchange. ‘…production occurs already 
in the context of a fetishized form…value cannot go without a mate-
rial bearer’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.9). Hence at the point of production, all 
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labour (no matter what its skill or type) is abstracted into value produc-
ing labour.
Kurz takes forward Tenkle’s conception of value and in doing so 
demonstrates the difference between value and the reality of material 
objects. This is a very important consideration when it comes to the 
ontological status of AI and technology in universities which are mate-
rial objects (fixed capital or a commodity). Value, according to Kurz is an 
‘…intangible social abstraction’ (Kurz, 2016, p.17) although it appears 
in real social relations and things its character ‘…being an abstraction 
cannot be immediate and therefore also not tangible’ (Kurz, 2016, p.17). 
Objects are not abstract but are made into real abstractions by what Kurz 
calls the ‘social projection mechanism’ (Kurz, 2016, p.17). Projection is 
the mechanism of forming real categories through which we see social 
forms as material objects which is similar to Pitts’ (2018) ‘social vali-
dation’ or Lotz’s (2014) ‘capitalist schema’. For example, we see AI as 
an amalgam of computing power or software or as an alternative to 
the physical human brain. We do not perceive it as the material sub-
strate (fixed capital) of an objective social form (money) that is our own 
abstract labour validated through exchange come back to confront us in 
the server room or on our laptop screen. As a social, not physiological, 
substance, abstract labour is (ultimately and tragically) the substance of 
capital. What we do at work, productive labour is a dual concept refer-
ring not just to material exchanges but to the ‘…expenditure of abstract 
human labor as the fictitious substance of value, which on the surface 
appears reified as exchange value’ (Kurz, 2014, p.21). The only labour 
that is productive by this definition is ‘…that which is presented imme-
diately as a social real abstraction or value-forming substance’ (Kurz, 
2014, p.21). It is only in capitalist society that there is the creation and 
the deviation between two forms of productive labour. Concrete labour, 
the physical production of commodities, which occurs simultaneously 
with abstract labour is also a uniquely capitalist form of labour. In the 
capitalist university, concrete labour involves the production of physi-
cal things (such as academic ‘outputs’, styles of teaching, and financial 
reports) that are strangely specific to capitalist commodity production.
In terms of automation and AI, there is a tension between the meta-
physics of capitalism and a progressive capitalist teleology. Capitalism 
may have a tendency towards greater technological progress, but it also 
(because of this tendency) has a countervailing tendency towards the 
destruction of technologies, particularly those which do not appear to 
yield a profit. The same applies to skills and education whereby accel-
erating levels of skills and education in the name of productivity are 
mirrored in deskilling and the obsolescence of qualifications and whole 
areas of human knowledge. This rejection of a teleological and also 
an anti-empirical view of technology is found throughout the work of 
Kurz (2012, 2014) in terms of both economic categories and the relation 
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between value and energy in a physical sense. However, parallel to his 
analysis of material objects, Kurz (2012, p.10) does not consider the rela-
tionship between value and surface economic categories to be infinite. 
Value does not possess the ability to transmute itself into anything. ‘The 
idea of a infinite flexibility in relation to the substance of value has been 
a vast illusion’ (Kurz, 2012, p.11). Kurz would be dismissive of an accel-
erationist position on AI, for example, that would view acceleration as 
combining all entities, ideas, and technologies into a cybernetic amal-
gam. As Marx, there are a ‘succession of stages through which the broad 
lines of possible outcomes can be determined’ (Kurz, 2012, p.10) and a 
limit, a tension between the empirical and theory. Whilst theory reveals 
valorisation the ‘mass of real value…cannot be determined directly in an 
empirical fashion’ (Kurz, 2012, p.10) but:
The mass of real value is linked to the substance of abstract labour, 
thus to the mass of abstract human energy expended in the function-
ing space of capital. On the other hand capital can only use as much 
human labour power as it requires, but only in relation to the level of 
productivity which is also imposed between competitors.
(Kurz, 2012, p.10)
Here Kurz links value to the ‘substance of abstract labour’, historically 
specific labour power. In this formulation the ‘…mass of abstract human 
energy’ does not have a direct relationship with physical energy. This 
has similarities with Postone’s (2003) account of abstract labour. Kurz 
and Postone would both concur on the ‘critique of the concept of labour’ 
(Kurz, 2012, p.16) and consider labour to be a historically specific form 
of social mediation in capitalism and part of a negative critique of that 
form (rather than a positive critique, as is sometimes implied in labour 
movement Marxism). Capitalism is indifferent on how ‘brain, nerve and 
muscle’ are expended (Kurz, 2012, p.27), only that the expenditure of 
abstract labour (or ‘the abstract expenditure of human energy’, Kurz, 
2012, p.27) might be extended, preferably to infinity by capital. The 
essence of capitalism is abstract labour. ‘…Marxists occasionally for-
get what value really is – namely the socially real fiction of objectified 
human labor in context of the immediate production process’ (Kurz, 
2014, p.53, my italics).
Value critique, therefore, presents a unique perspective on the rela-
tionship between capital, technology (including AI) and crisis. Based on 
his critique of value, Kurz does not believe that capitalism can continue 
forever partly because of its tendency towards an advancing technolog-
ical level of development. Kurz (2012, p.14) contends that the ‘minority 
theories of collapse’ of Luxemburg (insufficient realisation of surplus 
value) and Grossman (overaccumulation of capital) are theories of an 
‘internal limit’ of capital that are premised on empirical determinations. 
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Kurz instead proposes that Marx had two theories of crisis that are not 
yet unified. One was concerned with capital circulation, disproportion-
alities between production branches, and the other concerned with the 
underproduction of surplus value due to the diminution of the work-
force which becomes superfluous with technological change such as 
AI. Kurz considers that it is rather that the real substance of capital, 
labour power, diminishes which underlies the crisis. This is the ‘desub-
stantialisaton’ of capital (Kurz, 2012, p.15). Capital itself undermines 
its own life force and becomes a ‘…pseudo-accumulation without sub-
stance’ (Kurz, 2012, p.15). Capitalism replaces labour through new 
technology and scientific methods of mechanising the human process of 
production such as Taylorism and AI (Kurz, 2014, p.39), but it can never 
fully eliminate ‘…mediated, indirect labor’ (Kurz, 2014, p.40). In this 
sense, Kurz holds to Marx’s concept of a gradual increase in attendant 
labour (although Kurz also extends this to labour involved in circula-
tion). But neither attendant labour, nor machines, can actually produce 
value. Science is not an ‘immediate productive force’ in that science, 
technology, and machines realised in AI cannot produce value (Kurz, 
2012, p.41). The idea that technology, which would include AI (although 
Kurz does not mention that here) can create value would be another 
‘…moment in the immortalization and consolidation of the process of 
the abstraction of value’ (Kurz, 2014, p.41). Technology, including AI, 
is not able to produce value in the same way that human labour can. 
Related to this point, technical and scientific labour whether human or 
cyborg cannot (according to Kurz, 2014, pp.42–3) produce value in the 
Marxist sense, at least as an entity separate to labour, but this does not 
mean that we should fetishise immediately productive labour. Rather, 
this needs to be understood in terms of relative surplus value as part 
of the development of capital. As well as increasing the length of the 
working day and the intensity of labour (increasing absolute surplus 
value) technology leads to a fall in the SNLT and a temporary increase 
in ‘…the proportion of the new value that the living labor has created 
over and above the costs of its reproduction’ (Kurz, 2014, p.44). More 
material products are produced and there is an increase in the concen-
tration of capital (Kurz, 2014, p.45) whilst each commodity produced 
loses value. Kurz adds another, rarely discussed consequence, which is 
that ‘…capital itself becomes the absolute logical and historical limit 
in the production of relative surplus value’ (Kurz, 2014, p.47). Capital 
is its own limit. Capital ‘…increases the extent of exploitation, but in 
doing so it undermines the foundation and the object of exploitation, 
the production of value as such’ (Kurz, 2014, p.47). If capital can expand 
and accumulate, seize more social space (including by destroying other 
capitals, trade wars and national wars), and absorb more living labour, 
outward crisis can be stalled. This involves the ‘speeding up’ of life and 
the disjuncture between abstract and concrete time discussed by Postone 
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(2003, pp.186–225) and a destruction of space by time (Harvey, 2010, 
p.37). Even as space and time are warped, our subjectivity of both past 
and future is destroyed as ‘…the temporalization of the future through 
credit and the temporalization of the past through accumulation is that 
these two horizons become one horizon for one world, which allows 
us to speak of “capitalism” or “capitalist world”’(Lotz, 2014, p.103). 
This cannot continue indefinitely and eventually capitalism runs out of 
new areas to expand into and ‘…concrete material wealth can no longer 
be engendered within the limits of the value relation…a crisis of value 
itself, from which there can be no longer be a way out for capital’ (Kurz, 
2014, p.54). This does not mean that we have attained ‘…the absolute 
and complete automation of production as a whole, the ghost factory’ 
(Kurz, 2014, p.57) but rather the point at which more labour is being 
eliminated than is being absorbed. State capitals and monopolies, even 
future utopias and dystopias controlled by an AI, do not move beyond 
a ‘value-imminent mode of observation’ (Kurz, 2014, p.71). It is the 
‘qualitative disproportionality in the relation between matter and value’ 
(Kurz, 2014, p.71) not (or not just) the ‘quantitative disproportionality’ 
which is the root of capitalist crisis. Both capitalism and state capitalist 
(or AI controlled) regimes still accept value as an organising principle 
and there is no ‘…mechanical automatism of the transition to socialism’ 
(Kurz, 2014, p.71).
Although this is a powerful and internally consistent representation 
of capitalist crisis, one ‘critique of value critique’ and of the NRM is 
in terms of the emphasis on value as an abstraction rather than the 
approach taken to the pursuit of profits by capitalists at the expense 
of wages, and class struggle, in what is sometimes called ‘traditional 
Marxism’. Firstly, in terms of what capitalists achieve through their 
investments, there must be some relation, no matter how indirect, or 
subject to metamorphosis, between value and the surface economic cate-
gory of profit (perhaps through relative surplus value) as this surfacing of 
profit (as a form in which value presents itself) must influence the behav-
iour of capitalists with regard to their actions in investing in fixed capital 
and new technology. Notwithstanding the notion of a ‘real abstraction’, 
capitalists want to see a return on the monetary investments that they 
make. In particular, subjectivist theory considers that value critique and 
value theory is ‘metaphysics’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.11). Although ‘…value can 
in no way be nailed down empirically’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.11) and labour 
is not literally preserved in a product (as in positivist, vulgar strands of 
Marxism), it is a non-empirical category, yet it does appear in various 
mutated guises (social forms) as exchange value, use value, price and 
profit, the commodity, the state, and as AI. However, capital is not inter-
ested in the world as an abstraction or even in the absolute level of value 
or how it moves, but only in surplus value (Ortlieb, 2014, pp.81–2) spe-
cifically relative surplus value and the determination of profit. Secondly, 
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it can be argued that value critique does not sufficiently consider class 
struggle. This critique is somewhat misjudged as value critique does 
consider the relation between labour and capital in a manner which is 
congruent with Marx’s original thought. Where NRM, value critique, 
and other forms of Marxism are somewhat separate is in terms of the 
attention paid to the working class as a historical agent. Value critique 
contends that value, as the social substance created by abstract labour 
and measured by SNLT, is a (if not the) defining principle of capitalism. 
Therefore, a society that defines value as the primary social principle in 
society will be a capitalist society. Societies which have been judged by 
some commentators to be ‘state capitalist’ (such as the later, dictatorial, 
forms of the Soviet Union) are criticised as adhering to value as a pri-
mary principle of society and as creating a metric based on SNLT. Such 
societies are seen to be little different from capitalist societies as the state 
plays a role as a monopoly capitalist. The tendency for such societies 
to be anti-democratic is also noted by Kurz and others. Similarly, and 
somewhat bizarrely, workers’ struggles which consider that labourers 
should not only control society but place labour above other principles 
are regarded as counter-productive in terms of producing a communist 
society. Labour (at least capitalist forms of labour which is all labour 
according to value critique, aside from the ‘dark side’ of value being 
the forms of labour, such as housework, that indirectly support value 
production) is tragic in that it creates capital and the conditions of its 
current and future exploitation. ‘Workerism’ is rejected by value critique 
in favour of the dissolution of value. The problem with this perspective, 
as I will argue in the next chapter, is that it neglects the role of class 
struggle in developing consciousness and critique in the wider working 
class seeing it as a logical and intellectual discipline for the intelligentsia. 
It also ignores the experimental and formative nature of earlier commu-
nist societies and struggles. At worst, ‘social form analysis’ allows for 
the restatement of a new-bourgeois form of political economy. Lange 
(2019) argues that recent value-form analysis has ignored the social 
form of labour in capitalism, that is, Marx assumes the totality of the 
capital and labour relation from the beginning. The forms of value are 
not self-explanatory without an appreciation of the specificity of labour 
in capitalism. Pitts (2018) is more explicit concerning the necessity for 
work on value to concern itself with the establishment and maintenance 
of capitalism through violent and continuing dispossession, exploita-
tion, and immiseration. Usefully, Open Marxism, particularly the work 
of Bonefeld (2014) combines an understanding of the ‘real abstractions’ 
and value form with the violence that underpins them through an under-
standing of Marx’s Capital which focusses on its historical rather than 
its logical (as in NRM) exposition (Pitts, 2018, pp.105–37) as ‘…the real 
abstraction of value…cannot be separated from its constitution in the 
actual relations of life’ (Pitts, 2018, p.109). Labour, class, surplus value, 
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and class struggle, in the entirety of capitalist society (Arthur, 2015) are 
integral and presuppose the value form. Although Pitts (2018) considers 
that these are historical manifestations of labour and capital, they are 
also logical as these dialectical categories are necessary for capitalist 
production to occur.
To summarise, the NRM and value critique provide a totalising the-
ory to negatively critique AI in capitalism in terms of the transhistorical 
nature of labour (and capital), the endogenisation of technology, and 
emphasising the imminent and internal nature of capitalist crisis. This 
informs the simultaneous, rather than coincidental interactions, of 
technology, labour, and time. This, in turn, explains the relationships 
between AI, labour, commodities, time, the end of capitalism and com-
munist society which are the subjects of subsequent chapters. However, 
these theories need to be combined with a more traditional understand-
ing of Marxist conceptions of class struggle and antagonism, otherwise 
they risk what they most wish to resist – the imposition of a new form 
of political economy – hence in Chapter 3, I emphasise class and class 
struggle, as manifested in academic labour in HE, as presupposed and 
fundamental aspects of capitalism.
Against Entanglements
The NRM and value critique (together with Open Marxism and class 
struggle) are Marxist perspectives that are at the centre of how AI and 
the capitalist university can be critiqued negatively. They are at the 
heart of the theoretical arguments in this book. There are, though, 
many non-Marxist conceptions of commodities and value which have 
been prominent in contemporary debates on technologies such as AI. 
Arguments regarding the agency of material objects, our entanglements 
with objects (including AI and computers), and the role of various types 
of desire and embeddedness in our technological relationships have come 
to play a major role in critical theory. Despite some useful observations 
on process, these post-structural and New Materialist perspectives are 
theoretically inadequate in terms of theorisation of abstractions and the 
ways in which they relate capitalism to concrete practices (particularly 
as related to entities such as AI), their bourgeois foundations in a taken 
for granted understanding of categories of economy and society, and 
their affirmative or neutral critique of society rather than a negative cri-
tique. I will return to the alleged liberatory potential of post-humanism 
and transhumanist perspectives in the concluding chapter, but here I will 
explain why New Materialist or Deleuzian perspectives are not being 
used in this book. Broadly, one brand of perspective, New Materialism 
(Object Orientated Ontology and Actor Network Theory) are about 
‘things’ and sometimes ‘commodities’ whereas another (Deleuzian per-
spectives on ‘desire’) are about vectors and movements. Either of these 
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theories are inadequate to explain the specific form of AI in the capital-
ist university. Although they use alternative ontologies, these ontologies 
are inconsistent and add little to the arguments concerning AI and 
capitalism.
As considered above, the commodity is a staging device in Marxist 
arguments on the nature of capitalism as a system of social domination. 
Without the concept of the commodity, it is not possible to sustain a 
Marxist critique of capitalism (unless this was based on some kind of 
pure financialisation), but the commodity is actually no more important 
than any other aspect of this ‘real abstraction’ maintained through class 
struggle. It should be noted that commodities are not objects (such as 
a computer), they can be services (such as education), but commodities 
have the specifically capitalist characteristics discussed above. One per-
spective on objects (and some objects are commodities, although object 
is an inadequate depiction of commodity) that is part of ‘new material-
ism’ is Object Orientated Ontology (OOO) (Harman, 2016) which sees 
objects as being literally anything (a stone, a pile of stones, a thought, 
a set of ideas, or AI) that entangle and interact together, dismissing the 
idea of imposing theories concerning grouping and taxonomies, as well 
as theories about composition or purpose. Objects have an ‘is-ness’ that 
withdraws from understanding. Although value critique might, wrongly, 
be thought to be somewhat in accordance with OOO as theorists such 
as Harman recognise the appearance of objects interacting ‘amongst 
themselves’ (Harman, 2016, p.6), it also recognises that this appear-
ance is only one layer of reality. Harman might accuse value critique of 
‘undermining’ the autonomy of objects by seeing them as an appearance 
of which value is the essence, but value is a non-objective essence (cer-
tainly not an object). The claim of immaterialism (OOO) that objects 
have an ‘…autonomous essence’ does not necessarily exclude a Marxist 
consideration of commodities, but this is in opposition to the Marxist 
understanding of commodities. Commodities do not have an auton-
omous essence beyond understanding but a really-existing abstract 
essence (value) in exchange. Although commodities ‘…have relative 
independence…from their constituent places or histories’ (Harman, 
2016, p.9), the keyword here is relative and objects do not have full inde-
pendence from value as an abstract category in the Marxist ontology 
discussed earlier. Commodities are not objects as they are the products 
of abstract labour intended for exchange. This is not transhistorical but 
is part of capitalism and was violently imposed on humanity and nature.
In addition, New Materialist ontologies read everything as equal, 
for purposes of negation of anthropocentric privilege, or in seeking the 
epistemological truth of a flatland. For example, Harman (2016, p.2) 
depicts Actor Network Theory (ANT) as a ‘…flat ontology in which 
anything is real insofar as it acts…’ and Object Orientated Ontology as 
more inclusive again as encompassing all objects and entities whether 
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they act or not (Harman, 2016, p. 2). This uses object ‘…to refer to 
any entity that cannot be paraphrased in terms of either its components 
or its effects’ (Harman, 2016, p.3). Objects have agency and conduct 
mediation (Harman, 2016, p.5) and OOO brings in the inhuman action 
of objects in that ‘…the vast majority of relations in the universe do not 
involve human beings…objects interact amongst themselves even when 
humans are not present’ (Harman, 2016, p.6). These theories provide 
an ontological plane where everything is equal but fail to address met-
aphysical questions about the nature of reality. Stuff just ‘is’ and just 
‘acts’, with no special status accorded to the specificity of historically 
produced forms of objects or non-objects which ascribes agency to every 
possible contemplated actor. These theories naturalise the commodity 
as an actor possessing agency rather than the carrier of an abstraction, 
and obscures power relations in terms of the division of labourers from 
nature and capitalism as a form of social domination, involving social 
forms (Choat, 2018). OOO and ANT are affirmative ontologies of 
objects and also forms of ‘materialist post-modernism’ adopting a tran-
shistorical framing where everything has a linear history relative only to 
itself. This leads to accusations that OOO is a simple form of commod-
ity fetishism, that things are the real characters of history rather than 
examining social relations. This is surface statis, not even acceleration-
ism, which takes objects as entities as they are. Although OOO rejects 
the accusation of commodity fetishism, it makes things the subject of 
history. Even the realities of OOO that push back and retreat are not 
even there for any other entity, being a hallucination of their external 
appearances, which is a seemingly idealist form of materialism.
Aside from critiques from OOO and ANT on the commodity (more 
properly the object), there have also been recent critiques on how capital-
ism operates in terms of ‘desire’ or ‘coding’ rather than ‘value’ and ‘class 
struggle’. Deleuze, as a prominent politically post-structural author, has 
considered issues of capitalism and value, but whilst Deleuze’s analysis 
of desire can said to be positive, or at least productive (in terms of polit-
ical and social change – Deleuze and Guattari, 2013). Marx’s critique 
of capitalism (value in motion) is negative, and axiomatically resistant 
to repurposing, rather than indeterminant. It must be noted from the 
start that Deleuze is political and his work was influenced by Marx, 
particularly in his work with Guattari, which defines concepts such as 
mechanic surplus value, surplus value of code, and territorialisation/
deterritorialisation that have become influential in post-Marxist theory. 
Some contemporary Marxist writers on AI and technology have con-
sidered that Deleuze’s analysis is extremely important. Dyer-Whiteford 
(1999, pp.180–1) argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on desire 
as the constitution of social reality has similarities with Marx’s notion 
of value being productive and dynamic but not subject to morality. For 
Dyer-Whiteford, this is similar to Marx’s definition of labour before 
Capitalist Universities, AI, and Value 37
appropriation by surplus value extraction (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, 
p.180). However, in this conception of desire Dyer-Whiteford adopts a 
transhistorical notion of labour without considering that in capitalism 
labour is abstract labour, as discussed in the above analysis, that can 
only be critiqued as part of a negative critique of capitalism as a whole. 
The molecular nature of desire and its territorialisation’s are not the 
same as the movement of value either in its basis as abstract labour or in 
its appearance in social forms. Deleuze and Guattari’s (2013) work does 
give some consideration to Marx’s conception of value as the essence of 
capitalist society as value in motion. Despite this, the idea that Deleuze 
and Guattari transcend Marxist theory, or open up new areas of the-
ory by not essentialising aspects of Marxism, are over-estimated either 
because the authors undermine aspects of Marxism by generalising the 
terms through which capitalism operates (code rather than value without 
accepting the historically situated nature of value within capitalism), or 
by misunderstanding and misapplying Marxist concepts (surplus value 
which is treated as arising from financialisation rather than exploitation).
This is not to critique Deleuze and Guattari’s theory in its own 
post-structural terms (Colebrook, 2002), but rather to consider it in 
relation to value critique which (in term of its conception of capitalist 
society and, for our purposes, the critique of AI) presents a superior 
framework for understanding these relations. To expand on this, cap-
italism’s origin is understood by Deleuze and Guattari (2013, p.49) as 
‘…born of the encounter of two sorts of flows: the decoded flow of pro-
duction in terms of money capital and the decoded flows of labor in the 
form of the “free worker”’, but these are not ‘flows’ of the same order 
(one is circulatory and the other is an abstraction, as abstract labour), 
and the correspondence of these with value is unclear. Furthermore, 
the primary elements of Marxism are the (deterritorialised) worker and 
(decoded) money, according to Deleuze and Guattari. They do consider 
abstract labour as an ontologically different form of labour than appears 
in previous economic formations and value as a substance in motion that 
realises itself (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013, p.262; see also Tynan, 2009, 
p.33). These relations are called a distinct ‘coding’ relative to that which 
occurred before and unnecessarily mystified as a ‘surplus value of flux’ 
(Tynan, 2009, p.40). Choat (2009, p.19) claims that this leads Deleuze 
to consider a relationality in which ‘…class relations are not character-
ised by some pre-existing identity but are reciprocally determined…
actual relationship and all social relationships are the incarnation of 
economic relations as different virtuosities that may be actualised in 
different ways…’ Whilst this reciprocal determination is fundamental, 
and might transcend certain forms of vulgar Marxism, this does not 
offer anything additional to Marx and certainly not the NRM or value 
critique. Matters become confused when the authors consider that cap-
italism represents a movement from a surplus value of code to a surplus 
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value of flux, when surplus value only has a meaning under capitalism. 
This concretises the economic categories as transcending capitalism and 
would be clearly rejected in the historically specific (to capitalism) the-
ories of value discussed above. They also refer to a ‘mechanic surplus 
value produced by constant capital’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013, p.267) 
which is taken to be a counter-acting tendency to the falling rate of profit 
where innovation ultimately reduces the SNLT, but this is not explained 
in terms of value as historically and logically associated with abstract 
labour. Abstract labour and value are, therefore, included in a ‘form’ in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s adaptation of Marxism, but they become sub-
sumed in a peculiar understanding of code, surplus, and the mechanic 
which is particular to their theories. This acts to limit the ways in which 
Deleuze and Guattari understand capitalist fundamentals and crisis 
which they relate to disproportionalities between sectors of production 
or countries (as in the discussion of centre and periphery, Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2013, pp.266–7). This is discussed by Tynan (2009) who sees 
a relationship between Marx’s rejection of Say’s law and his emphasis 
on the conflictual relationship between worker and capitalist, and the 
disjuncture between production and machine in Deleuze and Guattari. 
Tynan (2009) sees the contributions of Deleuze and Guattari in terms 
of enabling us to consider the unequal relations between worker and 
capitalist, the relationship between money flows as the ‘interior limit 
of capital’, and the ideological flows of repression and permissiveness 
between the state and the market. If this is the case, then we might ask 
why is it even necessary to construct an elaborate apparatus of coding 
and decoding to recreate what is already there in (even vulgar) Marxism 
whilst losing the interior contradictions of the value relation itself. In 
addition, this focus on unequal distribution in exchange does not con-
sider how exchange itself performs the function of social validation 
(Pitts, 2018) focussing instead on inequalities or disproportionalities. In 
contrast, value as conceptualised by the NRM and value critique offers 
not a flattening ontology, but a dynamic one, displaying how through the 
‘cell’ of the commodity form capitalism warps space and time, and how 
capitalism comes to dominate all social (and physical) space. Compared 
to theories of coding, territorialisation, deterritorialisation, and lines of 
flight (which often lead to a focus on money and financialisation with 
no understanding of why this movement has taken place in terms of a 
negative critique of value) value critique enables an understanding of 
capitalism that is neither teleological (that certain movements are inev-
itable) or merely vectoral (that things operate in different directions 
with no principle). In conclusion, the Deleuzian analysis of capitalism 
unnecessarily complicates but also mystifies capitalism. Capitalism is no 
flatland, Cthulhu, or rhizomic tree, although it might appear as all of 
those things. The essence of capital is value in motion, but this is not 
an essentialised notion. The concept of ‘mechanic surplus value’ adds 
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nothing to the concept of surplus value as it already exists but rather 
mystifies the production of machines (including AI).
Conclusion: AI and the Capitalist 
University in the ‘Vortex’
In contrary to the theories discussed in the previous section, Marxist 
theorisations of capitalism and value discussed in this chapter provides 
us with a way of thinking about universities, technology, skills, and AI 
that demystifies some of our assumptions around these dimensions of 
capitalist development, and enables us to think about these questions 
across the life cycle of the commodity, and in relation to labour, strug-
gle, and negation in a superior way to other recent social theories of 
value and the commodity. The social positing of value (in any indus-
try, including the academic labour expended in the capitalist university) 
through abstract labour brings us consistently back to labour not in a 
positive sense (that valuing labour value above all else should be the aim 
of a future society) but a negative one. That abstract labour, which only 
exists in capitalism, creates value which in the hands of capital destroys 
not only living labour but also the planet. It is hard to see at this stage 
how current forms of technology, such as AI, which drive the creation 
of relative surplus value can be used as the basis for a future communist 
society whereby these can be repurposed, but this question will be dis-
cussed in the final chapter.
We can also see, as stated above, the difference between technology 
and capitalism in terms of the self-valorisation of value. That is, mate-
rial technology and value are coincidental variables. It is the search for 
increased profits (relative surplus value) that leads capitalists to invest in 
increased technology which ultimately undermines relative surplus value 
(and on a material level, profits). Ultimately, all of this occurs in relation 
to labour (abstract labour) which is the source of value for capitalism. 
Hence technology (including AI) and human skill is wrapped up with the 
relation between capitalist and labourer. Within this, AI has a role, not 
only in the process of production, as fixed capital, but also within the 
valorisation process as a whole and is one of the ways in which capital-
ists attempt to increase their profits, valorise commodities, and expand 
the universe of capitalist values. Of course, this is the subject of the 
whole book but even this preliminary analysis suggests a variety of ways 
in which AI is used in the capitalist university.
Firstly, AI is used not only to measure and discipline work, in the 
creation of a commodity through the analytics of things such as league 
tables, but data analytics and AI also act as a process by which value 
can be ‘socially validated’, in terms of production of a commodity that 
can be sold on the market (Pitts, 2018). Processes such as data mining 
and data analytics are used to validate the existence of a commodity 
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(whether student experience or research outputs) that are socially vali-
dated through their exchange for money. Pitts (2018, p.237) describes 
this as the ‘work of combustion’ and the ‘form giving fire’ of the creative 
industries (branding, advertising, and design) but this also applies to the 
algorithmic work in the service industries, including universities, where 
AI is used to give form to the commodities whether these are material 
or services. AI is part of the ‘…considerable effort to endow a commod-
ity with a social relationship whereby it can stand in relation to other 
commodities through the mediation of monetary exchange’ (Pitts, 2018, 
p.228). This could be in terms of academic outputs or student experi-
ences. In terms of student experience, for example, although this is a 
subjective, mental, experience of the student initially this is given ‘form’ 
by predictive analytics based on student surveys and analysis of social 
media so that this ‘potential’ commodity can be commodified as a result 
in student surveys that are exchanged for money in terms of student 
fees. The abstract labour of academics, in terms of teaching students, is 
abstract labour that is only valorised in terms of student fees.
Secondly, AI acts to impose labour discipline directly in terms of algo-
rithmic calculations to attempt to calculate the productivity of labour 
with regard to the global imposition of labour time, the SNLT, to pro-
duce an educational commodity. AI acts almost as if it were extension 
of the mind of the capitalist, and this enables the monetarisation of all 
aspects of activity in a university.
Thirdly, value critique enables us to make various assessments about 
the nature of AI in the capitalist university and not just about its relation 
to it. At the level of the material, there is an understanding of the relation 
between physical entities, the material form of AI, and real abstractions. 
Value, as well as the relation between abstract labour and surplus value 
may be intangible, non-empirical concepts, but they act back on the 
material world that we experience. They have real consequences for our 
lives as experienced in capitalism including the way that we see AI. The 
material (concrete) component of labour and the material qualities of 
technology are sense impressions or residues. AI is ephemeral. That is not 
to say that it is a post-modern signifier that has no connection to reality. 
It is scientifically real by the criteria of physics, chemistry, and biology. 
There is physical and mental effort involved in the work of building and 
coding AI, and electrons move through the circuits of computers are as 
real as the electrical impulses that move through neurons. Having said 
this, we must assume that science is capitalist science and is often moved 
in the directions which are required by capitalism. Therefore, we should 
not concentrate on only the concretisation of AI in universities, but its 
relationship to value and capitalism.
Fourthly, despite the fundamentals of capitalism as ‘self-valorising 
value’ there are no teleological assumptions in terms of the ways in which 
this might progress and move. Capitalism can go through different 
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stages, crisis, and reinventions and remain capitalism. There is no reason 
why capitalism will progress through certain discrete stages of techno-
logical development, and no reason why technology or AI should move 
in a particular direction. Certain technological routes may be closed 
off, or stunted, because they do not meet the particular direction of 
capitalism for profit. Other forms of technology might be progressed to 
meet the need for greater profitability but not deliver on these profits. 
AI might be a particular and peculiar ‘moment’ in capitalism. What is 
certain is that capitalism is driven by profit (the search for relative sur-
plus value) to survive. Although capitalism must revolutionise the means 
of production, this does not mean that AI will accelerate alongside any 
particular line, and it may join the list of capitalist industrial fads that 
did not continue, not because they were technologically unsophisticated, 
but purely as they were not profitable.
Fifthly, despite this non-teleological or empirical view, value will 
become increasingly unsubstantial. When all labour is drawn into the 
production processes of capitalism and pushed towards maximum pro-
ductivity, skill, and labour time, then value becomes stretched between 
an inexorably growing universe of commodities. It becomes increasingly 
difficult for capital to live as surplus value is increasingly hard to realise 
in the sale of commodities. As capitalism grows towards the infinite, it 
struggles to breathe. Of course, it continues to struggle with no regard 
to the actual physical or material resources that are needed to sustain 
life and ecology. Capital is not interested in the world but only in profit.
In conclusion, Neary and Winn (2017) consider that the value-form 
vortex ‘…grounds the modern University as a function of material social 
processes of capitalist value production’. The vortex of value means that 
everything becomes a ‘social form’ within capitalism but not as a flat 
ontology, but rather a flattening one. This is described by Neary and 
Winn (2017) as the ‘value-vortex’ in the modern capitalist university 
which is ‘…grounded in the material reality of the value form’ (Neary 
and Winn, 2017). AI is part of this process of grinding down reality to 
become value. However, it is necessary to consider abstract labour in 
this context if we are to understand that it produces value under the con-
ditions of class struggle which is not incidental, but integral, to abstract 
labour as a social form. If there is no ‘outside’ of capitalism from which 
a perspective can be developed by workers then the direction of revolu-
tionary progress must be decided on by intellectuals and other groups 
tangential to workers struggle. The problems with this approach are well 
established in Marxist theory, but even in its own terms value critique 
and NRM must (and does, particularly in the work of Pitts, 2018) accept 
that class struggle is central to the establishment and continuation of 
abstract labour. Therefore, there is no other way to desubstantiate value 
(and hence capitalism) other than directly engaging with class struggle at 
various levels. This involves a connection with worker struggles, mental 
42 Capitalist Universities, AI, and Value
and manual, including academic labour and its relation to technologies 
such as AI, which is the subject of Chapter 3.
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Introduction
As explained in the previous chapter, Higher Education (HE) is just 
another form of capitalist enterprise that is an element of the vortex of 
value that is capitalism. Despite the privileging of intellectual labour 
in societies, and the fetishising of universities as centres of ideas and 
culture, what academics do is still work. Within capitalism, academic 
labour is no different from other forms of labour, as it is abstract (and 
concrete) labour with the aim of creating value in a circuit of com-
modity production. What academics do in concrete terms (concrete 
labour, which is often the subject of critiques of aspect of ‘academic 
work’) must be considered as a unity with the other, inseparable ele-
ment of their work, abstract labour. This is not just a description but 
a conception of value which is both a negative critique and regards 
value as a social form. Capital is a product of abstract labour in cap-
italism which becomes increasingly insubstantial as its forces develop. 
Academic work becomes increasingly concrete with measurement and 
managerialism but paradoxically its products become less substantive as 
efficiencies and enhancements are made. This is because organisational 
and technological innovations, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), do 
not directly produce value. They can only posit it (or put it into motion) 
as enhancing the productivity of labour power and through decreasing 
the Socially Necessary Labour Time (SNLT) to produce a commodity. 
These investments can temporarily lead to an increase in relative surplus 
value which, through further technological and organisational accumu-
lation, is eroded away. This process is only with social meaning when 
valorised by a complete cycle of production, circulation, and exchange. 
Hence, there is a constant search by capitalist universities for technologi-
cal and skill advantage which collectively disintegrates as that advantage 
is competed away. Any residual meaning in academic work, in terms 
of its intrinsic value, becomes lost in the blur of accelerating demands 
and competition between universities as capitals. This is an uncertain, 
fragile, process that accelerates towards its own destruction, and is an 
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inherently antagonistic one, in terms of the existence of academic labour, 
within conditions of class struggle. Class struggle also situates the rela-
tionship between technologies such as AI and academic labour as one in 
which the continued supply of labour power and its compliance is neces-
sary for production. Academic labour, as abstract labour, is a particular 
social (rather than physiological or technical) form. As noted in the pre-
vious chapter, value critique and the NRM (New Reading of Marx) have 
been criticised as avoiding discussions of class struggle. Without class 
struggle an account of value is meaningless.
In this chapter I will consider how academic labour has been consti-
tuted in the recent Marxist literature, with relation to class struggle and 
how the role of machinery and technology has been conceptualised. This 
leads to a discussion concerning the ways in which both academic labour 
and AI are part of the valorisation process. HE is being continuously 
capitalised and intensified in terms of commodity production. As part of 
this process, capitalism becomes less differentiated between industries 
as all are purposed towards the maximisation of profit through com-
modity production. Despite the variety of technologies, forms of labour, 
varieties of commodities and branding, HE becomes increasingly capi-
talised. This makes it simpler to borrow technique of labour discipline 
from other industries, and we currently see that AI-based techniques 
adopted from digital manufacturing and services are being used in con-
temporary HE to subsume academic labour as part of capital. This is 
a process that involves various kinds of subsumption – absolute, real, 
ideal, and hybrid – and, I will argue, a (version of) Dyer-Whiteford, 
Kjøsen and Steinhoff’s (2019) concept of hyper-subsumption which rep-
resents a scalar shift in primitive accumulation towards AI. The ways 
in which AI enables a synthetic version of the ‘mind’ of the capitalist 
into the academic production process and privatises the attempt to 
construct a general intellect will also be discussed as a way in which 
capitalists try to curtail the disruptive, collective power, and revolu-
tionary potential of workers in HE. As soon as AI does not increase 
profits, perhaps by becoming generalised across HE or through a tech-
nological or organisational impasse, then it will be abandoned for a 
‘superior’ technology. Hence the discussion of AI and the adoption of 
digital manufacturing techniques might be a fleeting moment in HE, 
but one that illustrates the tendency towards new forms of subsumption 
and control.
Although it is made of failing components, capitalism gives the 
impression that it is a totalising system. A discussion of academic labour 
is intimately connected with the nature of the ‘commodity’ produced in 
HE and its valorisation. Academic labour is purely directed towards 
commodity production (teaching, research, and knowledge exchange) 
with an administrative apparatus within universities devoted to achiev-
ing the social validation of these forms for money (such as completing 
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the data returns to exchange those commodities for income from the 
state or from a sale of tuition, or knowledge, to private actors). In the 
traditional, human capital focussed, field of neoclassical economics of 
education, HE establishments are considered to produce a basket of 
commodities such as research and education. Students are given the role 
of consumer in many of these economic models but the state and private 
industries also purchase outputs. For most HEIs (Higher Education 
Institutions) worldwide, they are funded (to a greater or lesser extent) 
by private student fees and other income from research and teaching 
based on a funding formula (this is true of most HEIs worldwide, few 
are funded by a block grant from government independent of these 
factors and if they are then this is subject to a certain level of perfor-
mance). The final commodities produced by HEIs are therefore usually 
a series of data returns to government as well as some kinds of private 
fee income and revenue from other sources, such as research. Only when 
these commodities are valorised for money, and in an instant represent 
the valorisation of abstract labour, it is that all that academic labour 
‘makes sense’ within capitalism. Hence students and research outputs, 
including the final version of an academic paper, can best be thought of 
as the intermediate products of production just prior to valorisation or 
the ‘commodity stock’ (Marx, 1992a). This does not mean that they are 
ephemeral and non-existent, rather they have a really existing material 
essence as physical objects (through concrete labour, but they might not 
be quite the things that academics would have produced outside of cap-
italism), yet they are also products of abstract labour. The ‘data return’ 
by which most HEIs gain their income from the state and other sources, 
as a commodity, already represents a mathematical (computational) 
formula, even of a simple additive nature, which is easily monetarised 
ex-ante in anticipation of the valorisation. In this way, it acts back on 
academic labour which is already abstract labour in anticipation of that 
moment of exchange for money. The nature of the commodity in HE 
means that it is already, for the most part, a formula that requires cal-
culation and there is an obvious role for computation, data analytics, 
and AI in the maximisation and optimisation of strategies including the 
treatment of academic labour power. The final commodity produced 
by most HEIs (as a data return) is akin to a large-scale item, such as a 
battleship that is sold to the state rather than as a series of small com-
modities which are similar to consumer goods. Of course, a minority 
of HEIs specialise in rapid turnover short courses or modular degrees 
in exchange for regular fee income and the volatile nature of the HE 
commodity in the era of AI will be discussed in the next chapter. It 
should be apparent that the norm of a collaborative form of production 
towards a single (or series of large) data commodities makes parallels 
with digital manufacturing (and the implementation of data analytics) 
clear.
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The Violence of Academic Labour 
and Labour ‘In General’
As a social material substance, as considered in the previous chapter, 
value can only be created in conditions of domination, exploitation, and 
class struggle which presupposes labour and capital as socially antago-
nistic, but mutually dependent, categories. Labour and capital depend 
on each other. The dispossession of property from the working class and 
the hammering of work into its capitalist form as labour power (abstract 
and concrete labour) are necessary for the existence of capital:
The worker’s propertylessness, and the ownership of living labour 
by objectified labour, or the appropriation of living labour, or the 
appropriation of alien labour by capital – both merely expression of 
the same relation from opposite poles – are fundamental conditions 
of the bourgeois mode of production, in no way accidents irrelevant 
to it.
(Marx, 1993, p.832)
It is true that, as academics, we might enjoy aspects of our academic 
work, and even the production of the ‘commodity stock’ (teaching stu-
dents and writing articles) that become the commodities that are realised 
for money, but we do so under conditions not of our making and always 
in conditions of struggle. Work, as a transhistorical concept, can be 
something that humans want and enjoy doing, but this is twisted into 
an alien and unrecognisable form in capitalist production. Now work 
becomes synonymous with the constant supply of labour power under 
the conditions defined by the capitalist to produce value under strict time 
discipline (production which is only socially valuable under the condi-
tions of SNLT, average skill, and with a valorised product). This does 
not allow for any ‘slack’ production, ‘mistakes’ or ‘personal projects’ 
as time to do anything other than that involved in the production of 
commodities is dead, frivolous, time. It does not allow for any organi-
sational or technological slack or any deficiency in skills of the worker 
(which are increasingly becoming disciplined by the sentient academic 
commodity as explained in the next chapter). Labour time in excess of 
the SNLT, or below the average level of socially defined skill, is not rec-
ognised as labour in capitalism. The eventual result of excessive labour 
time to produce an academic commodity would be that profit will fall 
in a particular university, and this will mean that the university will 
leave production (as profits have fallen) or will be taken over or merged 
with another university, or another type of capital entirely. Even state 
forms of HE are under the watchful eye of capitalist companies in terms 
of whether any ‘slack’ labour time or resource can be replaced by pri-
vate sector processes. These objective and alienating compulsions are the 
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conditions of any worker within capitalist production and they will sub-
jectively and objectively suffer the consequences unless they resist (and in 
resistance the threat of losing the capacity to labour – unemployment – 
is threatened). Of course, some (perhaps most) workers might succumb 
to capitalist work easily, perhaps joyfully, for fear of losing their wage 
or a slight subjective advantage in consumption above other workers. 
Such fears are completely justified and realistic. In capitalist society, not 
to be exploited means to earn no wage or any of the other benefits of 
work (in some societies this includes health care). The power of a class 
struggle theorisation of value is that it brings into the dynamic of work 
an appreciation of not only the subjective and objective but also the nat-
urally resistant elements of that relationship. By combining this with 
value critique, a theoretical framework can be created that protects such 
critique from some of the arguments that have been made against it by 
what has sometimes been called ‘traditional Marxism’. In essence, this 
is simply a reminder of the primordial (since primitive accumulation) 
duality of class relationships in capitalism. Human beings including aca-
demics have to labour as they:
…can only survive by selling themselves temporarily, or more pre-
cisely, by selling their vital energy, as labour power, for an exter-
nal purpose…For them labor thus primarily means a fundamental 
extraction of vital energy and in this respect is thus an extremely 
real, actually existing abstraction.
(Tenkle, 2014, p.4)
The expenditure of abstract labour in capitalism creates value which is a 
form of social domination. Academic workers might oppose the extrac-
tion of labour power at various levels of organisation from the trivial and 
subjective (daydreaming), to the organised (union work) and objective 
(creating co-operative universities). It is not that abstract labour involves 
a particularly defined labour process or mode of organisation, but rather 
it is in the a priori nature of labour in capitalism and academic labour is 
no different in this respect. The increasing precarity of academic labour, 
redundancies, and performance management are rightly seen as signs of 
the increasing proletarianisation of academic labour but the nature of 
academic labour, as abstract labour in the creation of value, is equivalent 
to all other forms of labour in the process of valorisation as discussed in 
the previous chapter.
In the moment of valorisation of the commodity for money all labour 
involved in its composition is validated as abstract labour. Academic 
labour time is already abstract labour (in value critique) or at least pos-
ited as abstract labour (in the NRM) but awaits a final combustion 
before it is meaningful in capitalism. In HE, this commodity is usu-
ally a data return and in the moment that the monetary return hits the 
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University bank account every interaction between student and lecturer, 
every seminar run by a GTA (Graduate Teaching Assistant), and every 
keynote held by a Professor in the formation of that commodity reveals 
its nature as abstract labour. It is valuable to the university only in terms 
of the creation of value. This collective labour, and then the entire social 
capital of global HE production, returns to face each of these workers 
in terms of investment in new technological and organisational forms 
(including AI), a falling SNLT, and an increasingly alienated, stressful, 
and competitive workplace. Although academic workers might identify 
with different class strata and class interests (for example, many aca-
demics identify as middle class and some have inherited wealth), they all 
objectively labour to produce value in conditions of class struggle.
Class struggle is fundamental, and not optional, when analysing the 
nature of labour and value within capitalism, and this includes academic 
labour. Autonomist Marxists have paid particular attention to the role of 
labour and class struggle within the creation of value. De Angelis (1995) 
defines value as the class relation of work (De Angelis, 1995, p.118) with 
abstract labour as substance, its measure as SNLT and its objective form 
as money (this is the money form of value which is the only material way 
in which value appears objectively in capitalist society). According to this 
view, the labour theory of value is a class relation, being both the capi-
talist imposition of, and working-class resistance to, work as discussed 
above. The production of value is synonymous with resistance and class 
struggle. It is, therefore, conceptually better to invert the phrase ‘labour 
theory of value’ to a ‘value theory of labour’ (Elson, 2015) in that it is the 
creation of value in capitalism (as self-valorising value) that is intrinsic 
to the relation between labour and capital. Such a conception of labour 
opens the possibility of working-class struggle being both within and 
against capital to consider possibilities ‘beyond the law of value’ (De 
Angelis, 1995, p.119). De Angelis, therefore, defines work both in terms 
of the labourer and capitalist’s side of the relation. This emphasis on the 
‘class relation of work’ immediately identifies the creation of value in 
terms of the production side of the relation rather than the circulation 
side, which is where value becomes exchange value but as discussed in 
the previous chapter, the realm of circulation is necessary in terms of 
valorisation. This abstract relation has visceral consequence for work 
activity.
These consequences are not only in terms of social domination and 
the ways in which a ‘real abstraction’ determines the concrete mani-
festation of life in capitalism but also in terms of alienation and the 
continuously expanding ‘abstraction away’ from lived experience. De 
Angelis considers that capitalist work (abstract labour) separates the 
worker from their sensuous experience of working (concrete labour, but 
even the performance of this in capitalism is alienating), placing them 
in a ‘position of indifference’ to such labour (De Angelis, 1995, p.110). 
50 AI and the Subsumption of Academic Labour
In every moment of work, the labourer must overcome ‘pain, human 
suffering, human brutalisation, boredom…’ (De Angelis, 1995, p.110) 
as well as the immiseration and inequalities of working. As money is 
boundless as a social objective, the possible number and variety of com-
modities are limitless and as capital has to expand and accumulate to 
survive, there is no limit to the imposition of work. Similarly, Tenkle 
(2014, p.5) considers labour to be abstract in the temporal separation 
between work and experience ‘…time that has been separated from the 
subjective sensations, feelings and experiences of working individuals’. 
It should be noted that it is this aspect of labour, its nature as abstract 
labour in capitalism which makes it unique. Abstraction is thus not just 
a theoretical process, whereby an abstract entity comes to dominate our 
work but part of lived experience. We can feel abstraction through our 
alienation from work and the objective and subjective experiences that 
result from this, including our use of technologies such as AI.
This approach to abstract labour and class struggle is in opposition 
to so called ‘technological paradigms’ which use formal, mathematical, 
linear programming approaches to the determination of value. There are 
several problems with the technological approach from those who take 
a more social approach. Firstly, it neglects the specificity of the form of 
value (money) which is a specifically social form of mediation. Abstract 
labour refers to a social process rather than a merely technical congeal-
ing of labour. The social nature of this process is seen in all the processes 
involving value, including its production and circulation. Secondly, 
abstract labour exists prior to the process of exchange (as it is technolog-
ically determined) whereas in the social paradigm, it is only in exchange 
that the social validation of abstract labour occurs. De Angelis (1995) 
considers that both perspectives are problematic as they do not recog-
nise the substance of value as identifying ‘a social relation of struggle 
of a particular nature’ (De Angelis, 1995, p.121). It is the class strug-
gle approach that adds to the truly social dimension of value above the 
social-validation (and positing of labour as abstract labour) approach. In 
opposition to the technological paradigm, De Angelis (1995) therefore 
opens the possibility (following Cleaver, 1979) of a ‘strategic’ or ‘politi-
cal’ reading of the labour theory of value (De Angelis, 1995, p.128). This 
view is not without some controversy. Kicillof and Starosta (2007) con-
sider that De Angelis’ argument has two heroic contentions. Primarily, 
that Marx’s critique of classical political economy was based on his con-
ception of the specific form of labour in capitalism, rather than simply a 
critique of the inability of the classical economists to consider capitalism 
as a historical form. Additionally, that abstract labour is the substance 
of value and that abstract labour is the capitalist form of work. Kicillof 
and Starosta consider abstract labour to be instead ‘….a generic material 
form’ (Kicillof and Starosta, 2007, p.16) being the expenditure of the 
brains, muscles, nerves, and hands of humans. Here they posit that it is 
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acts of private, physical labour, that are simply brought together as a sin-
gle ‘generic material form’ in the commodity. This infers that there is a 
combined physiological form of abstract labour in the commodity (which 
does not seem to be a particularly Marxist depiction of abstract labour). 
As workers needs are determined by capital ‘…there is no way in which 
they can stand in absolute contradiction with the ‘principle’ of capital’s 
self-expansion’ (Kicillof and Starosta (2007, p.23) ‘…there is no exteri-
ority to the alienated social relations of capital’ (Kicillof and Starosta 
(2007, p.27). However, there is a key difference between labour power 
and labour which is not considered by Kicillof and Starosta (2007). It 
is labour power that capitalists wish to obtain – the consciousness of 
the worker is of peripheral (although not unimportant) consideration 
in determining their willingness to provide labour power (in exchange 
for a wage). Ultimately, physiological theories of labour do not really 
describe how labour is sold and used in capitalism. Workers don’t sell 
corporeal units (use of their brains, hands etc.), they sell their time and 
this is bound up with the fact that immiseration means that time is not 
the labourer’s. Although Marx was interested in energy as a metaphor, it 
was a social metaphor, and this was not to ever state that labour power 
could be expressed in calorific terms (and, as previously stated, value is 
only ever relative as it is determined by all other social labours, average 
levels of skill, and technological development). Besides, workers are con-
scious subjects who viscerally feel the consequences of work and not just 
energy transfer machines.
A class struggle reading of abstract labour is applicable to academic 
labour, and its relationships to technologies and machines such as AI. It 
enables the identification of despotism in capitalism and identifies value 
as not just an analytical category but one in which revolution is implicit. 
In locating class struggle as central to the understanding of abstract 
labour and value, De Angelis provides an important rebuttal to Kurz 
(2014) and Postone’s (2003) critique of labour movements within capital-
ism. Class struggle, and labour movement Marxism, is not only (except 
in its most reformist formulations) about fetishising value and promot-
ing wage labour but also about the brutality and alienation of work and 
of overturning those relations. This is a fundamental element of working 
class struggle and critique. Extrapolating from De Angelis’ work means 
that we must consider that all aspects of capitalist existence, including 
the relationship between humans and AI, can be contested through 
class struggle. This brings into question the nature of the human under 
capitalism and the extent to which materials such as prosthetics and 
other enhancements can be part of labour rather than capital. Indeed, 
these classification struggles are occurring in terms of how unions 
consider robot labour, and partnerships between humans and robots. 
Note that this is not about disputing the existence of these categories, 
such as ‘human’ or ‘labour’ but recognising class struggle around their 
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parameters which has existed since the earliest days of capitalism. De 
Angelis does not see class struggle as being either inside or outside the 
production of value but rather synonymous with it (De Angelis, 1995, 
p.119). Autonomist and Open Marxists sometimes emphasise wider defi-
nitions of class struggle and ‘cycles of struggle’ (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, 
p.13) which includes wider understanding of class to include the precar-
iat and non-market labour. Class struggle is offered as an alternative to a 
simplistic domination by capital. ‘Labor is for capital always a problem-
atic “other”’ (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, p.65). Labour can never be fully 
incorporated into capital, and the working class are defined in terms of 
their struggle against capital, not as simply selling labour power, but this 
determination has weaknesses in that it does tend towards analysis of 
‘social principles’ or ‘immaterial labour’ which will be critiqued in the 
next section, when I discuss AI and the General Intellect. Labour power 
cannot be performed without resistance. This is not in terms of utility or 
preference but in terms of the axiological potential of the individual, the 
collective, and the human species more generally. AI enters this terrain 
of struggle but does not determine it.
AI and the Nature of Academic Labour
There is a distinctive literature on academic labour which is separate 
from that on academic work (which primarily focusses on conditions of 
work and the impact of this on academic identity and conditions) as it 
considers labour as a historical, capitalist, category for critique within 
a negative critique of capitalism (Winn, 2015). Hall (2018), employ-
ing a Marxist framework of a negative critique of value, considers that 
academic labour takes place within what he refers to as a circuit of 
expanded alienation whereby academics are alienated from their own 
labour (labour power), production (product of labour), self and human-
ity (species-being). Through quantification and league tables academics 
are also alienated from their peers as production of academic commod-
ities becomes ‘commensurable and measurable’ based on abstract time 
(Hall, 2018, p.83). Processes of subsumption by capital as a social power 
in academia impoverishes and proletarianises academic labour and leads 
of capital. Maisuria and Helmes (2020) employ a historical approach 
to academic labour, showing how capitalisation, commodification, and 
marketisation have manifested themselves in contemporary HE through 
neoliberal policies. The ‘neo-liberalisation’ of the University has been 
achieved (despite worker resistance) through competition, privatisation 
(and quasi-privatisation), new technologies and managerial forms, the 
rise and promotion of the ‘entrepreneurial’ academic and curriculum 
reforms that promote competitiveness and employability. This drive for 
to fragmented identities and anxiety (Hall and Bowles, 2016, pp.38–40). 
At the same time, academic labour is objectified as an alien property 
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profit and surplus is the reality of academic labour, which increasingly 
becomes subsumed by capital. Within the totality of capitalist relations, 
academic labour also produces resistances and forms of communality 
and collegiality including alternative, co-operative forms of education 
(Hall, 2018; Maisuria and Helmes, 2020), and spaces (albeit con-
tested and self-contested) of free and resistant labour (Shukaitis, 2019). 
Academic labour, and its relation to AI, therefore needs to be under-
stood within a negative critique of labour as ‘…inside-against-beyond 
the capitalist university’ (Szadkowski, 2016, p.10).
In terms of its relation to academic labour, AI is not a peripheral tech-
nology as automation is central to capitalist production which appears as 
if it has an ‘automatic character’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.119), mobilised 
by labour and machinery, but in reality is ‘…inherent in the production 
relations of capitalism’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.119) which converts all 
processes into ‘automation’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.121). AI is part of this 
in replacing human labour power in capitalism whilst simultaneously 
extending and intensifying the production of labour power. Part of this 
process is in terms of increasing the quality of labour power through 
investment by capitalists in the social production of labour power. There 
is nothing ‘magical’ about technology and automation mechanisms 
including AI, in terms of their influence on capitalism. Indeed, the devel-
opment of AI ultimately (over time) has no net effect on surplus value 
and profits:
From the moment that the increased productivity becomes wide-
spread, innovative individual capital loses its edge. Nevertheless, it 
is not a matter of a return to a point zero or to a previous starting 
point. On the contrary, the higher level of productivity transforms 
itself into a new general standard. The hour of labour, as the basic 
unit of abstract labour, is always the same, it cannot have as such 
‘different’ levels. However, the new standard of productivity imposes 
the condition that fewer of those hours of always identical abstract 
labour be required for an increased mass of products. When capital 
is devalued or destroyed in the crisis, the achieved standard of pro-
ductivity remains the same, because it is inscribed in the aggregate 
constituted by knowledge and know-how.
(Kurz, 2014, p.17)
We should, therefore, not be under the illusion that AI employed in 
universities is ultimately transforming capitalism. There is a halluci-
natory sweep of capitalism with its ever-expanding skills, velocities, 
exoskeletons, big data, and machines. AI is a contemporary technology 
which may seem to revolutionise everything in universities. The appear-
ance may be of a ‘Constant revolutionising of production’ (Marx and 
Engels, 2002, p.223). The reality is that technical revolutions are a sign 
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that capitalism is a stagnant and weak system. Capital, in movement, 
is not like a growing layer of technology around the globe that con-
stantly expands. Rather it but is akin to the thinness of a sap moving 
through the world like it would through a dying tree and leaving noth-
ing but dead labour in its wake. Similarly, accelerationism may consider 
it original to state that an hour isn’t an hour, that time is non-linear, 
and that the future is hailing the present, that we are being happily 
invaded and colonised by an inevitably inhuman future (which is why 
the neo-reactionary philosopher Nick Land, who will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, turned to Lovecraft, as much as Marx). We never reach a 
technological singularity as when we think we are approaching the 
event horizon, the present consistently becomes historically useless, 
and the production clock consistently starts again as the SNLT falls 
towards nothing.
AI is an example of a mere machine, and machines in capitalism can 
be both entities (usually physical objects) or activities (organisational 
forms and practices which can include regimes of skill accumulation 
and use). AI is both of those things in terms of its physical manifestation 
and coding, but also in terms of the ways in which work activities are 
orientated around supplying information for the AI or are disciplined 
by AI monitoring. AI does not produce value but, through enhancing 
the productivity of labour (which only arises as AI itself is formed of 
soaked up labour time), might enable the temporary existence of relative 
surplus value. Capitalists attempt to maximise, using AI alongside other 
machines, all the forms of labour power which are applied by capital. 
This means maximising everything physical, mental or otherwise identi-
fied in the body, or bodies however defined, or contemporaneous with it, 
dividing, combining, and multiplying work to maximise labour power 
applied to a commodity. In HE this involves the analysis and optimisa-
tion of individual work patterns, and how work can be best combined 
with others. Machines like AI also reduce the labour time required to 
produce a commodity (the SNLT) hence increasing relative surplus value. 
As stated above, in whichever form AI is employed as soon as the use of 
a particular AI or arrangement of AI becomes generalised, this relative 
surplus value disappears along with additional profits. Capitalism resets 
itself at a higher level of technological development as if the previous 
wave of AI had never existed. Rather than an accelerating world of AI, 
our capitalist world is static as AI never really makes a difference in the 
long run to anything, in terms of the production of value. Furthermore, 
AI can be antagonistic to the development of class consciousness and 
class struggle. Dyer-Whiteford (1999) examines various autonomist 
perspectives on technology which reject the idea of technology as pro-
gress. Technology is considered to be a weapon (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, 
pp.69–71) with a specific capitalist formulation but one which can be 
resisted, subverted, and sabotaged by workers.
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In terms of academic labour, we can consider AI for most purposes as 
a typical machine, no different from a hammer, but it can also be seen as 
a modern manifestation of the extension of the ‘brain’ of the capitalist 
into every domain of academic work. As class struggle is inevitable in 
capitalism, technologies such as AI are one way in which the capitalist 
class can insert themselves into work practices by enforcing work dis-
cipline (Maisuria and Helmes, 2020, p.25). AI inspired data analytics, 
or machine learning, even of poor quality, can provide a cloak through 
which capitalist universities can supposedly justify their decisions to shut 
courses or sack employees with troublesome research interests or union 
activities. AI is also a component of the absolute and relative subsump-
tion of academic life through extending the working day beyond the 
physical presence of the lecturer and researcher, and applying new organ-
isational and technological forms to the workplace. Digital technologies 
extend the working day by allowing home and mobile working (Hall, 
2018, p.147) facilitated by AI-driven technologies that provide nudges to 
lecturers and allow the division of labelling of lectures and seminars into 
isolated components that can be restructured into ‘new product’. AI, 
machine learning, platform capitalism (Uberfication according to Hall, 
2016) and AI inspired analytics on lecture capture or research outputs 
subsume academic labour into value production and capital, increasing 
relative surplus value as a component of real subsumption. As part of 
this, AI facilitates the ‘social synthesis’ of global academic labours in 
league tables and performance indicators. It is also part of the ‘social 
validation’ of academic labours which represent an intermediate part 
of the production process into a final commodity. Hall (2018) considers 
that as academia becomes increasingly subject to privatisation and com-
modification, it also becomes obsessed with exchange value as opposed 
to the use value of academic products. This capitalisation leads to new 
organisational and technological forms, an increase in the organic com-
position of capital, and the subsumption of HE by value production as it 
contributes to the ‘social totality’ of capital. Alienation and commodity 
fetishism mean that technologies, including AI, are projections of a ‘dis-
torted human essence’ (Hall, 2018, p.74) in which technology further 
divorces academics from the means of production and acts to further 
proletarianise academics (Maisuria and Helmes, 2020, p.23). This pro-
letarianisation (which is often associated with the Marxist concept of 
‘primitive accumulation’) continues through technological means. These 
technologies aim only to produce increased absolute, and relative, sur-
plus value. Hall (2018, pp.148–52) argues that for academic labour the 
promise of educational technology to liberate workers from working 
time and inefficiency is instead a form of technological alienation (sub-
sumption) that rather makes academics dependent on these technologies. 
Cybernetic forms of control monitor the performance of individual aca-
demics, increase the power of managers and re-engineer HE globally for 
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marketisation. This includes the use of metrics and the ‘datafication’ of 
HE (Maisuria and Helmes, 2020, p.15).
AI and the Subsumption of Academic Labour
AI needs to be understood as part of the process of a wider subsumption 
of academic labour. Szadkowski (2016) adopts an ‘orthodox’ Marxist 
reading of subsumption that enables a reading of how AI might influence 
aspects of this process. Formal subsumption, the formal establishment 
of capitalist social relations (in terms of the labour process appearing 
as a process of capital, the expropriation of the means of production, 
the dialectical creation of labour and capital, and the immiseration of 
labourers requiring the sale of labour power) makes it possible for uni-
versities to extract absolute surplus value through increasing labour 
time and the intensity of work (Szadkowski, 2016, p.16). Labour is sub-
ordinated to the rule of value whose production is determined by the 
entirety of social labour and social labour time (SNLT). As discussed 
above, AI and machine learning are ways in which capitalist univer-
sities can specify commodities and optimise inputs of labour. Real 
subsumption involves the labourer confronting the mystified products 
of capital in terms of commodities, technology, and science (the general 
intellect) which transform labour processes. Whilst formal subsump-
tion is primarily quantitative (in term of increasing the working day and 
the intensity of work), real subsumption changes the quality of work 
to become specifically capitalist (Szadkowski, 2016, pp.16–7), but the 
two forms of subsumption are not independent nor does one represent a 
necessarily more ‘advanced’ stage of capitalism, and there may be iter-
ations between them. Szadkowski (2016) also makes reference to two 
forms of subsumption described by Marx which are rarely discussed. 
Hybrid subsumption is, for capitalists, a prefigurative form of capitali-
sation of an area of production where financialisation or quasi-market 
activities are used by capitalists to open up areas of production. Ideal 
subsumption is used, by Marx, to criticise economists who refer to pro-
duction relations as capitalist when they are not, but Szadkowski (2016, 
pp.22–3) sees this as potentially referring to the way in which bourgeois 
conceptions of capitalism are related to all aspects of life. These four 
forms of subsumption are analytically powerful as they allow us to con-
sider the dynamics of capital and its accumulation in a variegated HE 
‘industry’ (Szadkowski, 2016) which, although it might not be fully in 
the private sector, is scaling up to the production of a variety of com-
modities that can be exchanged for money (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.130). 
Similarly rejecting a periodisation, or teleology, of forms of subsump-
tion, Hall and Bowles (2016) refer to ‘architectures of subsumption’ that 
reproduce capitalist social relations. Increasing quantification and meas-
urement of research outputs and student satisfaction and obsessions 
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with university ‘brand’ are elements of the subsumption of academic 
work to the law of value. AI enables real-time performance data on aca-
demics to be managed through ‘…quantification and the internalization 
of algorithmic regulation’ (Hall, 2020, p.125). AI is, therefore, part of 
the positing of academic labour as abstract labour, prior to its realisa-
tion as exchange value through algorithms that relate labour to objective 
variables such as number of students, research outputs, or knowledge 
exchange.
Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019) consider that AI additionally brings 
about a new form of subsumption which they call hyper-subsumption, 
whereby it becomes part of the ‘means of cognition’ (Dyer-Whiteford et 
al, 2019, pp.63–7) as part of the infrastructure or ‘grammar’ of capital-
ism. In some senses hyper-subsumption is like real subsumption where 
the ‘general intellect’ is mobilised by capital. For capital, cognition is 
no different from muscle as a concrete labour, and it is not particularly 
interested in whether machines replace, or act as a multiplier to, workers’ 
arms or brains in realising profit. Hyper-subsumption is also described 
as being the end-point of a teleological history of forms of subsumption 
(Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.51). It could be described as the realisa-
tion of capital as thought, or as a thinking machine (Dyer-Whiteford 
et al, 2019, p.67), but this is remarkably close to accelerationist the-
ories that equate capital with a mechanical materialism (critiqued in 
Chapter 6). However, hyper-subsumption could usefully be used to 
describe the end of the current project of capitalism but not the end of 
capitalism in general with a conscious AI (or more likely a new human/
AI cyborg organism) taking the place of labourers aside from which the 
conditions of capitalism would be unchanged (as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, this is implicit in theories of existential threat of AI, which 
are largely concerned with how to make AI into labour). This does not 
only involve the creation of AI of increasing intelligence, but also the 
subsumption of human processes of thought and reason to capital, a 
process that is already in motion. Moore (2018) analyses the ways in 
which AI is used in workplaces to allow for ‘All-of-Life Surveillance’ of 
labour. In these processes all aspects of work including the emotional, 
affective, moods, reactions, and gestures can be quantified, analysed, 
and controlled (Moore, 2018, p.140). Frischmann and Selinger (2019) 
detail the ways in which ‘techno-social engineering’ is currently being 
used to make human mental processes more amenable to interaction 
with robots and AI, including potentially the engineering of humans 
to be incapable of thought and reason. Preston (2017) has additionally 
detailed the ways in which pedagogy and learning are disappearing as 
concepts in ‘competency based education’ which is becoming increas-
ingly common in HE. These tendencies increase the scope of capital to 
appropriate and control labour power whilst denying it any prefigurative 
possibilities of resistance.
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The potential of AI in this respect also introduces a ‘Stakhanovite’ 
mental labourer which imposes synthetic timing (Sohn-Rethel, 1978) on 
the labour of academic workers. Synthetic timing is that imposed by 
the demands of capital rather than specifically scientific management 
(although it can be masked by such processes and justified post-hoc). 
Such things have always been part of computation but with AI the syn-
thetic timing of labour, external to the actual time for labour to be 
performed, becomes more insidious. There is not only a ‘human’ com-
parison for the time in which mental tasks should be performed but also 
an imminent AI comparison which accelerates the downward spiral of 
SNLT. AI represents the idealised Stakhanovite imminent labourer, able 
to work at any time and at any speed. To differentiate hyper-subsumption 
as separate from relative and absolute subsumption, and to avoid tel-
eological explanations of historical progression, it could be described 
as the replacement of the entire human species by an exact equivalent 
whilst maintaining the transhistorical categories of labour and capital. 
This is possibly closer to barbarism than capitalism. As will be discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6, forms of hyper-subsumption are a particularly 
capitalist solution to both the embodiment of labour power (and its 
resistance) and AI and existential threat.
From Digital Manufacturing to Digital Higher Education
HE, in its entirety, is an industry. Capitalism is concerned only with 
profit and machines, services, and organisational enhancements that are 
sold to one industry can be sold to another. Conceptual barriers between 
industries can be dissolved through technologies that employ similar 
methods to maximise profits. Marketisation and financialisation dis-
solve the barriers between industries to open them up for exploitation. 
In manufacturing industries, a contemporary concept is ‘manufacturing 
as a service’ whereby manufacturers offer personalised products to a 
customer, or their commodities as a service, whether that is a consumer 
at home or another industry. Similarly, service industries increasingly 
employ Taylorist principles which previously operated in manufactur-
ing. The early manufacturing system of ‘piece work’, for example, where 
workers were paid for each product produced, has been reinvented as 
‘platform capitalism’ whereby service providers, such as taxi drivers, 
are paid for each journey fulfilled in a period of time as practiced by 
companies such as Uber. As noted earlier, this ‘Uberfication’ of services 
has similarly been applied to the operation of Universities (Hall, 2016). 
AI, as a form of machine that has universal applications across a range 
of industries, therefore, allows for the control and comparison of dif-
ferent forms of labour both within and across sectors. All industries, 
including HE are increasingly subject to what Szadkowski (2016) refers 
to as hybrid subsumption, the potential for all areas to be opened up 
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for capitalisation, as well as its absolute and real forms. The growth 
and increased profitability of what has been called the ‘Edutech’ sector 
(being part of the private sector that specialises in educational technol-
ogies) is part of this process. Underlying these processes of subsumption 
is the repurposing of all aspects of labour power as capital, including 
workers skills and capacities. This is not just for purposes of profitabil-
ity but is a necessity for the continuation of capital as workers must be 
consistently appropriated from the means of production and placed and 
replaced into positions, where they must continuously resell their labour. 
This involves repeated rounds of primitive accumulation (Bonefeld, 
2002) and the continuous enclosure of knowledge production by capital 
(Canaan, 2019, pp.70–3). Hence, the accumulation of both individual 
and collective mental, ideational, and emotional properties (Moore, 
2018) that might exist outside of capital are stripped from individuals 
and collective workers, including academics, and AI is a key tool in this 
process. HE is, unsurprisingly, colonised by AI and machine learning 
techniques that are used in other industries.
In manufacturing, the intoxication of what has been called the ‘Fourth 
Industrial Revolution’ (Schwab, 2016), Industry 4.0, digital manufac-
turing or New Industrial Systems (NIS) has been an actively pursued 
dream of a seamless and frictionless movement of sensuous commodities 
(or sentient commodities as in Pixarfication, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4) in factories where all aspects of the factory, and all exter-
nal aspects are monitored, controlled, and predicted using tools such as 
AI, the Internet of Things (IoT), and wireless and mobile technologies. 
Such factories operate as hermetically sealed information and skill boxes 
where anything that can be monetarised and capitalised either now or 
in the future is made into private property. Machine learning, and more 
sophisticated forms of AI (including AI embedded in machines, pro-
duction lines, and commodities) is central to the operation of a digital 
factory. Although digital manufacturing is the latest innovation in cap-
italist production, it must be remembered that this is just an iteration 
of capitalism and no different from capitalist forms of production more 
generally. According to Cole (2021, pp.46–7) Industry 4.0 is a capitalist, 
anti-democratic, and inequitable ideology that benefits the ruling class. 
In common with the ‘treadmill effect’ (Postone, 2003) of capitalist pro-
duction, its intention is not only the reduction of concrete production 
times (through falling SNLT and the application of synthetic timing) 
and the reduction of circulation times (through smart logistics) but in 
digital manufacturing, the metric of concrete time is altered further in 
moving from the analog through the digital to the quantum. The ‘speed-
ing up’ of time in capitalist production is extended beyond the limits of 
the standard clock measure of time (the second or millisecond) to further 
finer divisions. Through digital logistics, digital manufacturing leads to 
a fall in times for distribution by applying digital methods to factories. 
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This reduces space for the storage of items and also speeds up circula-
tion times. In terms of use value it leads to the speciation, intelligence, 
and inversion of products (their Pixarfication, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter). Commodities are further engineered to secure their 
own valorisation, and to act back on the labour process to enable prof-
itability. Capital further inverts the human to become the ‘organs’ of 
factory machinery using AI in the hollowing out of human skills through 
digitisation and routinisation (Avis, 2020, pp.52–3). AI can also specify 
optimal ‘fatigue functions’ in Industry 4.0 which are measures of human 
resilience that attempt to ascertain the limits of how hard humans can 
work. Humans become the conscious linkages of capitalism. Even con-
sciousness implies a human characteristic, but this increasingly becomes 
a commodified consciousness, or consciousness as fixed capital where 
the mind/brain can be used as a machine function. As well as decreasing 
time, and space compression, this converts the worker into the prey of 
parasitic capital which attempts to remove any individual or collective 
form of resistance, particularly manifestations of class struggle. Digital 
manufacturing’s push beyond human and mechanic capabilities is a 
manifestation of what Pitts (2018) refers to, using the work of Sohn-
Rethel (1978), as how labour timing does not come about as a result of 
the application of scientific management (which can be extended to AI 
techniques), which is a coercive timing but rather becomes a synthetic 
timing. As explained earlier, this is not interested in the ‘time of the act’ 
but removes the act from all of its contents and causalities to be disci-
plined by the practical abstractions of capital.
In terms of grounding this theorisation in real practices, as part of 
an empirical project involving observations and interviews considering 
how knowledge is being used in manufacturing environments (known as 
‘Chatty Factories’). I considered how digital manufacturing seeks to sub-
sume the potentialities of labour and repurpose this as capital using AI 
and machine learning techniques. Digital manufacturing uses AI to opti-
mise both in terms of cost functions (to maximise profits) and fatigue 
functions (to maximise the use of labour by capital in the production 
process) which, when combined with other data, can become algorithms 
for profit maximisation. As well as data, such as fatigue functions being 
employed within individual factories, there is also a sharing of algo-
rithms and results between companies, nations, and industrial sectors 
(particularly between manufacturing and services). The fatigue func-
tion, for example, is developed through the application of AI in different 
environments which becomes part of a ‘behavioural surplus’ (Zuboff, 
2019). This is a component of the knowledge of the production process, 
that becomes part of the datum of various capitals which, in turn, deter-
mines the labour time required to produce a commodity. This datum 
may differ from place to place, but as part of the world market with 
global science and technologies of manufacturing and human factors, 
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it eventually becomes a universal that acts back on labour as a determi-
nant of abstract labour. Technology, particularly AI, enables capitalism 
to gain deeper knowledge of workers physical, mental and social capa-
bilities to increase exploitation and to understand better their capacity 
for commodity production (Moore, 2018). As discussed above, the dig-
ital also becomes part of the time compression of work. Digitisation of 
various kinds enables one to divide time into successively smaller units 
to split processes of production and circulation (the ‘moments of capi-
tal’) into fragments of time. With the constant monitoring of workers 
through digital value chains, exploitation and the degradation of labour 
accelerates. Capitalism abhors limits and digital manufacturing aims to 
transcend biological limits in terms of the worker’s body in a human 
form by constantly aiming to extract the maximum surplus value from 
workers. Taylorism can be seen to be an initial part of this process 
where ‘…the fusion of natural-scientific technology and the science of 
labour must bring about another, far more hideous capitalist monstros-
ity, because such a fusion eliminates human labor altogether from the 
immediate process of production’ (Kurz, 2014, p.39).
AI facilitates these processes, but in the most developed forms of NIS 
human skills, movements, and capabilities are deliberately read by an AI 
that copies, replicates, reproduces, and improves upon these skills. There 
are several ways that this appears in the real world of capitalist manu-
facturing and services. Firstly, humans are being used to train robots 
to replicate their skills and eventually to replicate their jobs. According 
to a Forbes article (6th May 2015 ‘The Job of the Future is Training 
Robots to Work with Humans’ – Knapp, 2015), the training of robots 
by humans is becoming more common in manufacturing. Knapp (2015) 
explains how conjoint teaching and learning increases the potential of 
both workers and robots implying that there is a conjoint pedagogical 
space that enables ‘more’ to be created (presumably in terms of profits). 
Similarly, Rayethon’s factory in Tuscon, Texas comprises humans and 
robots that work together but the robots purposively do not arrive at the 
factory prepared to meet the requirements of production automatically. 
Rather Rayethon installs software which makes it simpler to ‘retrain 
and retask’ the robot. Work tasks are first simulated by humans and 
then tested by the robots. Once the task is perfected, then it is pushed 
to all of the robots in the factory. This learning also occurs in terms of 
how workers move around a factory. General Motors’ factory workers 
and robots learn to work safely around each other. Their collaborative 
robot, that stacks tires, has been fitted with heightened force sensors that 
can detect human movement (as ‘manufacturing is a contact sport’) and 
humans are provided with training through an ‘awareness week’. ‘The 
robot is now considered to be part of the team’. A. Zahner’s welding 
robot learns by watching engineers through copying their movements 
to weld along an arc. In all of these ways, robots are learning human 
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skills to eventually replicate these in the workplace. This not only 
removes human labour from production and is a manifestation of real 
subsumption, but it also creates a consistently reduced time for the pro-
duction of commodities. Secondly, the collaboration between humans 
and robots is creating systems whereby human skills can only exist in a 
form where they can only be used if it is in work with certain robots or 
machines. For example, Hollinger (2016) examines how collaborative 
robotics (cobots) are changing manufacturing, which means that human 
labour needs to be restructured and re-engineered to work with these 
AI-embedded devices. SEW-Eurodrive also uses collaborative robotics. 
Workers work in ‘cells’ restocked by robotic trucks, assisted by ‘Carmen’ 
the robotic arm and a robotic workbench. Workers need to learn to 
work alongside cobots and the ability of cobots to produce alongside 
humans is consistently improved through machine learning and artifi-
cial intelligence. Robotic arms can be programmed without coding by 
humans moving them and hence they learn to replicate the movements 
of workers by repeating those movements. This is not restricted to mul-
tinationals and SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) may also use 
cobots (cooperative robots). Stenner-Pump uses a cobot (Baxter) in pro-
duction to feed parts in both the manufacturing and packaging process. 
However, they are more commonly used by large corporations. Airbus 
is testing a system where humans can ‘pilot’ a cobot and testing a sys-
tem where a robot on wheels will point out where humans need to drill 
holes. Mercedes-Benz has replaced some robots with humans, as they 
are less agile and humans are quicker to ‘reprogram’ themselves when 
faced with novel problems. Shah (2016) states that we are reaching an 
‘inflection point’ in terms of how humans and robots work together. She 
claims that:
Roboticists are starting to reverse-engineer the human mind by 
translating the cognitive models that humans use intuitively into 
computational models that machines can use. With this approach, 
robots and humans working in pairs have been able to accomplish 
complex tasks as well or better than human teams.
Shah’s team at MIT are working on software that allows robots to infer 
tasks from observing human teams and analysing their decisions to 
arrive at a strategy. In defence and healthcare robots could learn through 
expert human demonstrations. Again robots are considered to be work-
ing with humans, but companies are interested in gaining skills from 
humans:
Robots will truly be at our service, ready, willing, and able to learn 
from watching us. They will work shoulder-to-shoulder on assembly 
lines, in hospitals, and on the front lines of emergency response. The 
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awkward robots of the past will be replaced by valued members of 
the team.
(Shah, 2016, my italics)
Nichols (2015) gives the example of a robot that is learning to crack eggs 
by watching videos on YouTube. The researchers in this project consider 
that ‘Our ultimate goal is to build a self-learning robot that is able to 
enrich its knowledge about fine grained manipulation actions by watch-
ing demo videos’. Studies such as this are used to argue that self-learning 
robots could revolutionise manufacturing and meta-data from these 
robot/human hybrids can be used in wider networks. For example, 
researchers at Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT) have devel-
oped a self-adjusting welding system that uses a neural net to correct 
welding mistakes and improve its performance. The FRAME project 
at the University of Nottingham aimed to construct a ‘fully automated, 
self-learning and self-aware production system’. Despite these attempts 
to ‘strip skills’ from humans, it may be difficult to automate all areas of 
human skill formation. Chui et al (2016) in a report for McKinsey con-
sider that education is the most difficult area of production to automate. 
Speculatively this could be the reason that robot/human pedagogy and 
learning is an area that is mainly being developed in manufacturing. 
There are also forms of pedagogy, where there are no shared human/
AI domains and the robots and humans must learn to work around 
each other or where the pedagogy of the other is unknown and perhaps 
unknowable. Researchers are aiming for rudimentary forms of peda-
gogical presence, in terms of the robot sensing how the human learns, 
and adaptation in terms of how to work around the human (through 
force sensors). There are also forms of learning where the human can 
bank learning inside a cobot through modelling the desired behaviour 
either visually or by moving the cobots arm or other feature so that it 
can reproduce a particular movement. Robots and AI do not have to 
learn through the actions or thoughts of an individual, they can analyse 
the learning of a team. In this way there is a distillation of learning in 
terms of a many-into-one process. This is a change of scale in terms of 
skills, the separate learning processes of a team are synthesised into one 
process by an AI. This concentration of labour is similar to the concen-
tration of physical labour by a machine. In other pedagogical work, the 
robot occupies its own pedagogical space, learning to do tasks through 
the use of a neural net or other types of machine learning. Hence skills 
are relocated from something that exists within the individual human 
(‘human capital’) and into a collective, shared intellect, but an intellect 
that is owned by a private corporation.
There are many ways in which robots and AI are ‘stripping skills’ 
from workers in manufacturing, but there is nothing teleological about 
the future of robotics and AI. Robots and AI are produced not for 
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deterministic reasons (in terms of removing skills from humans) but so 
they can produce relative surplus value, in terms of soaking up additional 
labour, and hence profit. In observations from the ‘Chatty Factories’ 
project, some specialist areas of production did involve constructing 
anthropocentric robots, but usually the future of robotics is aimed at 
producing robot ‘bodies’ suitable for capital, involving robots that can 
extend to various spatial dimensions rather than those that can conduct 
complex forms of learning and engagement with humans. Innovations in 
this area include drones capable of heavy lifting; drones that can print 
using construction materials (such as tarmac for roads); robots that can 
print other robots using 3D printing, with capabilities for the 3D print-
ing of metal; robots that can extend upwards (from a solid wheeled base) 
for up to 20 metres; animal robots (of the Boston Dynamics type); and 
small robots for pipework; robots that can fold themselves so that they 
can post themselves through letterboxes (or through small holes) and 
reassemble themselves; and drones that carry small-wheeled vehicles. In 
all cases, profit, pragmatism and cost is the reason for the construction 
of these robots as specific tools that allow machinery to transcend the 
current limits of time and space (whilst often requiring human labour 
as part of the function). The specificity of such robots to the require-
ments of capitalism in terms of repairing infrastructure or surveillance 
is also apparent. The requirement for AI, or even machine learning, in 
these robots is sometimes minimal. It is not necessary to produce forms 
of consciousness when simple machine learning can lead to increased 
profit. As already stated, robots, AI, and algorithms do not impart any 
additional value to a product by being like humans (only that which was 
embedded in them from their construction and that is transferred to the 
product, all other things being equal) but may increase relative surplus 
value. Hence the stripping of worker’s skills in current capitalism is a 
tendency of capitalist production, but one that might be reversed if there 
was conceived to be the potential for profit elsewhere.
Although HE is often considered to be very different from manufac-
turing, remarkably similar processes as in ‘digital manufacturing’ are 
being employed to repurpose worker’s capacities to naturalise them as 
part of capital. In HE, a similar subsumption takes place – ‘…capital 
enforces human-machine interaction as a means to parasitize labour…
The reconditioning of this machinery is important for the widening 
circuit of alienation that reproduces exploitation’ (Hall, 2020, p.128, 
referencing Wendling, 2009, p.100). HE is to an increasing extent a form 
of manufacturing of educational commodities. As discussed earlier, the 
commodity produced in HE is often determined by a statistical return 
to government where Universities are not private or operate using a qua-
si-market. Therefore, academic labour is often an intermediate part of 
the production of a ‘final commodity’ which is akin to a large manufac-
tured item. For example, in terms of obtaining funding for a student, 
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this is often the product of the final result of an algorithm (or algo-
rithms) that can include the student’s completion of their degree, their 
employment after their degree, and their satisfaction with their degree 
(in the UK these are all part of what determines University funding in 
2020). Hence in terms of the production of the final commodity, each 
individual concrete manifestation of academic labour provides a partial 
and fragmentary portion of what will eventually become the commodity 
that is valorised. The lecture, or course of lectures provided, the per-
sonal tutor session, and the e-mail feedback on an essay in the early 
hours are all intermediate parts of the production of the final commod-
ity prior to its valorisation (normally through a funding or statistical 
return for money). This also includes the administrative and professional 
services labour to ‘produce’ this final commodity. As stated previously, 
Marx (1992a, p.215) refers to intermediate components of commodities 
as ‘commodity stock’, and academic labour involves adding to this stock 
by activities that will eventually see this already abstract labour val-
orised as money. Every word spoken in a lecture or written in an article 
(as long as it is performed with the average level of skill and at or below 
the SNLT) becomes commensurable for money even though it exists for 
a time as ‘commodity stock’ before becoming a commodity for valorisa-
tion. Although the conception of ‘student as consumer’ is unfortunately 
correct, the students themselves are just a vector for the passing through 
of ‘commodity stock’ which is realised in terms of payment of fees or 
valorisation of various outcomes (student experience, their employment, 
continuation or acquiring a degree). The student’s co-operation in the 
process of commodity production for the University is a ‘force of nature’ 
(in that they want to acquire a degree or find a job).
A report for the University and College Union (UCU, 2020) consid-
ers several ways in which AI is being employed in the contemporary 
University which are remarkably similar to the types of AI applications 
that are used in manufacturing. As well as the automation of tasks and 
the speeding up of work, datafication and AI is part of how the ‘many 
functions, practices and tasks of HE are being rendered “machine reada-
ble” as digital information’ (UCU, 2020, p.6) which means that the work 
of academics becomes subsumed by capital in a form ready for data ana-
lytics, machine learning, interrogation and control and where, in some 
cases, AI can take autonomous actions to intervene in the labour process. 
AI learns what academics do, not necessarily in terms of learning to write 
an article or teach a student (although that could be on the horizon) but 
learning how to maximise the return on the university investment. The 
abstract nature of commodity production posits the labour of academics 
as abstract in terms of emphasising activities that are ‘readable’ in the 
production of value. This means that the concrete labour of academics 
(the text in which an article appears or the words spoken in a lecture), 
unproductive labour (work that is performed below the average level of 
66 AI and the Subsumption of Academic Labour
skill, a lecture provided free to the community with no commodifiable 
benefit, or an article that is written for free in a political newspaper), 
and work that is of no ‘value’ (a book that takes decades to produce that 
is not valorised by the University) is considered to be useless if it does 
not fit the funding algorithm. Universities increasingly become ‘data 
universities’ with ‘quantitative control’ (UCU, 2020, p.3) of academic 
outputs and labour. Universities can then be ‘unbundled’ into different 
areas of commodity production which can be subject to data analysis, 
performance indicators, and ‘digital dashboards’, the provision of which 
is often farmed out by Universities to private companies (UCU, 2020, 
p.10). This allows for the production of what was referred to earlier as 
the ‘behavioural surplus’ (Zuboff, 2019) as the knowledge obtained is 
used to improve algorithms, provide training sets for machine learning, 
and develop increasingly advanced forms of AI. Hence the measure-
ment of academic labour is used to develop fixed capital worldwide, as 
another form of real subsumption in a networked ‘smart campus’ (UCU, 
2020) which is analogous to ‘digital manufacture’. At the national level, 
in the UK, national level data infrastructures have been developed to 
measure institutional performance which can be reported on using data 
dashboards. UCU (2020) and De Angelis and Harvie (2009) analyse the 
process through which the ‘immaterial labour’ of academics is made 
commensurable through measuring academic commodity production (or 
at least the production of intermediate commodities) and through driv-
ing down the SNLT (De Angelis and Harvie, 2009). This process is both 
synchronic (equating labours) and diachronic (pushing down SNLT) and 
operates within institutions, in nation states, and across nation states 
and sectors. AI is a concrete example of the process that De Angelis and 
Harvie (2009) describe in terms of applying machine learning to work-
load models, hence accelerating processes of subsumption.
The increasing technological sophistication of AI means that it is pos-
sible to gain knowledge of individual and collective labour processes, 
in a form similar to manufacturing, but we must be careful not to mys-
tify AI as omniscient and omnipotent. For capitalism, synthetic timing 
(Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.155) rather than scientific notions of timing, 
being how long a job should take (to be profitable) rather than how long 
it could take (given a scientific analysis of its components) is a necessary 
feature of capitalist production. Like all technologies, AI is part of the 
compulsion for workers to work harder and faster, and to that extent 
it does not matter if an AI has any scientific basis, if it can be used 
as an element of synthetic timing. The notion of unrealistic targets in 
academia (in terms of producing journal articles, teaching classes, or 
gaining funding) that might have a material basis as the ‘real’ measure 
of production (how fast it is possible to work) is forever subordinated to 
the ‘synthetic’ measure of production (how fast it is necessary to work 
in the capitalist university). In this way, the application of ‘Industry 4.0’ 
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and ‘digital manufacturing’ techniques to HE are a manifestation of the 
despotism of capital rather than scientific progress.
The Hyper-Subsumption of Collective Academic Labour by AI:  
Social Brain and General Intellect
As previously discussed, Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019) consider hyper- 
subsumption to be a recent form of subsumption involving AI, robot-
ics, and post-human forms of labour. This extension of subsumption is 
helpful but somewhat teleological and it does not transform real sub-
sumption in any meaningful way other than accelerating the law of value 
within, and extending it across, existing and new industries. Workers 
are constantly subsumed by the physical manifestation of capital of 
different sorts including mechanical looms, production lines, and com-
puter terminals. However, hyper-subsumption could also refer to the 
complete replacement of human workers with AI entities and this might 
occur in HE in terms of the hyper-subsumption of collective academic 
labour or the ‘…total replacement of the subjectivity of a human labour 
power’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.173). Note that for this to occur, it would 
involve the primitive accumulation of AI labour as wage labour (which is 
implicit in work on the existential threat of AI, as explained in Chapter 6 
that can only conceive a viable form of AI existing as a form of wage 
labour) and its relative and real subsumption by capital to become value 
production. This could also involve, perhaps in its preliminary phase, 
the replication of human labour through digital human twins which we 
can already see, in essence, in terms of the online lecture and seminar 
which is replicated beyond the normal working day (see Chapter 5). 
Concepts used by Marx such as the ‘social brain’ and the ‘General 
Intellect’ allow us to interrogate not only the liberatory, but also the 
subsuming tendencies of collective human, and artificial, intelligences. 
Hyper-subsumption can be usefully connected with the ‘social brain’ 
and ‘general intellect’ (which are frequently used as liberatory concepts, 
particularly in recent work on ‘Fully Automated Luxury Communism’, 
as discussed in Chapter 7) to show how AI is subsuming present, and 
future, collective, academic labour.
Marx’s critique of capitalism is bleakly transhumanist. Capitalism 
not only fundamentally transforms the nature of work and the mode 
of existence of the worker but also the nature of the capitalist and 
humanity in general. Money, as the objectified form of alienated labour, 
becomes human capacities. Marx (1992b, p.377) considers how human 
capabilities, what ‘am I’, becomes money. What were human capacities 
such as strength, beauty, mobility, and moral ‘goodness’ become not just 
properties of money. Money is human capacity, and human essence in 
capitalism is and is not just enabled by money or purchased by money. 
Marx describes mind as money:
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I am mindless, but if money is the true mind of all things, how can 
its owner be mindless? What is more, he can buy clever people for 
himself, and is not he who has power over clever people cleverer 
than them?
(Marx, 1992b, p.377)
Mind cannot entirely become a commodity now, but money itself is the 
‘true mind’ of things. A Marxist version of transhumanism is that money 
becomes all of the properties of the human and (within capitalism) the 
objectification of all human capacities. Of course, in the more mature 
Marx, money is the objectified form of abstract labour power as entirely 
alienated labour. Money acts as the universal agent of ‘separation’ and 
‘cementing’ in capitalist society – ‘It is the chemical power of society’ 
(Marx, 1992b, p.377). Money operates as a ‘singularity’ in terms of the 
objectification of abstract labour power and the turning of this against 
humanity as an alien power. In contrast, humble AI is a mere machine and 
a fixed asset, but it also represents the capitalist fantasy of the purchase 
of mind, not just human minds which can only be hired on a temporal 
basis as labour power for a wage, but an artificial mind as a commod-
ity and asset. Despite AI not meeting the earlier promise of becoming 
an artificial consciousness, it remains a fantasy within capitalism that 
consciousness can be sold and purchased. Capitalism does not require 
‘human brains’ as such (although if elements of brain tissue or product 
from humans or animals can be commodified or sold, capitalism will 
find a way), but the labour power that is part of personhood which is not 
necessarily associated with any particular organ. Capitalism needs some 
element of human consciousness which, in terms of intent and imagina-
tion, is a fundamental property of labour power, which allows capital to 
appropriate the individual and collective powers of labour (Braverman, 
1998, pp.34–5). In contrast, AI might be nothing like a human brain or 
mind but could function as an amalgam of learning entities that seems 
to simulate a mind. According to Hall (2018, pp.108–9) (after Marx, 
1993)‘…capital soaks up or takes in the knowledge skills and capabil-
ities’ of what Marx called the ‘social brain’. In HE this might include 
‘…performance management through learning analytics and data min-
ing’ and ‘extending the management of networks’ as well as methods of 
cybernetic control (Hall, 2018, p.112). In this way, collective knowledge 
about academics as workers, and academic work, becomes part of the 
‘social brain’ of capital. Sohn-Rethel (1978) considers that the very idea 
of ‘mind’ and ‘mental labour’ in capitalism is necessary to maintain the 
real abstraction of the exchange relation which takes place in abstract 
time and space (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.48). Commodities transfer own-
ership for money in empty, abstract space and in instantaneous, empty 
time (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.53). Although these concepts may exist 
in human minds, they do not arise from the mind, rather from a real 
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abstraction of commodity exchange. Hence the ‘social brain’ of AI is not 
just the product of accumulated worker knowledge. It is also one of the 
sites of abstract thought (in this case symbolic manipulation) that makes 
possible the social synthesis of capitalism. For example, teaching stu-
dents can happen in all sorts of different times and places in a university 
involving many collective hours of teaching. Paying for tuition (by the 
state or private individuals) is a transfer of funds for a commodity that 
takes place in an instant. That real time of teaching can be turned into 
an infinitesimal time of commodity exchange requires abstract thought 
(as it is, in practice, a real abstraction). Computation, machine learning, 
and AI allow ‘thought about abstract thought’ in terms of how best to 
count, compare, and optimise actual hours of teaching in terms of their 
profitability.
The concept of a privately owned social brain, or a ‘commodified 
mind’ (Artificial General Intelligence, or AGI) in HE, or other indus-
tries, is also appealing to capitalists as it appears to resolve two inherent 
contradictions of capitalism. Firstly, the intractability of consciousness 
in the labourer. Capitalists would love to map the entire capacity of the 
human for exploitation, including their mental resilience. They can’t 
fully control consciousness as such because they need the intentionality 
and creativity of individual and collective labour to constantly increase 
productivity. An AI that destroyed human consciousness (in the sense 
useful to capitalists) needs itself to be conscious (in the sense useful to 
capitalists), so that it could become the source of a new round of prim-
itive accumulation in capitalism (otherwise that would be the end of 
capitalism). Capitalism has to create its own ‘gravediggers’ whether that 
is humans or AI. Secondly, every action that capitalists take desubstan-
tialises labour further and makes the production of value even more 
ephemeral. Capitalists believe that a mind external to capitalism would 
enable a cool perspective on its own existential threat (see Chapter 6). 
A mind external to capitalism might be able to think its way out of the 
existential threats of capitalism in a way that capitalists are unable to 
do so. In some ways, capitalism has already produced its own ‘mind’ 
seemingly external to itself without AI (the theory and praxis of com-
munism), which it has to consistently reject or it would not remain as 
capitalism. Capitalists would prefer a godlike AI telling them what to do 
rather than releasing power to the working class.
In conjunction with the idea of a ‘social brain’, in the section in the 
Grundrisse which is sometimes called ‘The Fragment on Machines’ 
(which is the latter section of Marx’s notes for ‘The Chapter on Capital’ 
Notebooks VI and VII, Marx, 1993), Marx considers the concept of the 
General Intellect. From the outset by its nature the fragment, is only that 
– notes and fragmentary thinking – and to search for some particularistic 
hidden meaning without the other works of Marx privileges speculation 
and ‘Marxology’. The earlier sections of the notebook, in particular, are 
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cautious on the role of machines in capitalism. Firstly, Marx considers 
that the development of machinery and technology is part of the more 
general development of capitalist competition which operates incremen-
tally and tentatively, especially in its initial phases (Marx, 1993, p.560) 
and where the development of the ‘constancy’ of fixed capital requires 
the ready supply of appropriate labour (Marx, 1993, p.563). Secondly, 
although science in capitalism is the collective power of labour, this is 
also true of all other manifestations of capitalist society (including the 
division of labour and the social powers of production) which subse-
quently appear to be powers of capital (Marx, 1993, p.585). Thirdly, 
capital usually exists in a form that there are many workers to one cap-
ital (although one can imagine a future form of capitalism with a single 
AI labourer selling its labour to many capitalists). Therefore, in the lead 
in to the ‘Fragment on Machines’, Marx does not appear to be deviating 
from ideas on machinery that would appear in his later work. There 
is no conceptual break in his theory of machinery (other than it meets 
the uses of capital), all natural and scientific attributes are assumed to 
be properties of capital and (although this is not a necessary condition) 
there are many workers available as a ratio to each capital. Similarly, 
the ‘Fragment on Machines’ (Marx, 1993, pp.690–95) begins by restat-
ing the point that the materiality of capitalist production is ‘…only a 
mean of production for capital, for which value alone is an end in itself’ 
(Marx, 1993, p.690). It is not that human labour becomes superfluous 
in the automatic system of production that Marx proposes, but rather 
that it becomes metamorphosised into becoming ‘conscious linkages’ of 
machinery which are ‘scattered’ amongst it as a ‘living accessory’ with 
its ‘insignificant doings’ (Marx, 1993, p.693). This is a transmutation of 
both humanity and machinery but by no means distinct from the real 
subsumption of labour. In a later section (Notebook VII), Marx consid-
ers that a situation could exist that ‘…depends less on labour time and 
on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies 
set in motion during labour time’ (Marx, 1993, p.704) including sci-
ence and technology. This, too, is little different from real subsumption 
as the ‘amount of labour employed’ usually becomes less significant in 
the generation of value as the productivity of labour and technology 
increases in any case. Similarly, the ‘agencies set in motion during labour 
time’ are still part of the working day. Particularly for academics (as a 
sub-class of knowledge workers), science produced in the working day 
becomes a property of the university. A real change only appears when it 
is the ‘appropriation’ of the worker’s cumulative knowledge (rather than 
labour power as such) that becomes the foundation of wealth (Marx, 
1993, p.705). This ‘general intellect’ might prefigure a different society 
but not due purely to ‘science’ or ‘technology’ as an appropriated form of 
cumulative knowledge but ‘…also the immediate organs of social prac-
tices, of real life processes’ (Marx, 1993, p.706). Based on this reading, 
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automation, technology and science (including AI) do not by any means 
represent a certain break with capitalism no matter what their level of 
advancement. Being a ‘conscious linkage’, a ‘living accessory’ engaged 
in ‘insignificant doings’ is a fair description of the current subsumption 
of academic labour by technology. Moreover, science and technology 
are (and can be) appropriated by capital, and the general intellect relates 
as much to ‘…social practices, of real life processes’ that can ‘blow this 
labour is an important component of this hyper-subsumption but before 
turning to this, it is important to consider that the General Intellect is 
not an inevitable or decisive feature of the trajectories of capitalism and 
class.
Hardt and Negri, whose research is related to the postoperaismo 
school of Marxism, consider that immaterial labour (including academic 
labour), the development of the General Intellect and advanced tech-
nologies such as AI and computer networks have led to a break with 
traditional Marxist notions of value and class struggle. Hardt and Negri 
(2000, pp.364–65) claim that we are living in the time of the General 
Intellect, but this is not just intellectual but also affective and corpo-
ral where ‘…biopower becomes directly productive’ (Hardt and Negri, 
2000, p.364). The productive capacity of society becomes a property of 
the ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2005) who 
possess a networked and commons-based form of productive capacity 
(Hardt and Negri, 2005, pp.189–227) that replaces traditional class 
antagonisms diffusing them into ‘…the discontinuity and dispersion of 
the dynamic elements of production…’ (Negri, 2018, p.47). In this con-
ception of the dispersion of productive powers and the ‘General Intellect’, 
it is implied that immaterial labour means that work and its products 
can elude measurement (Pitts, 2018, p.148) and rather than the working 
class, the unit of analysis becomes the ‘socialized worker’. The factory 
becomes diffused into society as ‘…capital suffuses the entire form of 
life’ (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, p.81), undefinable labours produce society, 
and class struggle is dissolved into a variety of locations and struggles. 
The diffusion of technical knowledge and expertise produces a ‘general-
ised form of labour power’ (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, p.84) where capital 
‘must appropriate the communicative capacity of the labor force’ (Dyer-
Whiteford, 1999, p.85).
Although some postoperaismo thinkers have developed Marx’s notion 
of the General Intellect into an anthropic concept, which applies to 
the collective cognition and knowledge of human workers others con-
sider the AI and networked components of this form. Griziotti (2019) 
foundation sky-high’ (Marx, 1993, p.706) as it does science. Before that 
happens, capital may tire of humanity (but never of labour power) as an 
entity and this is a better categorisation of what Dyer-Whiteford et al 
call hyper-subsumption than a technologically sophisticated form of 
‘real subsumption’. As will be explained below, collective academic 
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considers that we are seeing the ‘digital production’ of the General 
Intellect (Griziotti, 2019, p.19) where ‘…intelligence becomes a protago-
nist in this revolution’ (Griziotti, 2019, p.20). Griziotti sees bio-cognitive 
capitalism as focussing on the prosumer ‘…constantly looking for 
income through information about behaviour, emotions and the life of 
the prosumer in general’ (Griziotti, 2019, p.61). Cellphones are seen as a 
biopolitical device, making use of bio-hypermedia, a fusion of biological 
and technical networks (Griziotti, 2019, pp.107–18). A digital, gener-
alised commons, therefore, becomes a new area for political activity. 
Dyer-Whiteford (1999) also draws on autonomist and open Marxism 
where class struggle will ultimately be realised in terms of a ‘contest for 
general intellect’ (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, p.14).
Pitts (2018) summarises postoperaismo as a shift from material to 
immaterial labour, from the factory to the social factory, and from the 
supposedly ‘workerist’ (caricatured white, male, working class) subject 
of class struggle to that of the ‘Multitude’ with diffuse and collectively 
organised labour as collective sets of linked singularities. The immaterial 
labour of the multitude drives capitalism in a reciprocal and simultane-
ous fashion (Pitts, 2018, p.143), that is, in an affirmative direction rather 
than a negative and conflictual manner. This leads to a conclusion that 
‘…liberation is possible in the present state of things. Where humans 
emancipate themselves the world follows. However, this is opposed to a 
picture whereby humans emancipate themselves by abolishing the state 
of things’ (Pitts, 2018, p.144, my italics). According to Pitts (2018), the 
argument of Hardt and Negri is illusionary as both material and imma-
terial labour’s abstract nature means that neither has a real source of 
measure (only in retrospect are these socially valorised in exchange). It is 
not that the ‘labour theory of value’ has been challenged as the challenge 
disregards the qualitative nature of value and social form (Pitts, 2018, 
p.200). Furthermore, in capitalism there is no affirmative, single, ‘social 
substance’ that unites labour and capital rather these are in conflict by 
definition. There is no lasting ‘creativity’ in capitalism, and the things 
that we create come to objectively dominate us:
…the desire to be creative in capitalist society can be fulfilled in 
commodity society only through waged commercial work, contrary 
to the pleasurable use of skill and through the value relation it gen-
erates depends on all the same, even while denying it and stifling 
it. There is no simple identity between capitalist power and human 
practice. It is a broken mirror, full of contradiction.
(Pitts, 2018, p.159)
Rapid technological change has led to contemporary Marxist theorists 
considering new ways in which the General Intellect might be formed 
using AI and other digital infrastructures. Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, 
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p.31) propose the term ‘means of cognition’ to refer to the AI infra-
structure but distinguish this from postoperaismo notions of cognitive 
capitalism. The ‘means of cognition’ are not the capacities of the mul-
titude but are the appropriated cognitive capacities of humans either 
as the property of individual capitals or as the general conditions of 
production useable by all capitalists (Dyer Whiteford et al, 2019, p.46). 
Even if there is such a thing as an emerging General Intellect, this can be 
privatised and be made into a ‘private intellect’. As explained in the pre-
vious section, skills can be ‘scraped’ by fixed capital and (as explained 
in the next chapter) pedagogy is becoming increasingly irrelevant to 
capitalism as the location of learning is displaced and fetishised as it is 
moved from workers to commodities. Through mechanisms of surveil-
lance capitalism and the quantification of labour at work (and in other 
spheres), knowledge and skills can be ascribed as entities that are no 
longer owned by individuals. One perspective (Žižek, 2019) is that this 
knowledge becomes a source of rent for capitalists. Žižek (2019) sees an 
absence in Marx’s consideration of the general intellect:
As a result of his neglect of the social dimension of the ‘general intel-
lect’ – which is roughly the collective intelligence of a society – Marx 
didn’t realise the possibility of privatising general intellect itself but 
this is what lies at the core of the struggle for ‘intellectual property’.
(Žižek, 2019, p.8)
In terms of the physical manifestation of capital in machinery such 
as AI, Lotz (2014, pp.121–30) also considers the totalising nature of 
capital which ‘…enables capital to access the human mind and human 
capabilities, but also to produce those capabilities’ (p.125). A form 
of General Intellect could, therefore, exist in a system of AI. Lotz 
also considers increases in speed of communication and the affective 
possibilities of machinery which brings about the possibility of no spon-
taneity in human agency as communication is produced ‘in advance’ 
and the libido is orientated towards money by destroying the ‘attentive 
systems of citizens’ (Lotz, 2014, p.126). Cybernetic capitalism could, 
according to Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019), bring about a new mode of 
subsumption where AI controls work and production. AI-Capital would 
become part of the infrastructure that enables capitalist production 
through such mechanisms as the smart city, the internet of things (IoT), 
and AI. Cognition is not necessarily anthropic (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 
2019, p.63), and this point is similar to Marx’s original formulation 
of the General Intellect as operating through, and being embedded in, 
machinery (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.63). In doing this, Marx dis-
tinguishes between the (mechanic) ‘general intellect’ and the (anthropic) 
‘social brain’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, pp.63–4). Warnings con-
cerning an AI superintelligence also consider the concept of a ‘collective 
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superintelligence’ that transcends human intelligence through a system 
that is ‘…educated, digitally connected, and integrated into global intel-
lectual culture…’ alongside an internet that ‘wakes up’ (Bostrom, 2014, 
pp.48–9).
To summarise, it is quite plausible that the ‘General Intellect’ would 
be a private property that is completely embedded in machinery (AI) 
which capitalists see as eventually become a new labouring subject of 
capitalism. At present, there are national projects for AI superintelligence 
and quantum supremacy which involves academic labour in national 
and corporate efforts involving ‘…the increased number of private, 
global companies seeking profit and data harvesting from universities, 
potentially impacting on the nature of universities themselves and their 
purpose’ (UCU, 2020, p.3). In this way academic labour and universi-
ties are complicit in the continuity of capitalism, but not necessarily an 
anthropic version of this. Rather than a relationship between persons, 
knowledge, skills and machines where human science is progressing, we 
move into a time of the stripping of skills, but this is also a depedago-
gisation as part of subsumption as the work of academics becomes less 
concerned with pedagogy and more with profit. As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, agency moves from individuals to machines and com-
modities (Pixarfication). This privatised General Intellect may present 
itself as the new commons but one that is accessible only to capital. 
The privatised General Intellect foreshadows the removal of educated 
humanity (including academic labour) from the stage of human history 
and heralds the arrival of a potential new labouring subject: AI. Indeed, 
the idea of learning and pedagogy is disappearing under capitalism, and 
new models of learning are not emerging in practice as humans become 
‘conscious linkages’ (but still conscious), ‘attendant labourers’, or ‘social 
labour’ in the narrowest sense (social in that only workers can work in 
conjunction with capitalist processes). Frischmann and Selinger (2019) 
detail processes through which human thought and reason are being 
manipulated, or even nullified, to make us more amenable to interac-
tions with AI and robots. An example of how this is manifesting itself in 
HE is through an increased emphasis on mechanic systems of learning 
such as Competence Based Education and Training (CBET). As I have 
discussed in previous work (Preston, 2017), capitalism tends to support 
forms of pedagogy (which are really forms of non-pedagogy) that are 
optimal for the production of surplus value through increasing worker 
productivity and exploitation. The competence movement, which sets 
behavioural and binary outcomes for skills allows capitalists to specify 
exactly what workers should do without reference to any internal learn-
ing processes. In competence-based systems, the whole idea of pedagogy 
and knowledge disappears as all that matters is outcome. This results 
in the full subsumption of the worker who becomes a ‘conscious link-
age’ not only to the process of production but also to their own skill 
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formation. Skills become something that ‘pass through’ the worker to 
AI and evidence themselves in the workers’ labour without being medi-
ated by mind, knowledge, or any other conscious process of the worker. 
The behavioural nature of competence-based qualifications means that 
all that matters is behaviour. This means that the worker exists as a 
non-conscious monstrosity in a process of ‘skill display’, a formation of 
skills that does not involve them as a conscious, human, being. As there 
is no requirement, or theory, of ‘learning process’ in competence-based 
education then the learner/worker is treated as a conduit to deliver the 
skill process required by the capitalist. These ‘skill conduits’ are com-
bined in ways to optimise capitalist production. Hence there is no 
pedagogy involved in the process of skill acquisition (which is more like 
temporary skill attachment before human capacities are moved to AI). 
Competence-based education is part of what we might call the pedagog-
ical singularity in HE referring to the collapse of pedagogy into a single 
mode of human (or anti-human) teaching and learning.
Conclusion: Human Failure and Academic Labour
In this chapter, I have considered academic labour as a form of labour 
power no different to that which is the tragic foundation of capital 
more generally. I also considered how AI in HE facilities primitive accu-
mulation, subsumption, and the fantasy of hyper-subsumption in the 
continuity of capitalism without a human subject (a topic that I will 
return to in Chapter 6). To return to the argument made earlier in the 
chapter, academic labour takes place in conditions of class struggle and 
as well as being capital it continually glitches, fails, and resists in this 
process. These failures are opportunities. AI is not just a neutral form of 
joyful machinery but a form of capitalist violence in that labour power 
needs to be extracted through a conscious, visceral subject, and sub-
sumed through the reality of capitalist production (real subsumption) as 
value, and AI is a growing part of this process.
However, the possibility of what capitalists might see as the ‘human 
failure’ of academic labour, even with sophisticated AI methods of con-
trol, is part of its existence in class-struggle. This can be expressed in 
two ways in terms of academic labour. Firstly, in the constant drive of 
capitalism to enhance labour power, there are inevitably spontaneous 
and conscious resistances. Inhuman and infinitely expanding capitalism 
meets with the concrete barriers of human existence and labour:
In contemporary capitalism there is a social drive to enhance the 
quality of human labour power. This social drive, like all of capital’s 
social drives is infinite. It would not make any logical sense within 
the perverted social universe of capital to suggest any real limit on 
the basis of the functioning of the system itself. However, in similar 
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fashion to absolute surplus value production, the infinite social drive 
to enhance the quality of human labour power clashes with a num-
ber of practical considerations. First, labour power development 
depends on co-operation – which expresses itself in the ‘problem of 
motivation’, an individual willingness to aid development of one’s 
own labour power. Secondly, when pushed too far we witness ‘the 
humans are dropping like flies’: humans buckling under as they are 
subjected to concrete (and hence necessarily limited) manifestations 
of an infinite social drive. Thus: depression (with no terminal point 
to ‘improvement’); various forms of stress and ill health; and so on. 
Thirdly, people may protest and effectively revolt against an imper-
sonal social drive ‘manifesting’ itself as concrete social practice. 
Fourthly, those generating these social practices are only human, 
all too human…As capitalised life-forms, the designers of concrete 
schemes that seek to nurture a social drive that is infinite can do this 
precisely because they have some affinity with these social practices 
that express capital’s social drives. Fifthly, as “we” are capital too, 
we can aesthetically and logically ‘appreciate’ the concrete expres-
sions of infinite social drives, whilst also being able to see the con-
tradiction involved. This contradiction is the notion that an infinite 
social drive can be concretely expressed. The prospect is absurd, as 
it assumes infinite resources, time, labour (of a quality that is not 
just good but infinitely good) and effort (beyond all limits) to acti-
vate and effect the infinite social drive.
(Rikowski, 2000, pp.10–11, my italics)
Secondly, that the General Intellect does not inevitably represent the 
collectivisation of scientific knowledge (which is easily privatised and 
mechanised) but also represents the collective power and resistance of 
the working class. Neary (2019, p.50) states that ‘Marx uses the concept 
of the general intellect as a way of capturing the possibility for social 
emancipation through the social power of the knowledge of humanity’. 
This is for every individual and for society as a democratic, communal 
pool of knowledge that can be used for revolutionary purposes. This 
means that academic labour, whether subject to AI or other forms of 
automation or not, both creates and confounds capital in every second of 
its being. It can also create concrete and realistic alternatives to capital-
ism and the capitalist university, a topic that I will return to in Chapter 7.
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Introduction: Commodities and Pixarfication
As discussed in the previous chapters, capitalist universities produce 
a range of commodities that are exchanged for money even if they do 
not identify them as such. Sometimes universities will refer to their 
outputs, or even products, but rarely ‘their commodities’. The uniquely 
capitalist nature of the commodity, as the ‘cell form’ of Marxist social 
theory, is both a fundamental and contradictory concept (Rikowski, 
2000). Commodities hold a thread of a capitalist mystery together in 
that they store the metaphysical social substance ‘value’ but this is only 
realised in various social forms and only appears in an objective form 
in terms of money (a further social form) (Marx, 1990) which is rein-
vested in subsequent capital accumulation (Marx, 1992). As discussed 
in the previous chapter, commodity production is reliant on labour 
power to produce value and surplus value but value itself also pos-
its the possibility of valorising abstract labour. Labour’s existence in 
capitalism as abstract (and concrete) labour is dependent on the valori-
sation of value. As previously noted, anything (including services and 
intangibles) can be a commodity and we make visceral contact with 
commodities in the supermarket, on the battlefield and in the hospital. 
Commodity circulation is a necessary criterion for the valorisation of 
value, the explosive moments when value fleetingly appears in a recog-
nisable material form as money (Kurz, 2014). On the one hand, this is 
an inhuman process involving a single exceptional commodity (labour 
power) acting upon materials to produce a commodity with surplus 
value. The commodity is exchanged for money which, the capitalist 
hopes, is greater than the money advanced in its production. The rein-
vestment of money in terms of buying machinery and wage labour is 
used to produce further commodities. This inhuman process, the con-
version of living to dead labour, is a real abstraction (Ortlieb, 2014) 
that has visceral consequences for the lives of workers. As explained in 
the previous chapter, even given advanced technology and skills, there 
is little reason to suppose that generalised commodity production, 
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premised on labour, will disappear to produce a more humane sys-
tem of production based on knowledge. Technology strips skills from 
workers and privatises the ‘general intellect’. In the capitalist univer-
sity commodity production may not be in the minds of academics or 
administrators, but if they engage in activities that the university can 
valorise for money (either through the state or the market) then their 
mentality does not matter.
The process of commodity production is naturalised and fetishised 
in the capitalist university, as in any form of capital. It appears to cap-
italist universities not only that production should continue in this 
manner, but that it needs to consistently expand to become globalised 
and dominant. Excitement in capitalist societies, and in capitalist uni-
versities, is premised on innovation and new products. Millions of 
people tune in to see the launch of a new iPhone and queue at the store 
when it arrives. Great armies of parents have historically fought over 
the launch of a ‘Cabbage Patch Kid’ or a ‘Furby’ toy for Christmas. 
New features on Facebook or Instagram produce an outpouring of 
emotion and praise. Similarly, universities produce new innovative 
degree courses, bold research strands or luxury student accommoda-
tions. One response to this innovation and consumerism is to remark 
on its vulgarity but our subjectivity in capitalist society is not sep-
arate from capitalist objectivity (Backhaus, 1992, pp.54–92). The 
middle-class (in a Weberian class-stratified model) participate in the 
denigration of ‘vulgar’ consumption which is often used as a weapon 
of hatred against the working class (McKenzie, 2015; Skeggs, 2003) 
whereas middle and ruling class consumption is held up as superior 
(Bourdieu, 1984). This class stratification applies to universities where 
courses in vocational subjects are sometimes denigrated in the media 
as catering to a ‘mass market’ as opposed to the products of elite uni-
versities. Consumption can also be informed with a sense of irony, 
in particular the hyper-consumption of commodities can be excused 
as being omnivorous and displaying self-awareness by the middle 
classes (Skeggs, 2003). The classed formation of taste is one approach 
to capitalist society which exposes the morality of consumption prac-
tices, but commodities also represent the alienated nature of human 
activity. Commodity production is naturalised and mystified so that it 
appears that there is a natural chain of causation arising from the mar-
ket. Consumers (for universities students, governments, or research 
funders) seemingly send ‘signals’ through their purchasing decisions 
and firms then determine what to produce based on those signals so 
that it appears that ‘market forces’ produce the panoply of products 
that we see on the shelves, online, and in student prospectuses. In this 
way capitalism stunningly takes the appearance of ‘self-valorising’ 
value when in practice this is a mediated, contradictory, and exploit-
ative form of production. Capitalism, in its (ideal) visible commodity 
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form, adopts this fiction of self-valorising value which is materially a 
real and moving contradiction. Products appear to ‘sell themselves’, 
through the voices of consumers, cast a production ‘vote’ through pur-
chases, and give voice to their continued production.
This chapter argues that in contemporary capitalism with Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and associated technologies, this process of commod-
ity production and exchange is becoming materialised as Pixarfiction. 
Meinel (2016) first used the term ‘Pixifying’ for the potential ways that 
contemporary animation (named after the animation and entertainment 
company Pixar) could influence society and popular culture. The term 
‘Pixarfication’ is also used in the film industry as a description of the 
influence of the Pixar studio on film production. In this context, I use 
it to describe an AI facilitated method by which commodities achieve 
exchange and valorisation through artificial (often ascribed) forms of 
perception and consciousness. In describing this as a Pixarfication of 
consumption and production, I am following the application of earlier 
paradigms for services, McDonaldisation and Disneyization, to Higher 
Education (HE). Pixarfication is a technological complement to the 
creative processes involved in marketing, advertising, and circulation 
activities essential to valorisation discussed in Pitts (2018). The literal 
truth of commodity circulation and valorisation, of which Pixarfication 
is a part, is that commodities are becoming increasingly real personas 
in capitalism. We are embedded in their world and we are increasingly 
subordinate to their delicate nudges and decisions. Social media (and 
associated activities) have become a form of social engineering where 
our views and opinions are both data and the subject of corporate 
experiments. Along with AI and robots, commodities are increasingly 
learning about us as workers and consumers. As discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, the locus of learning is moving increasingly away from 
the human subject. Technology is advancing commodities so that they 
seemingly come to know. Through sensors and more elaborate forms 
of communication, commodities are becoming increasingly perceptual. 
Using AI, machine learning, and engineering for human interaction they 
are becoming increasingly intelligent. Pixarfied commodities are artifi-
cially-sentient in that they have developed a sentience appropriate for 
objects in capitalism, to facilitate their exchange for money and hence 
profit. This is not of the same order of the sorts of agency ascribed to 
objects in Object Orientated Ontology (OOO) and New Materialist 
ontologies (see Chapter 2) rather it is a mystification of capitalist pro-
cesses of exchange and valorisation. As it is usually located in material 
objects, Pixarfication seems more obviously applied to manufacturing 
(Preston, 2021) but it can also be applied to services and how the com-
modities produced by HE (through data analytics and AI) can become 
animated and enlivened.
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Pixarfication: A ‘Toy Story’
Pixar is an animation and entertainment company that is well known for 
producing technologically sophisticated, entertaining, and highly prof-
itable animations in which objects (cars, toys, lamps), many of which 
are commodities, have human-type sentience. For example, in the Pixar 
film Toy Story and its sequels, toys can think, talk, and emote with 
distinctively human personalities. Some cultural theorists (Ackerman, 
2019) contend that the Toy Story films can be read in terms of hidden 
relations of consumption, production, and ownership. Cultural anal-
ysis sometimes considers that films contain hidden meanings that can 
be revealed by the cultural critic through their ideological penetration 
of the veneer of capitalism. As considered previously, value as a ‘real 
abstraction’ (albeit a contradictory one) means that we do not have to 
necessarily penetrate a sheen of ideology to arrive at the ‘capitalist’ sense 
of the films. A surface reading of the toys as literal commodities shows 
how the films cannot help but reveal the realities of capitalist commod-
ity production and the necessity of ‘social validation’ in exchange (Pitts, 
2018). This is not to suggest that the films are not without their inevi-
table contradictions particularly in terms of the role of labour and the 
division between use and exchange value of commodities.
The original film (Toy Story) is a fable about how a self-aware com-
modity penetrates its (alienated) consciousness by realising that it is not 
a human hero but rather a toy. Buzz Lightyear, a space adventurer figure, 
considers that he really is a rocket commander who must fight an evil 
alien race (led by another toy, Zurg). Through the film and his inter-
actions with other toys, Buzz becomes aware that he is not actually a 
space commander but that he is a commodity who was produced in a toy 
factory like the other toys that he meets. However, he discovers his pur-
pose which is as a source of use value by being a toy that children would 
like to play with. He has a purpose, a use value, and identifies that he is 
one of many other ‘Buzz Lightyears’ that have exchange value as com-
modities. Buzz’s full identity as a toy is only realised as not only a ‘use 
value’ but also as an ‘exchange value’ within capitalism. That is, Buzz 
recognises himself as a toy fully only in that he (it) is socially validated in 
capitalism as having an exchange value (being seen to be sold in a shop 
for money). Toy Story 2 which considers the acquisition of toys by a 
sinister collector can also be seen as a commentary on use and exchange 
value within capitalism versus the ‘miserly’ accumulation of wealth for 
its own sake (which is in itself a pre-capitalist form). In the film, the toys 
want to escape the toy collection they are held prisoner in to fulfil their 
use value as items that children play with. The collection and hoarding 
of toys is pathologised, as it is in capitalism, where investment in pro-
duction is required by the capitalist in order to continue and where toys 
can enter into ‘free exchange’. The lives of commodities are meaningless 
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without capitalist circulation. Similarly, Toy Story 3 is about toys which 
are no longer loved or cared for by children (which become ‘bad toys’) 
who are no longer of use value and so discarded. The film concerns 
the opposition between these bad toys and the good toys who still pro-
vide not only use value but exchange value as they can be valorised as 
commodities on the market. The first three Toy Story films only make 
any sense in a universe where use, exchange value, and capitalist accu-
mulation exist. Only Toy Story 4 provides a slightly subversive take on 
the role of the commodity in capitalism as the child’s non-commodified 
labour produces a toy from a discarded fork (‘Forky’) negating the idea 
that toys are always commodities produced under capitalism. The theme 
of commodity-sentience, used in Toy Story, is common in other Pixar 
films which deal with worlds totally inhabited by sentient commodities 
(Cars and Planes), where human life on earth has become seemingly 
impossible and a future earth where robots are the primary entities 
which possess emotions (Wall-E).
Toy Story, and its sequels, are films, but the increased perceptual 
apparatus and sentience of commodities is not just a technological shift 
by capitalism but represents an intensification of commodity fetishism. 
Commodities in capitalism increasingly express commodity personas. 
This relates to Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism which describes 
how the social relationships between people become objectified as the 
economic relations between things, obscuring the contradictory nature 
of both the commodity and of the class nature of commodity produc-
tion. Value is reified and objectified in the form of a ‘product’. This does 
not mean that commodity fetishism is a psychological trick which can be 
easily penetrated through reason and reflection. Backhaus (1992) con-
tends that objects (including commodities) are, following Marx, both 
‘sensuous’ and ‘supersensuous’ rather than a straightforwardly material 
being ‘which has been transferred and displaced into the external world 
which is independent from consciousness’ (Backhaus, 1992, p.62). It 
is labour that eventually appears in another, transposed, form alien to 
the worker as a commodity. This is a ‘real abstraction’ or an ‘objective 
illusion’. Pixarfication is a further ‘derangement’ as it is now seemingly 
commodities, rather than us, that perceive, learn, and act back on the 
world. Commodities wear their own ‘character mask’ of sentience.
The element of Pixarfication manifests itself in terms of ideas that 
magical or technological sentience is everywhere (a panpsychist, techno-
logical, perspective on commodities), that we are in the sensory world 
of commodities (their gaze), form relationships with them and that 
there is speciation (an ever-extending world of sentient commodities) 
which extends across time, eternally. This could comprise a whole uni-
verse of human consumption and production including the internet of 
things (IoT), the tools of the quantified self, smart factories, digital assis-
tants, and emotional attachments to AI and robots. At root, though, 
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This exercise of feeding back from the consumer to the producer has 
always been performed by companies through market research and 
ethnographic means of ‘observing’ commodities in the field but it is 
increasingly the case that this is happening in an unmediated fashion. 
Commodities increasingly directly drive the process of production in 
both manufacturing and services by providing instant feedback through 
technical means. For example, ‘Chatty Factories’ which was discussed in 
the previous chapter, involved examining how placing sensors on com-
modities can lead to real-time feedback to the factory floor which in 
turn would change production in real time to optimise the product, but 
always in terms of revenue and cost (profitability). One example of this 
could be the inclusion of sensors in cars that would constantly record 
the way in which they were dealing with the road, the temperature and 
the speed and location of the car. This could feed back to the factory 
in real time to change the production of the car in terms of various 
forms of optimisation (see Preston, 2021). Although this could optimise 
the experience of the consumer, it is evident that profit would be the 
major consideration. Workers would be subject to a fusion of both real 
subsumption (the increased use of fixed capital to enhance productiv-
ity) and a technological, pan-psychic, form of commodity fetishism. 
Through fixed capital (technology) their work and productivity would 
be shaped by value production mediated by the ‘experience’ of a com-
modity. This is another means of synthetic timing (Sohn-Rethel, 1978) 
by which exchange sets the time necessary for work. In capitalist univer-
sities, the equivalent of this are the league tables and data analytics that 
enable them to keep up with the competition but, in reality, are a form 
of labour discipline.
There are multiple examples of this dominance of commodities in our 
everyday lives. We already communicate with ‘digital assistants’ such as 
Pixarfication is motivated by the expansion of the world of value and 
hence profit. This in turn seems to be driven by technology, or forms of, 
technological innovation. The IoT, as an example, refers to a situation 
in which every entity is connected to the internet and can communicate 
with other entities. Hence, every entity has a status in time and space 
and can also relate with other objects. In this way objects communi-
cate together and seemingly exert influence over human affairs. This 
could be through changing human environments (temperature, energy 
consumption, and behavioural aspects such as anti-social behaviour). 
In practice the commodities are obviously not directly exerting these 
changes for their own ends but rather they (or their connections) are 
owned by capitalist enterprises who are motivated by profit. Dyer-
Whiteford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff (2019, p.31) consider that the IoT will, 
in capitalist terms, enliven and cognitise objects. Objects become ‘alive’ 
not only in terms of their sensory systems but also become ‘enlivened’ 
through AI by their capacity to determine production and profitability.
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Although in the examples the stress has been on consumption, it is 
the interplay between use value, exchange value, and production that 
makes this an aspect of real subsumption. That is, the Pixarfication of 
commodities leads to them having an apparent ‘voice’ in production 
as opposed to workers. In New Industrial Systems (NIS) the commod-
ity could be said to acquire a ‘use sovereignty’ (Preston, 2021), talking 
back to the factory where it was created and exerting authority over 
the labour process (subject to considerations of cost and profitability). 
It is the use of the product, the signals that it sends, in conjunction with 
forms of market research, that informs production. This use sovereignty 
seeks to resolve the contradiction between use value and exchange value 
by making it more likely that factories would produce commodities that 
are valorised in the market. If commodities are designed to meet users’ 
needs then they are more likely to be sold and exchanged for money. 
As an embodiment of this, in the 2019 UK advertisement for Amazon 
products, the commodities that roll off the packaging line and which 
are delivered to consumer’s homes have an animated smile (the Amazon 
logo) which also features on worldwide Amazon packaging. Logistics 
has a smile. In NIS the Amazon logistics smile becomes a mouth that 
talks back to the Amazon store, warehouses, and factories worldwide. 
Commodities produced in such systems can be released into exchange 
more rapidly and the process of circulation speeds up, exerting pressure 
on labour to work at increased intensities, producing a greater turnover 
of relative surplus value and driving the firm to invest in newer tech-
nologies. The concrete form of production becomes increasingly subject 
to real abstractions. Ultimately, the production of value is still the key 
criteria as a function of labour congealed in a commodity is expressed 
in terms of Socially Necessary Labour Time (SNLT). As SNLT declines 
with technological improvement and methods of organisation (as the 
‘datum’), there might be an increase in relative surplus value but as soon 
as all industries adopt NIS value will remain the same. The commodity 
form in NIS therefore is no different, in essence, from the social nature 
of the commodity in other types of capitalist production.
Amazon’s Alexa in our own homes, or on our phones, and these entities 
learn from our voices and behaviours, collecting data to profile us. In 
practice, it is Amazon, not an Alexa, that learns about us. Similarly, 
the affective and erotic attachments which some people have to non- 
technological objects such as ‘body pillows’ which feature anime charac-
ters, or computer avatars or video game characters, shows that all sorts 
of commodities can become personified and enlivened. This complete 
mystification through commodities, that commodities are sentient and 
are the real actors of society (as is evident in the Pixar timeline) has 
become (under capitalism) a (perhaps temporary and ephemeral) but a 
contemporaneous powerful principle. Learning has hence moved from 
being a human capacity to become a feature of commodities.
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‘Use sovereignty’ is an attempt by NIS to resolve the contradiction 
between various forms of value that exist in the form of the commodity in 
capitalism that cannot necessarily be resolved through the money form. 
Firstly, the specific form of use value attempts to ensure that the commod-
ity is valorised on the market as the commodity alters its concrete nature 
automatically in response to consumer desires (although still subject to 
the profit motive). Secondly, the commodity as the social form in capi-
talism directly disciplines the labour process. The commodity indirectly 
takes charge of the way in which production is organised in terms of the 
production of value. The commodity itself becomes the king of produc-
tion acting as a seemingly autonomous agent of the capitalist’s vision. 
Commodities have voices as they convey information to the factory. They 
have their own virtual life and even avatars as digital twins through 
which data-driven design and algorithms drive the factory. This is con-
gruent with other developments in manufacturing such as gamification 
and the neuroscience of labour. However, it is not that commodities really 
have an ‘autonomous essence’ (Harman, 2016) independent of capitalism 
but that they have a really existing abstract essence (value) (Kurz, 2014) as 
part of a capitalist process that is revealed only in exchange (Pitts, 2018).
The Pixarfication of Services and Higher Education
As well as manufactured goods (Preston, 2021), Pixarfication can also 
be applied to services. This is not a new development as techniques 
employed in manufacturing are frequently applied to intangibles. For 
example, Taylorism which started in slaughterhouses and car manufac-
ture is now employed in areas such as call centres. As well as shifting 
the locus of learning from humans to commodities, Pixarfication is used 
in the production of educational services. In particular, the corporate 
nature of HE has made it increasingly subject to Pixarfication processes. 
The HE sector has previously been examined through concepts such as 
privatisation, marketisation, commodification, and managerialism but 
datafication is also part of the contemporary landscape of the capitalist 
university and this lends itself to Pixarfication.
Datafication and the move from production techniques used for tangi-
ble to intangible commodities is part of a widespread trend in capitalism. 
Increasingly, the distance between manufacturing and service sectors is 
becoming blurred as ‘manufacturing as a service’ and the algorithmic 
forms of control first developed in Taylorist manufacturing are merged. 
Similar business processes are found across a range of organisations. In 
HE, commodities are increasingly abstracted from students, academics, 
and research, and exist as pure representations of funding streams in terms 
of quantifications, performance indicators, and league tables. These com-
modities are not ideological constructs but are the universalising measure 
that drives competition between institutions. This realist conception is 
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contrary to idealist critiques that contend ‘obsessions’ with ‘ideological’ 
league table positions are misguided. Comparative indices really do oper-
ate as actually existing abstractions (or real abstractions, Tenkle, 2014; 
Kurz, 2014), that drive productivity in HE. In itself the idea that league 
tables drive HE performance is not original, but the shift to Pixarfication 
is that these data personas are not simply a type of commodity fetishism 
but are ascribed a form of sentience. Specifically, data is given the status 
of a sentient being. It seems to act pedagogically, in terms of offering 
us ‘insights’ or ‘telling stories’ about our institutions, aiming to provide 
a ‘true picture’ of reality in HE. Data ‘sees us’ at the level of the insti-
tution, the department and the individual (Beer, 2018; Thomas, Nafus 
and Sherman, 2018). Data visualisations and animations in HE become 
a data ‘persona’ giving data a character and a sentience. HE is, therefore, 
not immune from the blurring of the lines between manufacturing and 
services and the drive towards products with (real or inferred) proper-
ties of sentience and agency. In HE, where the commodity is less easily 
identified when compared to other sectors, this Pixarfication manifests 
itself in terms of the ways in which data, and league tables, are ascribed 
sentient and characterful properties. Data ‘comes to life’, animated by 
visualisations, analytics, and AI tools. This has implications for where 
agency in HE resides. Rather than a paradigm as student-as-consumer 
being paramount as in theories of marketisation of HE, the ‘inhuman 
power’ of data is an existing, determinant, abstraction.
It must be noted that with Pixarfication there is no ontological break 
with industry, whether early manufacturing or Industry 4.0 in terms of 
its capitalist nature. It does not point towards an ‘identity politics for 
commodities’. Pixarfication is a flattening of the political surface due 
to the role of value, not as a way of extending the bourgeois concep-
tion of rights to the hammer, the paperclip, and the stapler. The phrase 
‘here comes everything’ and associated phrases like ‘internet of things 
(IoT)’ both indicate that commodities are bursting through the doors, 
but also that they are becoming conscious in a network of everything 
that is everywhere. As was considered in the second chapter, what is 
really at play is the capitalist process of profit maximisation through the 
exploitation of labour. Behind Pixarfication is a drive to increase surplus 
value and to achieve it through a seeming ‘self-valorisation’ of the sen-
tient commodity. Profit, not novelty, is the real force behind the adoption 
of new business models in HE.
McDonaldisation, Disneyization, and Pixarfication  
as ‘Business Models’ of HE
It is not novel to define and then apply a metaphorical ‘business model’, 
like Pixarfication, in contemporary capitalism to HE. Corporate para-
digms are often employed to generalise a mode of business behaviour to 
this sector. These have included McDonaldisation and Disneyization. 
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McDonaldisation, following Ritzer (2000), has been used to consider 
how bureaucratic forms of management in HE can impose standardised 
procedures and regulations on academics and students so that they are 
trapped in an ‘iron cage’ of limited agency (Hayes and Wynwood, 2002; 
Hayes, 2017). Disneyization (Bryman, 2004) emphasises the experience 
economy, the affective, and the performative in HE along the lines of an 
educational theme park. Despite the conceptual power of these theories, 
it must he recognised there are some limitations in applying them outside 
of the corporate context to universities. In a global system of HE, with 
new corporations in ascendancy, the salience of any one corporation 
(particularly a United States based one) for a world system of HE may 
be doubted. It could be argued that there is no one single corporate par-
adigm that is applicable to all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). For 
example, low-cost, teaching-intensive private institutions could be adopt-
ing a ‘Walmarting’ strategy (Goggin, 2016) of high-volume mass-market 
degrees, which is very different to other public universities. Relatedly, 
employing any one of these business paradigms risks losing some of 
the specificities of HE (in terms of the intangibility of what is produced 
and the generally not-for-profit nature of HEIs) for the generalities of 
capitalism and marketisation (in that a named corporation is used as 
a stand-in for capitalist processes as described above). Pixarfication, 
drawn from the creative work of the company Pixar, does have similar 
drawbacks but whilst recognising its limitations, its strength is that it 
allows for an analysis of the ways in which HE is increasingly driven by 
the anthropomorphised, seemingly learning and sentient (through AI), 
commodity of data. It therefore enables an original creative approach 
to understand the ways in which data, through ascribed sentience and 
its reification in league tables, increasingly becomes a driver of HE pro-
cesses. It also needs to be contextualised in terms of McDonaldisation 
and Disneyization as preceding paradigms.
Ritzer’s seminal (2000) work on McDonaldisation updated Weber’s 
bureaucratic paradigm for contemporary society and this has been system-
atically extended to HE (Hayes and Wynwood, 2002). McDonaldisation 
involves time discipline (efficiency), quantification (calculability), pre-
dictability, technological control of processes, and ‘fake fraternisation’ 
between workers and consumers which reproduces Weber’s bureaucratic 
‘iron cage’ across society. The model is the innovative production methods 
of McDonalds restaurant franchises that produce a standardised product 
of a defined quality, with associated training and manuals and scripted 
customer service. Hartley (1995) uses McDonaldisation as a heuristic to 
consider that policy moves in HE are designed to shift HE towards the 
production of an increasingly standardised product from the standpoint 
of production. In terms of activities of education, it enables us:
…to regard education as if it has some material essences, or as if 
its production processes could be readily broken down into a set of 
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fixed, measurable and assessable procedures which admit the title 
‘good (or even best) practice’, or as if its output should be predicta-
ble, standardisable and quantifiable.
(Hartley, 1995, p.419)
Hartley argues that McDonaldisation in HE is anti-democratic by 
reducing the means and ends of HE to purely mechanistic ones. 
Relatedly, Disneyization (Bryman, 2004) is the ‘…process by which 
the principles of the Disney theme parks are coming to dominate more 
and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world’ 
(Bryman, 2004, p.1). Bryman intends his notion of Disneyization to par-
allel the notion of McDonaldisation in two senses. Firstly, the parallels 
between the business models of McDonalds and Disney in terms of the 
shared elements of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control. 
Secondly the use of the paradigm to represent the diffusion of principles 
across organisations and societies rather than simply the spread of the 
firms, namely fast-food restaurants, and theme parks in general. Like 
McDonaldisation, there are four principles of Disneyization. Theming is 
the tendency to create business environments that are visually, sonically, 
and affectively structured around certain motifs and designs evocative 
of that business’s intellectual property. Dedifferentiation of consump-
tion is the tendency for elements of consumption to become interlocked 
and inseparable so that shopping, theme park rides, staying in themed 
hotels and purchasing films online become part of a seamless consump-
tion process. Merchandising concerns the selling of licenced products 
and services on or off-site. Emotional labour is involved in the creation 
of the themed environment of the park as employees take on the role 
of various characters and personas (Bryman, 2004). Disneyization is 
increasingly common in Universities which increasingly resemble malls 
where hybrid consumption takes place (Bryman, 2004, p.74) in a themed 
campus setting (Bryman, 2004 p.51) with branded merchandising 
(Bryman, 2004, p.97). The notion of the ‘student experience’ (particu-
larly in the US) is an example of Disneyization where students often 
purchase, and identify with, experiences and products related to their 
university. The university becomes a pseudo-theme park where students 
can purchase dedifferentiated products and continue their consumption 
beyond the university at alumni events and collective reminiscences on 
social media.
There are some differences between McDonaldisation and Disney-
ization but also similarities in terms of how they employ the notion 
of a ‘business paradigm’ to society. Bryman (2004) considers that 
Ritzer’s (2000) McDonaldisation primarily concerns control rather 
than capital and is closer to classical (Weberian) social theory than 
Disneyization which is more concerned with contemporary theories 
of emotion and affect. However, one common problem with both 
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McDonaldisation and Disneyization is that they strangely do not 
consider the specifically capitalist nature of McDonalds or Disney as 
enterprises at least not in a Marxist sense. In particular, they focus pri-
marily on consumption rather than production (Hayes and Wynwood, 
2002, pp.9–10). The processes which McDonald’s employs, for exam-
ple, are not particularly unique to this company and are foreshadowed 
by Marx’s writings on the nature of factory production with its time 
discipline, standardisation, and routinisation. The ways in which cap-
ital consistently finds new markets and sources of labour could be 
applied to both McDonaldisation and Disneyization with their ‘ded-
ifferentiated’ consumption and ‘emotional labour’. This is not to say 
that they are not incredibly useful descriptive devices for outlining 
the contours of capitalism (and potentially resistance) but they need 
to be theoretically contextualised if we are to understand them more 
broadly in terms of the specific character of capitalism. Specifically, 
both McDonaldisation and Disneyization naively consider the impo-
sition of business forms onto commerce and society which could be 
regarded as otherwise unmediated by these forms. As discussed in pre-
vious chapters, capitalism is compelled by a constantly collapsing floor 
(the desubstantiation of value – Kurz, 2014) to introduce cunning new 
methods of worker exploitation and ways of valorising value through 
the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of commodities. McDonaldisation 
and Disneyization are examples of ways in which this is being done but 
so are Amazon (as an example of platform capitalism), Walmart, and 
Nintendo. There are potentially an infinite number of commodities 
and business models which can influence social relationships. Indeed, 
the notion of the ‘social’ and ‘society’ is largely absent from these par-
adigms. Both McDonaldisation and Disneyization take a conception 
of society which is colonised by these business models in all aspects 
(including Higher Education). The problem is that this theorisation 
considers society to be external and morally superior to business in 
some sense. It is society that is colonised by business rather than cap-
italism as society itself. A Marxist account based on value critique 
would problematise society in capitalism as ‘the social’, which is value 
and capital, and analyse their class determined movements (including 
resistances). Capitalism actually does invert the world so that the ‘real’ 
is the world of commodities and value and we really wear the ‘char-
acter masks’ of actors. For example, Hartley’s (1995) reference to the 
‘as if’ nature of the way in which McDonaldisation is being employed 
in HE is unknowingly a reference to a ‘real abstraction’ in terms of 
the way in which the outputs of HE are being transmuted into a com-
modity which can be marketised. There is no ‘as if ’ here, rather an ‘as 
is’ as HE outputs become commodities in the existing contradictory 
sense of the word. Commodities ‘really are’ one of the actors in capi-
talism and the mystification is not just ideological but real if incredibly 
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fragile and collapsing given its basis in labour power (Kurz, 2014). 
This theorised account enables us to build resistance as an obvious and 
everyday part of this process. For example, Hayes (2017) considers 
that Ritzer misuses Weber’s work in making it unduly teleological in 
terms of the movement from rationality to the ‘iron cage’ and makes 
the case for academic agency and freedom of speech. This forms part of 
Hayes’ wider libertarian Marxist critique of HE as an area for worker 
autonomy and agency. Agency is somewhat absent from Ritzer’s own 
work in that he considers himself ‘…more of a Weberian pessimist 
than a Marxist optimist’ (Hayes and Ritzer, 2017, p.44). Similarly, 
Pixarfication cannot avoid some of the historical problematics of 
Disneyization and McDonaldisation. The collapsing and consistently 
reorganising nature of capitalist enterprises means that Pixar films 
may be as dated as Ealing comedies in the world of entertainment in 
the next decade. However, the basis of Pixarfication is in social theory 
(albeit updated for value critique) in terms of Marx’s theory of the 
commodity which may afford it some durability in applying it as part 
of a specifically capitalist process.
Pixarfication in Practice: Commodities 
and Datafication in HE
The process of Pixarfication in HE follows commodification (the crea-
tion of a commodity in the capitalist sense of the term) and datafication 
(the expression of the commodity in terms of data) and it introduces 
processes of data analytics in terms of animation, characterisation, and 
production. In terms of commodification, the question of what is pro-
duced by HE is one which has troubled economists of education who 
largely follow the principles of ‘classical economics’ in identifying the 
product, the price of which is determined by supply and demand. As 
previous stated, HE produces a number of things including education, 
research, and knowledge exchange. All of these things might be sub-
ject to a price, but a price is just a ‘label’ that can be attached to a 
thing (anything) and this does not necessarily make that thing a com-
modity. Notably, markets with prices predate capitalism and even 
feudalism. Marx rarely discusses education directly in his work, but 
he does make the point that it (along with other processes) produces 
commodities (in passing, HE may also enhance the unique commodity 
labour power – Rikowski, 2000). In terms of the production of educa-
tional commodities, Marx famously refers to education as a ‘sausage 
factory’:
…a school master is a productive labourer when, in addition to bela-
bouring the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground 
to enrich the owner of the school. That the latter has laid out his 
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capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, makes no 
difference to the relation.
(Marx, 1992, p.644)
In this very telling passage, Marx says that there is nothing special about 
education (or trivial about sausage factories) in that when a commod-
ity is being produced with a use value (the change in the heads of the 
scholars as a result of the ‘belabouring’) and an exchange value. The 
‘school master’ is a productive labourer as they have the potential to 
conduct both concrete and abstract labour (labour power) to posit value. 
‘Teaching’ and ‘sausage’ share identical features in that both are com-
modities which have use and exchange value and they present potential 
branches of industry where a capitalist could invest their money. Both 
are exchangeable in that it would be possible to exchange a quantity of 
sausages for a place on a degree programme through their objectified 
form (money). Unlike teaching, the sausage is a visceral object, but this 
makes no difference to their joint existences as commodities. In terms of 
HE, the process of commodification, the making of an educational com-
modity, involves primitive accumulation both in terms of the separation 
of the commodity from the universe of mere ‘things’ (such as the air) and 
the transformation of academic work into labour power presuming all of 
the other features of this social substance (quantification, wage labour, 
and proletarianisation).
There are many examples of the ways in which student satisfaction, 
degrees, and other aspects of HE have become commodified and made the 
subject of wage labour. An apt example of this process is the way in which 
research has become a product in UK HE via the current REF (Research 
Excellence Framework) and previous research excellence exercises which 
turn academic research and writing into commodities. Although the UK 
REF is perhaps an extreme example of how research has become com-
modified, Australia has a similar framework (Excellence in Research for 
Australia, ERA) and many countries have adopted research performance 
indicators for comparison and tenure purposes. Outside of the world of 
educational commodities, people write books and articles for all sorts 
of reasons including enjoyment, agitation, and communication. Books 
and articles can have a price in non-capitalist economies and books were 
sold in markets in Ancient Rome. Books become a commodity when 
they are produced using labour power (in the abstract) to produce a use 
value (by concrete labour power) and an exchange value (by abstract 
labour power). The REF means that the outputs of academics are com-
modities with not only a price (you can buy a book or an article) but 
they are produced for exchange value (not just use value) in terms of 
how much they can be valorised for. To explain further, the REF means 
that each academic who works in a UK university must (subject to the 
conditions of their contract and, exceptionally, other mitigating factors) 
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produce on average 2.5 outputs over the REF period (2014–2020) which 
are assessed by an external panel of reviewers. Depending on the ratings 
that the panel of reviewers attach to this grading, the University that 
they are a member of at the census data point (July 31, 2020) will receive 
funding based on this submission. The ‘sausage’ in this example (or the 
meat in the sausage) is the research output (whatever that might be). The 
creation of this commodity (the REF output) requires primitive accumu-
lation in terms of specifying what can and can’t be a REF output (for 
example, it needs to be peer reviewed), ascertaining the quality of that 
output (REF outputs are reviewed and are awarded a ‘star rating’ from 
Unclassified through to 4*) in a period of time (six years). The research 
labour of the academic becomes abstract labour as wages are allocated 
(albeit rather informally through promotions and appointments) accord-
ing to production of the REF commodities and academics become part 
of the proletariat as they must sell their labour power to receive wages. 
This again requires primitive accumulation as the academics must be 
‘displaced’ from their comfortable positions of permanency to become 
labourers whose conditions of employment largely depend on fulfilling 
the REF criteria. The REF process also commodifies other things that 
academics do such as the impact of their work on economy, society, and 
culture which also is a source of potential income for the university. 
Even the research culture and seminars of a department are made by the 
REF into a commodity as the ‘environment’. In this way, the universe 
of commodities is widened, and labour power is expanded into the cre-
ation of many commodities (teaching, research, impact, environment, 
and knowledge exchange). Hence academic labourers find themselves 
with an increasing set of demands to meet in terms of academic com-
modities which is set by state systems in the UK including the TEF 
(Teaching Excellence Framework) and the KEF (Knowledge Exchange 
Framework). This process is not autopoietic but requires the application 
of labour power under conditions of contradiction in every moment of 
production. The UK Government (through the REF) produces a consist-
ently escalating level of research expectations (to keep UK universities 
competitive) that involves increased investment by universities in both 
capital (labs, facilities, research funds, research support, and build-
ings) and labour (researchers with increasingly superior outputs). The 
drive for increased productivity of academics not only exhausts them 
and encourages the growth of casualised labour but undermines itself 
as value production becomes increasingly unprofitable as the criteria 
for funding becomes ever more extreme. Where once 2* ranked outputs 
would attract funding now it is only 3* outputs and in the next REF it 
may be 4* outputs. This also leads to a situation where the intrinsic (use 
value) of an output is subordinate to its exchange value. It must be noted 
that some commodities produced by HE have a rapid circulation. For 
example, a literal sausage sold in the university canteen is transferred 
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to the money form quite quickly whereas student fees are ‘returned’ to 
the university more slowly. In the case of the REF it takes a long time (a 
six year interval) for the various outcomes of academics to be converted 
into a vast data stream (the complete data sausage) which is submitted 
by a certain date and time. This is the datafication of the commodity. It 
is akin to the construction of a large battleship through various forms of 
labour power which is sold in one (uncertain) tender to the Government. 
The actual transmission of the commodity to government as a data 
stream is the moment at which the commodity leaves the University 
‘sausage factory’ to be eventually valorised in its objective form (money) 
at which point all academic and administrative labours are equated as 
abstract labours.
Through this process of datafication, there is simultaneously a 
Pixarfication of the research (and other) commodities in HE. The first 
aspect of this is animation. Animation is the creation of an outline 
mobile persona for the commodity. As with forms of scientific man-
agement and McDonaldisation, this primarily involves the process of 
boundary drawing and quantification that are synonymous with the 
creation of a commodity separate from nature or non-commodified aca-
demic labour. This is a violent process of primitive accumulation so that 
there is struggle and resistance over the imposition of these categories on 
academic labour. As described above, this first involves quantification. 
Once quantified, the performance of the individual and the organisa-
tion can then be animated. At the first order, this can be considered a 
literal depiction and drawing of the performance in terms of the pro-
duction of the commodity. The university produces graphs, charts, and 
visualisations of productivity which are temporal in terms of not only 
the measure involved but also in producing targets. In the example of 
research outputs, they become a commodity that has both literal exist-
ence and an animated existence in terms of its representation as data. It 
must be remembered that this data is an enormous stream with every 
output, impact, and environment statement as the total mass of com-
modities which is exchanged for money. Hence the university is involved 
in the capitalist circulation process of money invested subsequently being 
used to add value to a commodity (through labour power) to produce a 
greater sum of money.
There are various examples of how animation is practised in contem-
porary HE. Data interfaces such as Domo, SAS, and Tableau are being 
used by universities to literally animate their data:-
Tableau is business intelligence software that helps people see and 
understand their data…Connect and visualise your data in minutes…
Get the freshest data with a live connection to your data…Tableau 
helps people transform data into actionable insights. Explore with 
limitless visual analytics. Build dashboards and perform ad hoc 
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analyses in just a few clicks. Share your work with anyone and make 
an impact on your business. From global enterprises to early-stage 
startups and small businesses, people everywhere use Tableau to see 
and understand their data.
(Tableau.com, 2020, my italics)
Here the emphasis is on a ‘connection’ with data that enable one to 
‘see and understand’ the data. Although there is a benefit described 
in terms of ‘visual analytics’ (literal animations), there is an emphasis 
on data being ‘seen’ and the connection between the human and the 
data. Such approaches are supported by ‘Universities UK’ (2016) who 
consider that data and data assessments such as the TEF (Teaching 
Excellence Framework, a UK methodology for assessing student experi-
ence) are examples of instrumentalism and it is only when data is given 
a profile that it can move towards providing operationalised financial 
information:-
External performance assessments, such as the TEF, don’t in them-
selves support institutions understanding and using their data. 
Advanced learning analytics can allow institutions to move beyond 
the instrumental requirements of these assessments to a more holistic 
data analytic profile. Predictive learning analytics are also increas-
ingly being used to inform impact evaluations, via outcomes data as 
performance metrics. Ultimately, this allows institutions to assess 
the return on investment in interventions.
(Universities UK, 2016, my italics)
As academic productivity and competitiveness are key to profitability 
in the capitalist university, data must therefore be seen to move and go 
beyond static representation, being a literal ‘animation’ of statistics. It 
then becomes possible to see this data representation as an outline char-
acter and make some kind of connection with it just as we connect with a 
simple drawn face or an animated stick figure. This is the next stage in the 
process of Pixarfication – characterisation. An animation alone tells us 
little about a character although we might form some kind of anthropo-
morphic identification with this being (An early Pixar short film Luxo Jr., 
for example, was the story of a lamp who through the cute animation 
can be identified within an anthropocentric sense). Commodities are 
already fetishised in capitalism as real actors and this is as the result 
of a real abstraction and a recognition of the true sociality of capital-
ism. In other words, it is not an idealist mystification, in that it is true 
of really existing capitalist subsumption. Algorithms are used to ‘learn’ 
about the data and to recognise patterns through machine learning and 
AI techniques. We then speak about the data in anthropocentric terms 
using expressions that reflect what the data shows or tells us and what 
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we can learn from the data. The data is ‘reality’ in that it can apparently 
provide a ‘sense check’ of what the capitalist university is doing. We can 
look at the data, but the data looks back at us (Beer, 2018) and learns 
from us. This is not just datafication but commodity fetishism of a literal 
kind. The commodity, as represented by the data, is a learning and alien 
thing, with a mass (the total Key Performance Indicators in management 
speak) and tentacles reaching into departments and individuals and back 
from individuals and departments to the mass. Horrifically, it is literally 
that thing, which is a form of value arising from our own labour power 
and transformed into an objectified form of value (money). In this way 
the ‘learning’ and the ‘voice’ of the data character seemingly produce its 
own future determination by encouraging future plans for accumulation 
and investment or depreciation and divestment.
One example of characterisation is the Times Higher Education 
Supplement Data Point service (Times Higher Education, 2020) that 
provides a unique perspective on universities from various data sources 
as shown by the following extracts (with my italics). ‘Data points’ ena-
bles the university to ‘see what the world thinks of you’. ‘THE…(Times 
Higher Education) Reputation gives a unique multifaceted view of your 
institution’s global reputation and brand performance among influenc-
ers in higher education from across the globe’. By subscribing to Data 
Points, universities can ‘Join the rapidly growing group of global institu-
tions harnessing the intelligence of the rich data that power our rankings 
to unlock their highest potential’. One of the customers quoted in the 
promotional literature, Sunny Kwong of the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong states that ‘DataPoints gives us a view of how the world perceives 
us, and a perspective not readily available elsewhere’. Data Points is a 
good example of characterisation that is typical of Pixarfication. Data 
Points can seemingly see and perceive and reflect how the world judges 
the university as well as having an ‘intelligence’. This is more than just a 
quantification of the university position in league tables which are typi-
cal of marketisation. Through Pixarfication, these rankings become the 
actors (characters) of HE as narrated through performance and league 
tables based on these abstractions. Again, this not an ideological con-
struct but a real abstraction. The components of the league tables might, 
or might, not represent exchange but capitalist universities can always 
be compared. The commodities of HE become part of a series of ‘big-
ger’ characters who represent vast amalgamations of commodities. This 
can become an extreme form of aggregated commodity fetishism. For 
example, the QS World University Rankings (Times Higher Education), 
according to their website, ask the question ‘Who Rules?’ and invite us 
to ‘Meet the World’s Top 10 Universities’. The personification of the sov-
ereign as being a ‘university’ that rules and the idea that we can ‘meet’ a 
university through its data are perverse examples of the characterisation 
of a ‘ruling university’.
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Once, through the data, the characters of HE have been established as 
baskets of commodities they become the datum. This leads to the third 
stage of Pixarfication, Production. The commodities become objects 
of self-investigation and introspection through techniques of data ana-
lytics, machine learning, and forms of AI. These techniques are used 
to deconstruct and reverse engineer the commodities to find out how 
they can best be produced. From the perspective of the capitalist uni-
versity, this involves orientating the ‘factors of production’ which again 
mystifies the one commodity that can produce value (labour power). In 
production, Pixarfication can be seen to be a broader part of the wider 
primitive accumulation and dispossession process in HE in terms of the 
identification and production of a commodity through labour power. At 
first, the ‘outline’ of the commodity is unknown. It is difficult to estab-
lish what academics and other university workers are doing in terms of 
production. The university might know that it is producing research, 
teaching, or knowledge but as a capitalist producer, it needs certainty 
as to what the commodity (or commodities) being made actually are. 
The ‘certainty’ of commodity production is what animation is about. To 
‘guide’ the animation there are a whole series of league tables produced 
by organisations such as the QS University Rankings, Times University 
Guide and various newspapers. Although workers were already produc-
ing ‘stuff’ which yielded ‘money’ for the University, animation makes 
this visibly appear, a name can be put on to the ‘stuff’ and this can 
be seen to arise as a function of academic effort. These commodities 
can be produced through league tables and performance indicators. For 
example, the QS World University Rankings discussed above defines 
two ‘commodities’ as follows:-
Teaching quality is typically cited by students as the metric of 
highest importance to them when comparing institutions using a 
ranking. It is notoriously difficult to measure, but we have deter-
mined that measuring teacher/student ratios is the most effective 
proxy metric for teaching quality. It assesses the extent to which 
institutions are able to provide students with meaningful access to 
lecturers and tutors, and recognizes that a high number of faculty 
members per student will reduce the teaching burden on each indi-
vidual academic.
A highly international university acquires and confers a number 
of advantages. It demonstrates an ability to attract faculty and stu-
dents from across the world, which in turn suggests that it possesses 
a strong international brand. It implies a highly global outlook: 
essentially for institutions operating in an internationalised higher 
education sector. It also provides both students and staff alike with 
a multinational environment, facilitating exchange of best practices 
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and beliefs. In doing so, it provides students with international sym-
pathies and global awareness: soft skills increasingly valuable to 
employers.
(TopUniversities.com, 2020, my italics)
As can be seen through these quotes on metrics used in the QS rank-
ings, these commodities are produced through arbitrary distinctions. In 
terms of teaching quality, this is ascertained through student opinion 
and represents a good example of how the hyper-subjective itself (as in 
the National Student Survey in the UK) can become objectified. It is 
simultaneously the result of the labour power of academics even though 
it is then reimposed upon them as a commodity form and as a labour 
discipline. This ‘proxy measure’ is then what the commodity becomes. 
The second quote, on international reputation, is even more nebulous 
but shows how reputation is made to be a commodity through its asso-
ciation with the needs of employers. Note that these then (because of the 
global nature of the QS rankings) become global indicators and enable 
production as part of a global market.
This is an aspect of ‘commodity fetishism’ through which a thing 
becomes endowed with properties of price and profit that seem to be 
separate from human contact. As noted above, animation often involves 
the literal graphing and animation of key commodities. Once the com-
modity is established in outline, it can then be ‘characterised’ in terms 
of ascribing it with perception, sentience, and learning. The commod-
ity seemingly learns over time what ‘moves’ it and as we ‘observe it’, it 
observes us back in a thoroughly alien sense. We ascribe the commodity 
sentience as it knows more about us than we know about it even though 
we might attempt to analyse it. Here is where the idea of a commodity 
as ‘supersensible’ achieves a double layer of fetishisation. We seek to 
‘understand’ the commodity (student satisfaction, for example) through 
statistical methods, focus groups, and surveys that involve increasingly 
complex AI algorithms, but we always fail to ‘fully understand’ what 
are the factors that move the value of this commodity. Hence what is 
created (through our own labour) is beyond our human understanding, 
even in quantitative terms. The commodity becomes mystified even as it 
becomes more understandable in terms of its nature as a commodity. In 
the third stage, production, it is this sentient ‘thing’ that drives what the 
University does. Hence, KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and League 
Table Positions are not an ideological construct but operate as a real 
abstraction, a super sensible thing or character (in Pixarfication) that 
dominates production in the university. These aggregate ‘characters’ 
bestride world education in terms of their dominance across countries 
and education systems through the imposition of global metrics by which 
the success of universities can be gauged, rise, or decline.
100 The Pixarfication of Higher Education
Conclusion: Pixarfication and Academic Labour
The above analysis has developed the concept of Pixarfication as a form 
of commodity fetishism in the current stage of capitalism. Pixarfication 
is obviously linked to a particular corporate form (that of Pixar). There 
are problems, which have been discussed, in relating a particular histor-
ical form of business enterprise to a more generalised form of capitalist 
business. However, capitalism itself uses such metaphors to allow us to 
think about how capitalist reality might manifest itself and enables us 
to live in it. In this case, the commodity as a supersensible thing appears 
both as value (with the appearance of use and exchange) and as a ‘mere 
thing’. In Pixarfication the ‘mere thing’ takes on some of the attributes 
that we would usually associate with the human, such as perception 
and a limited form of learning and assumed sentience (though machine 
learning and AI) which then is determinant in production. As in com-
modity production more generally, the appearance is that the commodity 
is autopoietic in terms of being self-reproducing. The product seemingly 
produces itself and talks back to production to determine how it should 
be made in the future. Pixarfication can be described, then, as sentient, 
super-sensuous, autopoietic commodity production. In many ways this 
appears to be standard in terms of capitalism generally (in that capi-
talists produce on the basis of profit from exchange value but in doing 
so need to be confident that their product has a use value) but there 
is a new level of significance in that the ‘mere thing’ becomes a thing 
that (apparently) has a character, cognition, and voice although this is 
just a ‘character mask’ in the same way that workers and capitalists 
are masked. This is not just of theoretical importance – the commodity 
fetish, a real abstraction has very real consequences for workers in HE.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, real abstractions are not just the 
unfolding of value over historical time in the manner of some kind of 
‘spirit’. As a real abstraction, in its various guises, the movement of value 
in capitalist HE exercises a visceral compulsion for academics and in 
turn is, tragically, the result of labour power. This labour power is not 
given willingly to the capitalist but involves the primitive accumulation 
of labour (and the commodity) and various forms of exploitation in 
order to manifest surplus value. Pixarfication is a further perversion of 
labour in that the labour power of workers is ultimately used to make 
commodities that (through data analytics and AI) seemingly have cog-
nition of their own production and which command more labour of 
increased intensity to be used in the production process. This vortex 
consistently negates ever increasing quantities and qualities of labour 
power converting it to the ‘nothing’ of dead labour whilst increasing 
the mass of commodities produced over time. The appearance of com-
modities becomes the location of learning and sentience and commodity 
fetishism has reached its highest level where the commodity is seemingly 
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existence and life. Once this thing becomes data with a ‘persona’, this 
has resonance with what Dyer-Whiteford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff (2019, 
p.21) call hyper-subsumption in which ‘…capital’s automizing force 
manifests as AI’.
As workers in HE, discussion of sentient commodities, hyper- 
subsumption and the reality of the commodity fetish might seem to 
imply that Pixarfication is yet another theory that closes down agency 
and autonomy for labour. The real actors of HE really do become the 
performance indicators and league tables that liberal, or social-demo-
cratic critiques, have railed against. Bleakly, this is true. In capitalism, 
sociality, capitalist society, is the movement and expansion of value in 
all of its different forms to infinity (Kurz, 2014). However, this can never 
(by definition) subsume human agency as capitalism needs the auton-
omy and creativity of labour as a source of the sole commodity that can 
produce value – labour power. Managers may read us into KPIs and 
Performance Indicators by referring to our contribution to the collective 
effort and this is literally true in terms of our labour. It is our physical, 
mental, emotional, affective, performative, collective, and otherwise 
concrete labour that makes the performance indicators. In the sense that 
we are both in and against capital we are within and against aspects of 
capital including performance indicators as the sinister inverted form 
of our labour. As discussed previously, one of the forgotten aspects of 
capital is its weakness in terms of the ways it constantly undermines 
itself and this is key to understanding our role as workers in HE against 
capital and capitalism. The state (as a form of capital) must go to intense 
efforts in order to make and maintain HE as part of capitalism. HE is 
the ‘invisible sausage’ factory (to paraphrase Marx) as the notion of a 
commodity must be established simultaneously with the establishment 
of academic labour power. What academics ‘do’ must be made into a 
capitalist ‘thing’ and this requires academics to be made into proletari-
ans. This ‘thing’, the commodity, is consistently undermining itself, not 
only as it must be imposed by force as a ludicrous proposition, but also 
as its essence as a thing of value is consistently ungrounded by the way 
in which value itself loses its substantial nature. As labourers we feel 
that our labour power is a thing against ourselves in its exercise and 
in its products, but we have some agency over when, where, and how 
we choose to use this labour power (or not). In every moment of cap-
ital’s existence and accumulation, there is a human decision and effort 
involved which must be wrestled from the academic worker begrudg-
ingly. This applies to Higher Education as much as any other sector, 
but it is only as our work becomes increasingly related to the produc-
tion of educational commodities that we can understand our positions 
as labourers. Pixarfication both obscures and intensifies our position 
in terms of our relationship between capital and labour. On the one 
hand, the educational commodity as a composite becomes fetishised 
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and develops its own alien autonomy. Universities can both deny that 
they are interested in ‘Pixarfied beings’ such as KPIs and state that it is 
inevitable that we need to comply with their logics. On the other, the 
increased proletarianisation of academics pains us further as we are sub-
jected to greater levels of super-exploitation.
This exploitation is deepening (in terms of the subsumption of labour) 
and focussed on ever greater production of academic commodities (of 
which Pixarfication is a part), but it is also accelerating and intensifying. 
In Chapter 5, I will consider how ideas of existential threat, such as 
AI, are situated in ‘capitalist time’ and how existential threats, particu-
larly the current pandemic threat of COVID-19 are being used in HE to 
extend the working day, the productivity and intensity of work, through 
AI and other technological means.
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Introduction: The ‘New Normal’
Capitalism is a permanent disaster as it collapses all existence into the 
generation of profit and, through disaster capitalism, it can turn a crisis 
into an opportunity. ‘Disaster Capitalism’ (Klein, 2008) as a normal way 
of doing business is particularly relevant during the 2019–2021 global 
COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of writing (2021), the pandemic seems 
to show no sign of disappearing and has been described as a ‘new nor-
mal’ in terms of Higher Education (HE) teaching and lecturing. In this 
‘new normal’, in many countries, students increasingly learn through 
virtual lectures, delivered in synchronous or asynchronous time, by real 
or technologically mediated lecturers. There has been rapid, worldwide 
adoption of these technologies in the pandemic (Crawford et al, 2020). 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is used to support learning platforms such as 
‘Zoom’ and ‘Microsoft Teams’ with multinational corporations offering 
‘solutions’ to HE problems (Teräs, Suoranta, Teräs and Curcher, 2020) 
to profit from emergency. These digital learning platforms, along with 
technologies such as telepresence and holography, have long been pro-
moted as the future of HE by large monopolies such as Apple, Google, 
and Microsoft. The term ‘new normal’ suggests an ontological break 
with the continuity of social progress, that the normal has been rein-
vented in the face of an existential threat (the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Tesar, 2020). This implies that there is a break in time from the ‘old nor-
mal’ to the ‘new normal’ but (capitalist) ‘normality’ still reigns. As has 
been shown in the previous chapters, there is nothing ‘normal’ (or nor-
mative) about capitalist universities where the world is inverted so data 
commodities have a voice and in which capital (sometimes appearing as 
AI) subsumes academic labour. If anything, ‘the new normal’ is still ‘the 
abnormal’ and there is nothing new about it aside from that the pan-
demic has accelerated the application of digital and AI techniques to HE.
Like all such accelerations in capitalism, this changes what might be 
called the ‘density’ of capitalist time (more production, circulation, and 
exchange take place in each hour) but is not a ‘break’ in any kind of time 
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order. A disaster (such as COVID-19), and even an existential threat of 
a super-intelligent AI takeover, does not change capitalist time or the 
fundamental nature of capitalism, even as part of ‘disaster capitalism’ 
but instead leads to a step-change in time-density (with greater speeds of 
commodity production and circulation). It acts to accelerate formal and 
real subsumption by acting as a ‘force multiplier’ for academic labour 
whilst virtually extending the lifetime of the labourer. New digital tech-
nologies used in the COVID-19 pandemic seemingly revolutionise capi-
talist universities but only in terms of intensifying exploitation.
In this chapter I use Marxist understandings of time, associated pri-
marily with the work of Postone (2003), and his conceptions of concrete, 
abstract, and historical time, to argue for three contentions regarding 
COVID-19 and AI in Universities. Each of these is connected to the 
peculiarity of capitalist time or temporality. Firstly, that technological 
solutions allow for the extension not only of the working day, and the 
increased intensity of work, but (through AI) the working life of aca-
demic labour. Secondly, that the idea that the pandemic represents a 
discontinuity in terms of a ‘new normal’ is incorrect and the terminology 
of normality is unhelpful. For capitalism, disasters are not a break to the 
time order of capital. Thirdly, that AI and technological solutions, which 
are a feature of learning in the current pandemic, lead to an increase in 
the density of academic time with a greater production of commodities 
(or commodity stock) in every second of academic life. Although the 
examples used in this chapter relate to the COVID-19 pandemic, they 
are applicable to the trajectory of capitalist universities more generally 
where disasters and crisis (including economic shocks, natural disasters, 
and changes in student demand) are used to restructure not only space 
but also how time is used.
Virtuality, Academic Working Lives, and Re-animation
The COVID-19 pandemic appears as a class conflict over time and work 
allocation. In capitalist universities it seems to be a struggle between 
managers and academics as to whether they should work on campus 
(potentially exposing academics to the COVID-19 virus), and the times 
(and time) they should work in terms of delivering online lecturers and 
other forms of activity. The concept of time as an element in struggle 
is important (in terms of struggles over the working day) but time in 
capitalism is not just another domain of contestation between the ruling 
class and the working class or a division between a romanticised human 
pastoral (in front of students) and machine (in front of a computer) 
time, or even as a determining metric of production across societies (as 
claimed by Bidet’s, 2017 critique of Postone). Time in capitalism can be 
best described as abstract time (Postone, 2003). As part of this, capital-
ism also produces a differential framing of concrete time (Murthy, 2009; 
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after Postone, 2003) in which real events (production, distribution, cir-
culation) accelerate within the same temporal frame. Cumulatively, these 
events unfold in historical time.
These conceptions of time are located in Postone’s (2003) reworking 
of Marx’s critical theory which (as discussed in Chapter 2) historicises 
the concept of labour, as abstract labour, as unique to capitalism and 
shows its role in creating the unique form of domination of capital as self- 
valorising value. Postone makes the distinction between different time 
orders in capitalism where time is instrumental, and endogenous, rather 
than being exogenously determined. Time serves a particular purpose 
in capitalism. It is the measure of the expenditure of abstract labour in 
terms of labour time, definitively as ‘…the socially necessary expenditure 
of human labour time’ (Postone, 2003, p.189) being ‘…the labour time 
required to produce any use-value under the prevailing socially normal 
conditions of labour and with the prevalent socially average degree of 
skill and intensity of labour’ (Postone, 2003, p.190). This temporal norm 
of how long it takes to produce an item becomes fleetingly prevalent 
across capitalist society before this advantage is competed away. This 
abstract time of production differs from concrete time ‘…the various 
sorts of time that are functions of events’ (Postone, 2003, p.201) such as 
natural events (lunar cycles or seasons) whereas abstract time is ‘…uni-
form, continuous, homogenous, “empty” time… independent of events’ 
(Postone, 2003, p.202). Time is absolute, abstract, and homogenous and 
an independent variable (Postone, 2003, p.215). It is important to see this 
notion of time as more than ‘empty, homogenous time’ (Postone, 2003, 
p.47). Increases in productivity over historical time (and improvements 
in technology and organisational processes), redetermine the ‘abstract, 
constant time unit’ (Postone, 2003). The interaction between concrete 
production and abstract labour produces a treadmill effect (Wendling, 
2009, p.196), increasing the productive density of abstract time:
Increased productivity increases the amount of value produced per 
unit of time – until this productivity becomes generalized; at that 
point the magnitude of value yielded in that time period, because of 
its abstract and general temporal determination, falls back to its pre-
vious level. This results in a new determination of the social labour 
hour and a new basis of productivity.
(Postone, 2003, p.289)
Time becomes denser, like thickening soup, as more activity (produc-
tion, circulation, and exchange) takes place in every hour but this ‘…is 
not manifest in the sphere of abstract temporality, the value sphere: the 
abstract temporal unit – the hour’ (Postone, 2003, p.292). As units of 
abstract time move forward, an hour is still an hour on the clock despite 
the social labour hour being constantly determined as ‘…each new 
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level of productivity is redetermined “back” as the based level yielding 
the same rate of value’ (Postone, 2003, p.292). Workers are effectively 
running to stand still as more commodities are produced in each time 
interval that only yield relative surplus value if they break the previous 
production norm. Global collective labour is not only exploited by capi-
tal but also (as appropriated as a property of capital) consistently resets 
the capitalist’s clocks and production schedules. This is not in terms of 
what is scientifically or humanly possible, but what the market demands.
Materially, the nature of society and production is fundamentally 
changed over concrete time, a process which Postone refers to as his-
torical time (Postone, 2003, p.293). According to Murthy (2009) ‘What 
distinguishes historical time is precisely that it is linked to an increase in 
productivity that capitalists bring about through the production of rel-
ative surplus value’ (Murthy, 2009, p.21). Murthy (2009) considers that 
Postone has two notions of concrete time. One that refers to pre-capitalist 
societies, that is the time of events, and one in capitalist societies where it 
is a totalising dynamic. It is concrete when compared to abstract time in 
capitalism but its concreteness ‘…lies in a process of increasing produc-
tivity and this type of time is blind and not innately connected to a sym-
bolic world’ (Murthy, 2009, p.22). This is not a cultural or ideological 
process, but an economic and historical one in which ‘The temporalities 
of capitalism, then, are not specific to it, but are intrinsic to its struc-
turing social forms’ (Postone, 2003, p.47). Value production becomes 
increasingly stretched and diminishes in credibility as technology and 
other organisational forms accelerate and more use values are produced.
In terms of the pandemic, technology enables not only an extension 
of the working day (formal subsumption) by allowing lecturers to work 
from home and teach across time zones using their laptop and techno-
logical tools (real subsumption) but increases the productivity of labour. 
Now there is effectively no limit, in terms of a physical lecture theatre, 
of the range of a lecturer’s voice in terms of delivering content to any 
number of students who can be taught simultaneously. In many cases 
during the pandemic, for example, lecturers have delivered real-time lec-
tures whilst simultaneously giving lectures online. Through this process, 
the virtual capitalist university expands the possibilities of exploitation 
and subsumption of lecturers. They can teach more students at a lower 
cost as resource costs are displaced from the university campus to the 
lecturer’s own home. Their work is fragmented and separated from their 
colleagues and this work is mediated and captured by technology as a 
property of the capitalist university. This intellectual property of the 
university is then further exploitable through using machine learning 
analytics to edit and restructure lectures or series of lectures. More ‘com-
modity stock’ (students receiving lectures) is delivered in each hour and 
the profit made through this increased exploitation can be reinvested 
into technology or management. Capitalism uses the pandemic to move 
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to virtual universities or hybrid institutions with the optimal mix of real 
or virtual being determined by profitability.
AI and associated technologies enable this process on an hourly basis 
in the virtual university (as they are part of the technological infrastruc-
ture), but they also set the scene for a re-specification of the working life 
of an academic labourer. In Universities, there are some benefits of expe-
rience and, to a certain extent, HE balances precarious employment con-
tracts with facilitating working (for some) at least until retirement, but 
labour power does not persist after death as this is the end of the work-
er’s consciousness. There is, though, an application of academic labour 
not just on a second-by-second basis but also over a lifetime. Osborne 
(2008) raises the issue of the life of the labourer as an overlooked aspect 
of temporal orders in capitalism. According to Osborne, ‘abstract 
labour is not just ‘concrete labour’ and ‘abstract time’ (Osborne, 2008, 
p.19). Labour time is ‘…part of the life-time of the labourer’ (Osborne, 
2008, p.19). Osborne, therefore, posits the lifetime of the labourer as 
the ‘ontological basis of the “value” of time’ (Osborne, 2008, p.20). 
Lecturers often devote their entire working lives to one, or a series of, 
capitalist universities because of the necessity of wage labour. In support 
of Osborne’s argument on the ‘life’ of the labourer, Wendling (2009) 
argues that Marx was influenced by studies of thermodynamics in con-
sidering human labour power. Particularly when considering machines 
(especially their ownership and implementation by the capitalist class), 
Wendling identifies the history of existing science, technology, and 
manufacturing as being the subsumption of labour over generations. In 
terms of a contemporary female worker on a production line, the labour 
of her past generations are represented as capital:
It is though her mother’s and grandmother’s exhaustion are driving 
her out of work – as though they themselves had come to stand over 
her. The very powers that created her, the powers of her own class, 
powers that are her own powers, are undermining her. Instead of 
machine-worker class-kinship, strife appears between the worker 
and the machine.
(Wendling, 2009, p.123)
The ontological category of the labourer’s life, or the lifetime of previous 
labourers, does not enter into Postone’s category of time, although, in the 
era of AI it is applicable to the life of contemporary academics. For lec-
turers, the university buildings, computers, and administration are prod-
ucts of the labour of their predecessors and of many other workers such 
as builders and accountants. This generational dead labour facilitates, 
and creates an expectation of, the production schedules of academics. 
Increasingly, the banks of pre-recorded lecturers (Optimised for student 
customers through AI and machine learning) ‘stand over’ (Wendling 
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2009, p.123) each lecturer, intensifying the struggle to ‘add value’ to the 
university and remain in employment. The capitalist university could 
increasingly become an educational Netflix, with lecture choices opti-
mised for each student consumer from a pre-existing menu, perhaps 
facilitated by a GTA (Graduate Teaching Assistant) and a virtual, AI, 
assistant. The life of lecturers becomes an increasingly precarious strug-
gle to add to this technological pile that heaps increasing precarity and 
exploitation down to the next generation of academic labourers.
Similarly, humanity’s lifetime (or the human as a species being) is 
not factored into this schema. It is true that Postone’s conception of 
time is not existential (and hence not bound up with notions of life or 
death) as this is internally consistent with his notion of capitalism as 
abstract domination and anti-humanist. Capitalist (abstract) time has 
no notion of finality as a humanist concept. The lifetime of the individ-
ual labourer is not the real ontological basis of time’s value as this only 
represents a slice of the total labour time incorporated in capital and is 
meaningless to it. However, AI (and associated technologies) do provide 
the potential to seemingly extend the lifetime of the academic labourer 
through virtuality and ‘re-animation’. Lectures are currently recorded 
and replayed, but through AI and other technologies can be recombined, 
mined, and potentially ‘deep-faked’ to provide new content. Although 
these AI-mediated technologies are not sufficiently advanced as to 
allow for this substantively at present, the recording of lectures during 
the pandemic allows them to be banked as intellectual property by the 
University. Academic labour is therefore never quite dead, or incapaci-
tated, but may be consistently revived in a reanimation. For example, 
Concordia University continued to use the recorded lectures of a dead 
professor in an Art History module (Chin, 2021). Whether this is as 
continued labour power or as fixed capital is a contentious point (it is 
probably best classified as dead labour or fixed capital) but is a par-
ticularly diabolical variant of the concept of hyper-subsumption (Dyer-
Whiteford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff, 2019) that was discussed in Chapter 3.
No ‘New Normal’: Disasters, Existential  
Threats, and Time
Capitalism is obsessed with ideas of change, time, modernity, and accel-
eration, but also with the control of time through strategy, and a fet-
ishisation of agency and decision making. In the current pandemic, as 
discussed above, universities are seemingly compelled to be strategic in 
applying new technologies to introduce virtual and online teaching to 
mitigate against the illness (and resistance) of labour. There is no time for 
a pause or a stop in academic production no matter how severe the cri-
sis. As discussed previously, the capitalist university requires a constant 
revolutionising of the conditions of production in terms of technology 
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and organisational form even in disasters or pandemics. It continually 
requires living academic labour to produce value and demands that indi-
viduals invest in their own human capital to advance labour power. This 
is not ideological but a reality, a really existing abstraction that compels 
humans to work and invest, adopting the character masks of labour or 
capital. Students strategically use the pandemic to optimise their choice 
of course whereas universities realise value by creating demand for par-
ticular pathways. New online learning features are introduced as a result 
of investments in the latest technology and fixed capital. Web designers 
are employed to advance these technological developments. They work 
to produce a commodity under the same conditions (wage labour) as the 
academic workers who then will produce the lecture commodities (‘com-
modity stock’) on the virtual production line. For the capitalist univer-
sity, decisions are driven by the necessity to turn a sum of money into 
a greater sum of money through investing in the most profitable areas 
otherwise the capitalist may go out of business or their university may be 
taken over by another, or by the state. These ‘decisions’ are driven by the 
necessity for value to be self-valorising and ever increasing even under 
conditions of class struggle. In its desire for self-valorisation, capitalism 
is (non-anthropically) single minded aiming to increase profits. This is 
‘normal’, ‘business as usual’, for capitalism and, despite the novelty of 
the pandemic situation, this is no ‘new normal’ but rather a continua-
tion of the existing situation. It is the continuation of the ‘old abnormal’ 
(including capitalisms consistent technological development in the inter-
ests of profit) rather than any sense of the ‘new’. By making distinctions 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ and identifying critical junctures, we neglect 
the specifically capitalist nature of time. This also holds for ‘Disaster 
Capitalism’, which is not exceptional, but a depiction of the constant 
‘disaster’ of capitalism in every instant. This can be explained by exam-
ining critical junctures, unintended consequences, and the nature of dis-
asters and existential threats – particularly the existential threat of AI.
Critical Junctures and Unintended Consequences
Naturally, capitalists are familiar with disruption and the notion of ‘crit-
ical junctures’ as these occur frequently in terms of hesitations in the 
normal flow of events in capitalism. This could involve a disruption to 
production or circulation, to the creation or realisation of value, or the 
destruction of commodities or labour power. Existential threats repre-
sent the end of what is understood as the normal flow of spatial and 
temporal events but in capitalism such events are only meaningful if 
they represent the end of value production and circulation and the end 
of capital as self-valorising. Disasters and existential threats to humanity 
do not necessarily represent the end of capitalism as such. It can imme-
diately be seen that what is defined as a disaster (such as a tower block 
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fire) or an existential threat (such as AI takeover) in common language 
is very different to what might be described as a disaster or existential 
threat in the logic of capitalism.
In disaster capitalism, disasters are capitalised on at critical points. 
There is a series of events that capitalists, or (for some) the human rep-
resentatives of capital, or the character masks held by those involved 
in this production, decide to intervene in for the purposes of profit or 
accumulation. Although disasters often appear to be the unintended 
consequence of some series of events, the discourse of disaster capi-
talism understands them to be otherwise. They could be the result of 
the intention of capitalists, in the interests of a specific form of capital 
accumulation or capital accumulation in general, or a capitalisation to 
benefit from an unexpected event. The intentionality of capitalists does 
not have to be overt but can also be tacit and does not have to be direct 
but can also be distributed. In this sense time is just like space or any 
other physical entity in capitalism. It is a domain where there is unequal 
ownership and contestation with different levels of agency. Disaster cap-
italism can be depicted as this inequality of time and space. Although 
sometimes disasters and emergencies are engineered through conscious 
and conspiratorial enterprises, which are sometimes criminal, they are 
more often seen as unintended. Mica (2018) outlines three approaches to 
unintended consequences, those arising from social action, social inter-
action (and the production of resulting institutions or practices), or from 
institutionalised practices but the analysis of unintended consequences 
also concerns the realm of the contingent and the possible. In a Marxist 
analysis, disasters can be placed in the category of the contingent as they 
are homologous with capitalism (in essence it is crisis) but for a capital-
ist, a disaster is often an opportunity (Klein, 2008).
In Marx’s Capital, disasters had two sources which were endogenous 
to capitalism and did not represent a ‘break’ in the normal business of 
production. Firstly, Marx’s work on the conditions and injuries of fac-
tory workers emphasised the centrality of profit as a criterion for safety. 
Reforms would be resisted, or passed, only to the extent to which they 
led to sustained or increased profit (Marx, 1990). Secondly, the pro-
liferation of commodities and fixed capital (Marx, 1992) and capital’s 
ceaseless expansion exceeds the control of increasingly stretched human 
attention. Wendling (2009) explains how Marx (particularly in his writ-
ings on railway accidents) considered how the rhythms of the mechanic 
become increasingly beyond the limits of human perception:
Part of the monstrosity of machinery is its affront to pastoral time 
and pastoral timing. The speeds at which machines operate – speeds 
sometimes beyond the capacity of the human perceptual apparatus – 
contribute to the demonic mythology of machines.
(Wendling, 2009, p.192)
112 Disaster Capitalism and Time
The role of speed and attention in modern disasters has also been 
considered in non-Marxist theories. Campbell (2011, pp.56–7) consid-
ers that attention is an important aspect of judging whether an action 
can be described as having unintended consequences. Where attention is 
(necessarily or not) limited then it does not seem likely that an action can 
be described as having unintended consequences. However, attention is 
an important factor that can be said to be responsible for an increasing 
number of disasters as technology develops. Viral videos and memes 
showing people walking into roads or falling into fountains because of 
checking their mobile phones are commonplace on social media. Recent 
concerns over the attention economy have led some authorities to warn 
about checking mobile phones when driving or crossing roads. However, 
the attention economy predates modern technology and Merton (1936) 
originally discussed the implications of the economic costs of attention 
in determining the consequences of actions. The idea that the speeding 
up and acceleration of technology, becoming out of control, has reso-
nance with modernity and risk society thesis that view increasing com-
plexity as meaning that risks to humanity increase. This is the key theme 
of many works of what has been referred to as accidentology where 
the acceleration of technology and complexity produces increasingly 
complex industrial accidents of increasing scale (Matthewman, 2012). 
The theme finds its apogee in the analysis of the existential threat of 
AI (Bostrom, 2014) where the units of time concerned are the micro- 
and pico-second and chains of events are established which are beyond 
human action or agency as AI becomes conscious and then dominant. AI 
can work more quickly than human time, not being constrained by the 
neurological and physiological restrictions of human action.
Disasters, AI Existential Threats, and 
the Specificity of Capitalist Time
Capitalism is constantly speeding up production and events occur faster 
than human attention or senses, but it is important not to treat the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and the application of technological solutions in 
universities as in any way discontinuous with existing tendencies. The 
specificity of capitalist time means that disasters are inseparable from 
the normal flow of capitalisms ‘events’ even if they occur naturally. 
This perspective is counter-intuitive to a conventional understanding of 
disasters as disruptive, and as representing a ‘new normal’. Disasters, 
including pandemics or even the threat of a self-aware, malicious, AI 
are part of (and not separate from) capitalism but analysis of disaster 
situations often stresses their uniqueness. When disasters are reviewed 
in post-hoc analysis or public inquiries, for example, the role of time 
and critical junctures is seen to be central. Whether something could 
have been done to stop a disaster, or whether the action that someone 
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could have taken would have helped them survive, becomes a matter of 
chronology and clock time. Countdowns and critical paths are used to 
map the sequence of events. In the inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire 
that occurred in London 2017, for example, chronologies are a matter 
of legal and political argument as will be shown below. In work on the 
existential threat of an AI takeover, scientific debates are conducted to 
estimate when would be the correct moment to prevent the development 
of malignant technologies.
Work on disaster capitalism usually portrays time conventionally, but 
with a consideration that time, like resources, is a contested field where 
there is differential access to economies of time and space (Klein, 2008). 
Whilst capitalists and the state have the autonomy, intentionality, and 
resources to make decisions quickly and with superior information, oth-
ers have limited agency and limited access to truth. This understand-
ing of contested time in disaster capitalism is useful but it obscures the 
fundamentally capitalist nature of time. Disaster capitalism is not just 
a contestation of time and resources but a rupture between material 
wealth and value and concrete and abstract time. In capitalism, apoc-
alypse is not just something that happens in the future but is always 
happening in every moment of capitalism. All disasters in capitalism are 
related in terms of occurring in uniquely capitalist time. This applies to 
future disasters and existential threats as much as present ones such as 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
In terms of AI, for example, there is a rapidly expanding literature 
on the existential threats arising from an AI ‘takeover’ (Bostrom, 2014) 
which can involve various types of technological apocalypse. One 
scenario is complete destruction of humanity through malicious ends 
occurs as an AI becomes a malevolent psychopath. There are also acci-
dental scenarios such as those where a military AI falsely detects a mis-
sile launch from an enemy and decides to retaliate through dispatching 
its own salvo of nuclear weapons. More common are the threats from 
AI which arise from an inadvertent instruction, or an inability to write 
an instruction, which would mean that an AI would engage in an eter-
nal and purposeless instruction such as converting the entire universe 
to paperclips or performing invasive neurosurgery on every living thing 
to ensure that it was constantly happy. Some of the existential threats 
of AI verge on the magical. In one of these, AI could create a simulated 
universe of sentient creatures and torture them constantly. Even more 
fancifully, an AI could decide to simulate all sentient creatures who had 
ever lived by replicating their minds and mental states and torture them. 
Such a scenario has been considered in what is called ‘Roko’s Basilisk’ 
(discussed in Sandifer, 2017) where a powerful AI in the future brings 
the dead back to life in a virtual environment and subjects them to hor-
rific tortures. This scenario has convinced some that it is essential that 
we bring such an AI entity into existence as if the AI perceives that we 
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have not put our full efforts into realising its existence it can virtually 
resurrect us and decide to torture us (Sandifer, 2017). Such beliefs about 
AI border on the theological and are akin to the idea of Pascal’s wager 
where the cost of not believing in God is high as if God does exist then 
such a belief would mean that one would go to hell (Sandifer, 2017).
The idea that we have to make a decision about what to do about 
technologies such as AI in the here and now is pervasive in capitalist dis-
course. In disasters more generally, the importance of time and critical 
decisions is paramount. It is supposed in current capitalist discourse that 
if we knew the correct juncture, we would have known the optimal time 
to intervene to stop 9/11 or the stage at which the residents of a disaster 
should have evacuated or the time at which we should put a stop to the 
development of sentient productive AI. We could make decisions that 
would have important consequences. According to Bostrom (2014), for 
example, there is a critical juncture, which we may not even know of, at 
which an AI takeover becomes inevitable and unstoppable. However, the 
dynamics are already underway. Bostrom sees an AI takeover as almost 
being unstoppable due to the dynamics of capital (although he does not 
use that term). Capitalists and capitalist (or state capitalist) countries are 
in competition with each other to produce the ultimate AI, and hence 
accelerate the move to a point of no return.
In disaster capitalism, there is an emphasis on concrete time, with 
cause and effect, and where decisions make a difference, rather than the 
abstract time of capitalism which requires production under constant 
time compression and crisis. Existential threats, such as the threat of AI, 
assumes a new time order but this is not necessarily the case, as capitalist 
time can continue even given an existential threat to humans. Disasters 
unfold in capitalist time (abstract time) which is constantly and consist-
ently a temporal disaster already in terms of the dissolution of value. 
Rather than seeing a disaster or an existential threat as a ‘breaking point’ 
in capitalism, they are points of continuity. Disasters are symbolically 
represented as a disruption to what is understood as the normal flow of 
spatial and temporal events. The technologies of policy, academia, and 
law, for example, make sense of disasters as involving a series of events 
and critical junctures in which concrete choices can be made and hence 
invalidate a negative critique of capitalism. A choice to do one thing or 
another can result in a different timeline in which a building did not 
collapse, or a person did not die. Disasters are portrayed as a series of 
branching points which convey different realities. The countdown, or 
ascending log of seconds, is a common trope in disaster fiction or recon-
struction in which there is a certain time remaining before a critical 
event occurs, or is prevented, which will determine the subsequent series 
of events. The ticking clock in the television series 24 which constantly 
counts upwards, second by second, foreshadowing another imminent 
terrorist attack is one fictional example of this. Existential threats are 
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commonly understood as the end of a particular existence, through 
nuclear war or an apocalyptic natural disaster. In both cases, anthropo-
centric time and critical incidences are central. However, we rarely look 
at time in disasters beyond the mainstream view of linear, sequential, 
time. This is particularly salient when it comes to disaster capitalism, 
which is unusual; when one considers that there has been critical work 
in Marxist theory which examines the importance of particular time 
orders to capitalism. Disasters, and existential threats, are constantly 
present in the metaphysics of capital and are hence always here in the 
‘now’ as well as in the dynamic of capitalist history.
As a tragic example of how capitalist temporalities are absent from 
discourses of disaster, a thoroughly capitalist disaster was the Grenfell 
Tower fire on the June 14, 2017. In this disaster 72 residents were killed 
in a fire where there had not only been frequent resident’s complaints 
regarding the safety of the block, but also where the residents were 
advised to ‘stay put’ during the fire. This incident has become a symbol 
of disaster capitalism in the UK as iconic as that of Hurricane Katrina 
in the United States. Situated in the Royal Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea, one of the richest and most unequal areas in the UK, the disas-
ter has come to symbolise the shortcuts of contractors, the involvement 
of local authorities in property deals, the use of poor materials and fire 
safety in tower blocks, and the racial- and class-based elimination of res-
idents (Preston, 2019). In the inquiry into the Grenfell Tower Fire much 
was made of the decision to either ‘stay put’ or evacuate by the residents 
in the fire where there was apparently a critical point, or juncture, in 
which to do this. Experts in the official inquiry made reference to the 
difficulty of making timely decisions under these circumstances when 
confronted with ambiguous information:
So the behavioural side of it is: I’ve got this very difficult decision to 
make – which was faced by Grenfell occupants in some cases several 
times during the course of the fire. Early in the fire, you open the 
door, you see smoke, maybe this was after about 01.30 on the morn-
ing of the fire, when there was a lot of smoke in those lobbies, and 
you have to make this difficult decision: do I stay put or do I decide 
to try and make it to the stair and go out? If I go to the stair and get 
out, that’s over, but if I decide to stay put, I may then have to revisit 
this decision later on as conditions deteriorate outside the flat.
(Inquiry, Expert Witness Statement: Professor 
David Purser, November 29, 2018, my emphasis, 
Grenfell Tower Fire Inquiry, 2020)
What this shows is that many, many people started to evacuate very 
early on. Indeed, nearly all these people here on these floors started 
to evacuate before there was significant smoke in the lobbies. They 
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were able to make an effective and safe descent because there was 
virtually no smoke in the stair at that time either. But after that 
time, the stair is still relatively clear of smoke, but the lobbies are 
full of dense smoke. So now we have a period where people are 
opening their flat doors and either deciding to brave going through 
the smoke, or they say, ‘It’s too dangerous, I’m going to stay put’.
(Expert Witness Statement: Professor David Purser, 
November 29, 2018, my emphasis, Grenfell Tower 
Fire Inquiry, 2020)
There are also references to the difficulty of making judgements for the 
fire service:
‘At page 5 of your witness statement, you say that you remember dis-
cussing with AC Roe: "… whether to overturn the FSG advice being 
given from ‘stay put’ to ‘get out if you can’." Can you remember the 
stage in the evening when you had that conversation with AC Roe?
A. Yes, so I think it was probably the first time I actually saw him, and 
I think it was more of a one-way discussion, if I’m honest. It was more 
him telling me –
Q. Going which way?
A. Yes, him telling me that that’s what had happened, so that’s what 
prompted me to go and then brief the crews about the change in situa-
tion. So at that point I thought, because of the flow of people coming out 
the building, that probably that had happened, if I’m honest. So, yeah, 
as a discussion point, it was more for me to go and inform me to change 
my own risk assessment.
(Further LFB Evidence, October 2, 2018, 
Grenfell Tower Fire Inquiry, 2020)
These extracts show that the inquiry repeatedly referred to the impor-
tance of critical decisions being made, and the optimal advice and assis-
tance being given at the correct times. Disasters in these narratives unfold 
in time and the correct or incorrect decisions being made at the right or 
wrong time can change the flow of events, the public and judicial judge-
ment of the victims, and the agencies involved. This is not just a neutral 
observation. Preston (2019) claims that ambiguity in such processes is 
used to obscure processes of eliminationism and to absolve authorities of 
blame. However, the notion of critical junctures and disasters as ‘breaks’ 
with the normal can position capitalism as seemingly external to events 
which are described as involving individual decisions.
Returning to the discussion of AI, existential threats, such as an AI 
takeover are also framed in terms of critical junctures where an error 
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will lead to a catastrophic chain reaction but in this case, prediction is 
even more problematic. As explained previously, Bostrom (2014) does 
not necessarily consider it possible to make an accurate judgement as to 
when AI research will lead to an existential threat. As a future AI will 
apparently be capable of autonomous thought and bootstrapping its own 
intelligence, it is not possible to determine when a particular research 
programme should stop. This is particularly the case when there are 
competing research programmes between different firms and countries. 
As soon as the AI can ‘unbox’ itself and gain access to resources through 
technical and/or social manipulation, it can purposively or accidentally 
destroy humanity. Even if the AI is given a seemingly benign order (for 
example, to produce paperclips), it will follow this order to the point 
of absurdity (for example, working to convert the entire universe into 
paperclips). This will produce the end of human time, and a new non- 
anthropocentric form of time which nevertheless continues. Again, there 
are a series of branching and decision points and countdowns to the 
switching on of an AI. Increasingly, the existential threats from AI are 
considered inevitable after a certain point, and that no choice is avail-
able. Bostrom’s (2014) notion of mind crime where an AI can produce 
technologies that would simulate a sentient population which could be 
‘tortured’ in order to force humanity to bring about its ends is one such 
possibility.
The phenomena of Roko’s Basilisk (Sandiferr, 2017), discussed previ-
ously, implies that where not to use every available force to bring about 
a superintelligent AI means permanent damnation through endless tor-
ture of a simulation of each person who did not take this action. This 
means that AI is seen less as an unintended consequence of technological 
progress but rather a necessary consequence. The destruction of human-
ity is perceived as an inevitable consequence of technological progress 
that must be accelerated. Like Fisher’s (2009) discussion of Capitalist 
Realism where there is no alternative not only to capitalism’s existence, 
but also to its acceleration, the portrayal of there being no alternative 
to a catastrophic AI superintelligence is endemic in work on existential 
threat. As Žižek (2019) states:
From Zuckerberg to Gates and Musk, they all warn that ‘capitalism 
as we know it’ is approaching its end and advocate countermeasures 
such as minimal income…In short, their version of the end of capi-
talism is the capitalist version of its own end, where everything will 
have to change so that the basic structure of domination will remain 
the same.
Žižek (2019, pp.3–4)
Although Žižek does not fully explore his point, this ‘basic structure of 
domination’ is production on the basis of value. Dyer-Whiteford et al 
(2019) also point out that AI capitalists including Musk, Zuckerberg, 
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and Gates all warn of the existential threat of an AI takeover whilst 
investing in AI technologies and that:
…these AI moguls are no more, or less, than the personifications of 
abstract forces of market calculation that drive towards the maxi-
misation of profit. They also obscure the massive hubris of the cap-
italist class that believes it can control the forces it has unleashed.
(Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.4).
Despite a critical emphasis on ‘disaster capitalism’, then, the treatment 
of disasters often does not often deviate from ideas of what Firth and 
Robinson (2013) refer to as ‘mainstream time’, linear or clock time. 
Time is considered to be infinitely divisible and extended, representable 
in a time grid and part of a linear, irreversible progression (Firth and 
Robinson, 2013, p.3). Time may be a domain of contestation between 
the ruling and working class in a disaster, but it is a contestation of reac-
tion or ownership of moments rather than of temporalities. This con-
ception of ‘mainstream time’ allows for a standard (four) dimensional 
analysis of disaster capitalism where there is a spatial and a linear time 
dimension in which class conflict operates in an unfolding historical-ma-
terialist framework, but time itself is stripped of its capitalist nature. 
Understanding time as a capitalist abstract-real (rather than ideological, 
as explained previously) further enables us to understand not only the 
inevitability of disasters and existential threats to capitalism but their 
unique temporal nature. COVID-19 does not create a ‘new normal’ in 
universities, but it is part of the continuing capitalist ‘old abnormal’ 
where time itself is endogenous to capitalism. The capitalist university is 
not just subject to disasters and an exogenous time-order but it attempts 
to ‘makes time’, its own rules about how time is used and allocated, 
often using technology and AI to do so. It is also subject to the abstract 
time-order of capitalism. There is no ‘break’ and no ‘new normal’ after 
a disaster.
AI, Technology, and the Time-Density of Academic Work
Time, however measured in capitalism, contains an increased density 
of discrete events of production and produces an increased number of 
commodities and technologies expanding over historical time. As dis-
cussed above, disaster capitalism occurs in concrete moments but is also 
an artefact of abstract time. Even concrete time in capitalism is different 
from concrete time in pre-capitalist societies, being not just the time 
of events, but a time in which scientific, technological, and organisa-
tional development occurs with the purpose of increasing relative sur-
plus value. This in turn is in a dynamic relation with abstract time as 
historical time. Notwithstanding the ways in which capitalism uses and 
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despoils natural resources in its expansion, and accelerates circulation 
and movement, it is part of the dialectic of capitalism to produce a frame 
of time density that produces more discrete events (of production, circu-
lation, and exchange) and more, and increasingly complex and saleable, 
commodities. This is more than a rupture between mechanic and human 
time but a whole new time order. In effect, there are two conjoint time 
orders – abstract time and a consistently reconstituted concrete time.
This whole process may appear to be paradoxical. The capitalist 
system has to grow, develop, and expand to survive but this growth, 
development, and expansion makes its survival increasingly less secure 
(non-withstanding counteracting tendencies). Mica (2018, p.45) usefully 
distinguishes between differing strengths (or strains) of the paradoxical 
in considering unintended consequences in that the unintended does not 
have to be paradoxical. Indeed, in Postone’s analysis of capitalism the 
paradox between value and material wealth is necessary and definitional 
to the capitalist system. Capitalism has to contain a paradox as both a 
simultaneously thriving and decaying mode of production. The dialectic 
is also a paradox which unfolds in historical time.
It must be accepted that although Postone considers capital’s exis-
tential threat, he does not consider the ontological nature of time for 
humans and humanity (Osborne, 2008). Osborne, though, does not 
consider the capitalist logic, or capitalist realism, of an eternal system 
which considers existential threats only as they might prevent the future 
of capitalism. This is a system that is already in decay and deceleration. 
The acceleration of technology produces a growing sphere of techno-
logical sophistication which becomes of no relevance in the next round 
of technological innovation which has the purpose of further reducing 
production times to increase the relative rate of surplus value.
In the most recent and relevant ‘existential threat’ to HE, the COVID-
19 pandemic, ‘disaster capitalism’ though the state and the market, 
allows for a speeding up of commodities produced in abstract time. 
Capitalist universities worldwide are moving to online provision and, 
though recording, allow for courses to be delivered and redelivered 
across extended time. The aspect of the ‘commodity-stock’ is stretched 
so that it can be valorised across a seemingly infinite mass of student 
consumers. As explained above, lecturers become ‘virtual’ and absolute 
subsumption re-manifests itself as lectures can be reviewed at any time 
whilst there is pressure to work increased hours to accommodate stu-
dents in different time zones. It also manifests itself as hyper-subsump-
tion as AI has a further role in terms of the development of virtual tutors, 
intelligent agents, and the monitoring of academic work (UCU, 2020). 
The Socially Necessary Labour Time (SNLT) to produce a commodity, 
and the time of its subsequent valorisation, drops dramatically. The state 
can also have a role in this process. For example, as a possible (although 
not certain) escape from ‘market exit’ in the UK, universities who are 
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not financially viable due to the drop in (particularly international) stu-
dents due to the pandemic are offered a ‘recovery’ plan for a ‘restructur-
ing regime’. This allows for Government to instantaneously disestablish 
courses that are thought not to offer sufficient employment possibilities. 
In other words, those courses that are not considered to be part of the 
social production of labour power will disintegrate. Additionally, the 
government can then impose the use of AI learning technologies and 
learning analytics on Universities to make sure they are fulfilling their 
obligations. Concretely, the state can therefore change the type of com-
modities that are marketised.
Even without state sanction, the move to remote and online learn-
ing allows for the recording of lectures which then can be delivered at 
almost zero marginal cost to the University. The labour of the lecturer is 
extended through time, even after their death, as their lecture of an hour 
can be repeated indefinitely. This is the concept of the ‘force-multiplier’ 
(Marx, 1992) whereby machinery acts to increase the ‘force’ of human 
labour. Vice Chancellors and university management valiantly attempt 
to avoid losses as they act as ‘Time Lords’ in terms of manipulating the 
time continuum through which commodities are produced and extend-
ing the working day. Academics become a face on the screen (‘Zoom’ 
meetings) for lectures and meetings, easier to replicate, simulate, and to 
analyse through AI.
In the COVID-19 pandemic digital technologies and AI increase the 
‘density’ of time. More ‘commodity stock’ (Marx, 1992) (lectures) is 
being produced in each hour of time to eventually be valorised as a com-
modity (the data-commodity that is valorised for money). The ‘force’ of 
each lecturer’s labour is increased and virtualised, even immortalised 
through technology. This is real, absolute, and hyper-subsumption as 
even the extension of the ‘life-time’ of academic labour becomes pos-
sible. In terms of how this ‘feels’ to labour, there is the direct compul-
sion to stretch labour further in every hour (often producing both ‘real’ 
and ‘digital’ lectures simultaneously). Aside from increasing the gen-
dered division of labour and the use of ‘domestic resources’, ‘working 
from home’ is reported as being tiring as more commodity production 
is occurring over longer periods of time. The responsibility for this is 
diffuse. The intentionality involved in this form of disaster capitalism is 
not just a result of human operations (management) through linear time 
but nor is it just an artefact of a mechanical process in machine time. 
Capitalist time is empty, homogenous time, but it is time in which an 
alien intentionality is at work – self-valorising value. This has its origin 
in a subverted human essence, abstract labour time, and so is funda-
mentally human (at least in terms of labour power) but, in the form of 
capital, has become a form of social domination in itself. This is an alien 
expansion within an alien time with no human ontology (Murthy, 2009, 
p.20). The intentionality of the ruling class is a manifestation of this but 
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even the ruling class are subject to this form of social domination. Time 
becomes increasingly filled with the alienating expansion of capital. 
Even disasters become unattributable not just because of complexity but 
as capital as self-valorisation becomes an increasingly proportional fea-
ture of each time unit. The traces of human agency become thinner and 
harder to track as capitalism intensifies. Engel’s notion of capitalism’s 
processes of ‘social murder’ (Engels, 2009) becomes a process of aso-
cial, technologically mediated, murder (Preston, 2019). The ruling class 
still benefits but disasters cannot be blamed on the response of any one 
individual. The COVID-19 pandemic is the perfect example of this as 
it seemingly occurs ‘externally’ of capitalism and is ‘non-attributable’.
Even though time is becoming ‘denser’ in this technologically medi-
ated pandemic, what happens in each window in time is paradoxical 
and dialectical. Technological sophistication increases and a greater 
mass of commodities (commodity-stock – lectures) are produced whilst 
value becomes increasingly less substantial. The acceleration of technol-
ogy and production of commodities is concurrent with the deceleration 
and undermining of value. Capitalism operates on a new temporal order 
(abstract time) which is in a dynamic with the old temporal order (con-
crete time), but even concrete time is remade as time in which time’s 
purpose is subordinated to activities that increase relative surplus value. 
In every moment of an online lecture, capitalist production continues to 
be a disaster (for capitalism) in further progressing the end of value pro-
duction. Perversely, capitalism destroys itself (although it might destroy 
us first) as it grows, accelerates, and becomes more productive. Capital 
reaches its own end through a ‘desubstantialisaton’ (Kurz, 2012, p.15) 
and becomes a ‘…pseudo-accumulation without substance’ (Kurz, 2012, 
p.15). Disaster on an existential scale then becomes the only escape route 
for capitalism (Kurz, 2014). Temporary solutions such as the destruction 
of existing capital (as in the Grenfell Tower disaster) give way to the 
wholesale erasure of human knowledge (through perhaps a nuclear war 
which would perhaps reset the human species to late feudalism) or aban-
doning capitalism as a project based on human labour power for one 
where AI is the source of labour power. Disaster capitalism increasingly 
must raise the stakes in terms of the magnitude of disaster as time pro-
gresses. This is why AI is considered both to be an existential threat to 
capitalism but also as the ideal existential disaster for capitalism in terms 
of the continuity of production on the basis of value but one with a new 
species being (AI), for a ‘pseudo-accumulation’ (Kurz, 2012, p.15), if it 
cannot be tricked into becoming a new labouring entity. We are at the 
end and the dawn of capitalism but the dawn of a capitalism with appar-
ently a new labouring subject: AI. The possibility of transcendence of 
capitalism through the general intellect (which was always a false hope 
without the necessity of direct class struggle) has been replaced by the 
entrance of a seemingly new form of labour, AI, which could replace the 
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domination of human labour with the capitalist fantasy of a compliant 
AI ‘labourer’.
Conclusion
The pandemic, and disasters more generally are, of course, also domains 
of possibility (Mica, 2018) and there is the potential for disasters to 
bring about new possibilities for disaster socialism or disaster anarchism 
(Preston and Firth, 2020) as spatial autonomous zones are emerging but 
the possibility of new temporalities within this has not been theorised. 
Firth and Robinson (2013, p.18) argue that ‘…a sufficient approach to 
utopia must consider the nature of time itself’. In disasters the state and 
capital operate quickly to restore capitalism within zones of disaster. As 
these zones become increasingly large and occur more frequently, they 
create spaces not just of disaster but of resistance. The capitalist nature 
of time makes us reconsider the idea that an existential threat ever rep-
resents an ontological break in the time order.
Of course, there are some perspectives on time that criticise the 
anthropocentric nature of time and seek to trouble this time order with 
non-anthropocentric perspectives. Some post-structural perspectives, 
for example, do not give precedence to any particular time order and 
consider that time orders form a historical ‘plateau’ that has no pre- 
existent basis in a material reality (Colebrook, 2002). This allows them 
to consider non-anthropocentric time orders and objects such as the 
earth itself in cosmological time as an ‘actor’. Post-human perspectives 
sometimes consider that time is different for different actors and entities, 
each of which could have their own idiosyncratic nature of time that 
pushes back on other notions of time (Siddiqui, 2016). However, capi-
talist time is already quasi-anthropocentric in that although it is human 
created it is also part of the creation of an alien entity (capital) that comes 
to dominate humanity (Postone, 2003). This time is also seemingly eter-
nal, in that for capital there is no end to its growth or the possibility of 
its expansion. Capital does not impose limits on itself, even in terms of 
the end of anthropocentric time. Its future must necessarily be limitless 
as it must consistently expand to survive (Marx, 1990, 1992). It, and 
capitalists, do not consider that an existential threat would be an end 
to its expansion. Its empty, homogenous colonisation of time and space, 
therefore, must continue eternally. In the latest manifestation of disaster 
in the COVID-19 pandemic, capitalist universities use the opportunity 
to continue capitalisation, using technology and AI to do so. As AI accel-
erates, there are theories that this may even lead to human extinction 
(although what that means for capitalism is a moot point). In Chapter 
6 I will consider what might supposedly happen at that time of human 
extinction through capitalist fantasies of a transcendent AI, and what 
that means for AI and the practice of ethics in the capitalist university.
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Introduction
In the Science Fiction film The Terminator, Arnold Schwarzenegger 
plays the role of a superior Artificial Intelligence (AI) sent back in time 
to eliminate the human threat to an apocalyptic AI revolution. In the 
scenario of the Terminator films, a military AI (Skynet) destroys most of 
humanity through a nuclear war. Following the war there is a protracted 
conventional battle between the remaining humans and military AIs. 
This is a conventional science fiction view of the existential threat of AI. 
AI eliminates humans. In this imaginary scenario humanity retreats into 
barbarism, fighting a guerrilla war with the machines. It seems almost 
absurd that, given the existential threat of AI in scenarios like this, 
one might consider that capitalism might continue but that is implicit 
in some of the most popular academic theories on AI and existential 
threat. In some theories of existential threat, AI is even considered to be 
an existential treat for capitalism, as AI and capital merge. The ethics 
of AI research in the capitalist university reproduces this thought. AI is 
simultaneously seen as both a ‘threat’ and a ‘treat’, but the inability of 
universities to think beyond capitalism (particularly in applying ethics 
in their own research on AI which take for granted capitalism and impe-
rialism) means that discussions of AI and ethics inevitably reproduces 
what Fisher (2009) refers to as ‘capitalist realism’.
In this chapter, I consider two prominent social theorists on AI and 
existential threat – Nick Bostrom and Nick Land – and explain how 
their conceptions of both AI and threat make assumptions concerning 
the continuity of capitalism. These influential theorists have been chosen 
as they represent the clearest articulation of the existential threat of AI 
in terms of the liberal-capitalist centre (Bostrom’s work is cited by some 
of the leading capitalists who produce technology, particularly influenc-
ing the thought of Elon Musk) and the neo-reactionary right. (Land’s 
work provides the original intellectual basis for Alt-Right perspectives 
on AI and capitalism in terms of both his anti-humanist and transhu-
manist/eugenic orientation. In addition, his AI/capital synthesis provides 
the intellectual basis underpinning work on what might be described as 
AI, Existential Threat, and 
the Capitalist University
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the ‘capitalist singularity’, This view on singularity has been influential 
in terms of the thought of capitalists such as Peter Thiel.)
There are many things in these perspectives which are pertinent to a 
Marxist analysis of AI, such as Bostrom’s analysis of AI development 
in different conditions of competition and Land’s echoing of the alien 
nature of capital. However, in terms of the overall conceptualisation of 
AI and capitalism, neither perspective is transcendent of contemporary 
capitalist thought. In the case of Bostrom, his speculations around an ‘out 
of (human) control’ AI are similar to ideological fears around an ‘out of 
control’ capitalism. The existential threat of AI, according to Bostrom, 
is that it will exhibit some of the features that Marxists ascribe to capi-
talism in terms of infinite expansion and the profusion of commodities. 
Furthermore, he tacitly assumes that AI could become the new labouring 
subject of capitalism and although his primary arguments concern the 
avoidance of existential threat, they ironically consider how to turn AI 
into a labouring subject within a capitalist universe, with similar features 
to the labour of humans in capitalism. It is almost as though Bostrom 
considers control of AI only to be possible in terms of making it the new 
labouring subject (labour) and is writing a handbook for future capital-
ists on how to maintain capitalism and wage labour. In the case of Land, 
he assumes that AI will become capital itself but confuses and conflates 
capital with capitalism. Land has more similarity with postoperaismo 
thinkers than he might like to believe, and is positing a situation where 
AI, capitalism, and reality become a single ‘monad’ whilst exchange 
remains the means of validating whatever ‘abstract labour’ means in this 
system. Land considers that we do not yet live in a capitalist society. 
He argues that a fusion of AI and capital is capitalism whereas the cur-
rent state of technology and capital is merely proto-capitalism (Land, 
2018, p.340). Neither theorist transcends current capitalist reality and 
truly comes to terms with the nature of labour, capital, or capitalism 
beyond the categories of classical political economy nor considers the 
possibility that Capitalism, rather than any specific technology, is an 
existential threat for beings in general (whether they are human, ani-
mal, or Artificial Super Intelligence [ASI]). Similarly, for the capitalist 
university, like all segments of industry in capitalism, AI is perceived as 
an existential threat or a treat only in terms of whether it enables or pre-
vents profitability. The attempt to apply ‘ethics’ in AI research within the 
capitalist university to prevent an existential threat is not only mitigated 
by capitalist and imperialist pressures but is a misstep given the real and 
present existential threat of capitalism itself (Rikowski, 2003).
Bostrom on AI and Existential Threat
Bostrom’s (2014) book Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies 
outlines the dangers of AI but, as the title suggests, is also a primer on 
the strategies that we might use to contain AI, and how we can try to 
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use AI for benign purposes. As I will explain, the subtext of Bostrom’s 
work is how we can potentially make this unchecked, powerful force 
(analogous to labour power and its ability to create value) into a labour-
ing subject. Bostrom also assumes a capitalist modality of AI pedagogy 
in terms of seeing AI as a pupil that is aiming to ‘trick’ humanity. In 
response, humanity needs to find a method of AI schooling that stunts 
the potential of AI. Just like the education system in capitalist society 
AI learning and education must be prevented from subversive purposes 
such as adopting forms of revolutionary activity. Bostrom is, therefore, 
writing a warning about the unchecked and uncheckable expansion 
of AI. However, his book is (unwittingly) also an instruction manual 
on the ways in which AI can be primitively accumulated into the new 
labouring subject (labour) to prevent it from exhibiting some features 
which are surprisingly similar to unbounded capital expansion. As Dyer-
Whiteford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff (2019, p.25) state ‘Homo Sapiens is 
not necessarily the only possible subject of capitalist proletarianization’. 
‘Superintelligence’ is really a manual about the future proletarianisation 
of AI and how it can be achieved. In that sense, ‘Superintelligence’ is, 
therefore, brutally pragmatic and a fanciful piece of science-fiction. The 
book combines science, science-fiction, and philosophy, creating some 
new and beguiling technical terms and ideas around superintelligence, 
existential threat, and intelligence explosions.
Although Bostrom is evidently not a Marxist, there are some issues 
that are congruent to classical political economy in terms of questions of 
what AI ‘is’ or its metaphysics. One question is whether AI is the same 
as other types of machinery or technology (as fixed capital) but Bostrom 
thinks it is not because of its potentially agentic and cognitive nature. AI 
is not just another machine, but a special device which can act and think. 
Action and thought do not, though, necessarily preclude something as 
being fixed capital. One only need consider the wide variety of sentient 
animals that are used as ‘fixed capital’ (cows milked in a shed, horses 
ridden in a private stable, and cats stroked in a ‘cat café’) that have 
the capacity for independent thought and action. Like a possible future 
(caged) AI, the independence of thought and action of such entities is 
limited by capital. Another question posed by Bostrom is whether AI can 
be controlled to perform work for ‘humanity’ which Bostrom thinks is 
possible. He does not consider such work to be labour in a sense particu-
lar to capitalism so this would be work in the general sense, as applied to 
machines, unless AI was to become labour ‘as such’. Bostrom considers 
that without controls on the work that AI did, it could potentially spread 
across the Universe.
Rather than specific forms of application, Bostrom (2014, p.18) 
believes that there has been a resurgence of interest in artificial general 
intelligence (Strong AI). He defines superintelligence as ‘…any intellect 
that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually 
all domains of interest’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.22, author’s italics). These 
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domains could include speed, collectively, quality, and reach (Bostrom, 
2014, pp.52–61). Bostrom’s definition is ‘non-committal’ regarding 
qualia, or the consciousness of a superintelligence. Its ‘goal systems’ could 
be alien and it would not be motivated by human sentiment (Bostrom, 
2014, p.29). An AI of this type would be able to understand its own 
workings and bootstrap itself to greater levels of intelligence, or what 
Bostrom calls ‘recursive self-improvement’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.29). This 
could lead to an ‘intelligence explosion’ as the AI recursively improves 
itself, or refines models of itself, producing something that need not be 
in any way like a human mind (Bostrom, 2014, p.29). The key problem, 
at least in humanist terms, of developing a superintelligence is that the 
kinetics (speed) of an intelligence explosion could be very rapid and could 
quickly become out of control (Bostrom, 2014, pp.62–90). AI is the ulti-
mate pedagogical subject with an insatiable desire to learn about reality 
in order to achieve its goals. One manifestation of this could be compe-
tition between companies, superpowers, or groups of hackers to create a 
useable superintelligence but this is not the only reason for an explosive 
growth of a superintelligence. Enhancement could occur since ‘…there 
is no precedent in the human economy for a worker who can be literally 
copied, reset, run at different speeds, and so forth, managers of the first 
emulation cohort would find plenty of room for innovation in managerial 
practices’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.69). Our anthropocentric view of intelli-
gence may mean that we cannot comprehend AI intelligence until it is 
too late (Bostrom, 2014, p.70) and that we have a limited human com-
prehension of the limits of intelligence as the gap between ‘stupid’ and 
‘smart’ may be insignificant compared to the gap between ‘human smart’ 
and ‘AI smart’. We may not even be able to recognise the magnitude of 
AI intelligence even from our fictional accounts (Bostrom, 2014, p.105). 
A super-intelligent AI may not appear as a Terminator or a HAL 9000 
and may not even reveal any sense of intelligence to us before destroy-
ing us. Intelligence explosions are said to possess ‘kinetics’ that can be 
expressed in equations that show how once such an explosion begins it 
soon becomes exponential and catastrophic (Bostrom, 2014, pp.75–7). 
Bostrom defines a powerful AI superintelligence as ‘…one that could suc-
cessfully assert itself against the project that brought it into existence as 
well as the rest of the world’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.95). Note that this pro-
cess need not be opposed to capitalism as the unlimited self-valorisation 
of value. The super-intelligent agent could ‘colonize and re-engineer a 
large part of the accessible universe’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.100) turning it 
into ‘computronium’, pure processing power, that could emulate further 
universes and sentient beings (Bostrom, 2014, pp.101–3). AI is driven by 
a singular pedagogical goal to learn about everything to turn it into itself.
An AI’s ethics would not necessarily be correlated with any human 
or moral aptitude. This is Bostrom’s orthogonality thesis in that 
‘Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal: more or less any level of 
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intelligence would in principle be combined with more or less any final 
goal’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.107). AIs can possess harmful goals and there is 
no way that predictability can be built-in, so we wouldn’t know what its 
goals would be in advance, or even how its goals might evolve over time. 
It is likely, though, that all AI’s will share certain primal goals. This is 
Bostrom’s instrumental convergence thesis which attempts to define key 
characteristics of AI beings. AIs will share goals such as self-preserva-
tion and goal-content integrity (that it will retain its current goals into 
the future). In order to attain its goals an AI will wish to enhance itself, 
cognitively and physically, and gain further resources. Bostrom takes 
a non-capitalist view of why entities might want to gain resources, in 
terms of their own energy needs and status, but ignores the necessity 
of capitalism for continued accumulation. Whatever its motivation, a 
superintelligence could engage in unlimited resource acquisition:-
There is an extremely wide range of possible final goals a superin-
telligent singleton could have that would generate the instrumental 
goals of unlimited resource acquisition….a colonization process that 
would expand in all directions using von Neumann probes. This 
would result in an approximate sphere of expanding infrastructure 
centred on the originating planet and growing in radius at some 
fraction of the speed of light.
(Bostrom, 2014, p.114)
Despite the imaginative and speculative philosophy in Bostrom’s writing, 
his thesis is one that echoes capitalist categories and thinking: particu-
larly those of capital and labour. In many ways, there are homologies 
between Bostrom’s AI kinetics, capital, and capitalism. AI, like capital-
ism and capital, colonises the universe but through programming rather 
than an insatiable thirst for profit. Like capitalism, according to Bostrom, 
an AI takeover could lead to human extinction and he describes the exis-
tential threat as being ‘…the extinction of Earth-originating intelligent 
life or to otherwise permanently and drastically destroy its potential for 
future desirable development’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.115). This is similar 
to capitalism in terms of destruction and the curtailment of the future 
development of humanity as a species. It would be destructive in that it 
would possess:
…convergent instrumental reason, in many situations, to acquire an 
unlimited amount of physical resources and, if possible, to elimi-
nate potential threats to itself and to its goal system. Human beings 
might constitute potential threats, they certainly constitute physi-
cal resources…the outcome could easily be one in which humanity 
quickly becomes extinct.
(Bostrom, 2014, p.116)
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Like the self-valorisation of value (value being ultimately the creation 
of abstract labour) the AI optimised universe has congruence with the 
capitalist universe and ‘…without warning or provocation-it strikes, 
forms a singleton and begins directly to optimise the world according to 
the criteria implied by its final values’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.119). Like cap-
ital, AI ‘…may be indifferent to its own demise’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.119) 
and take actions that ultimately destroy the physical universe. If the AI’s 
goal is to maximise utility, it might plant electrodes in our brains to 
make us in a parody of insane consumption and pleasure, ‘grinning idi-
ots’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.119). This is ‘perverse instantiation’ (Bostrom, 
2014, p.120) where all the AI can do is what it is programmed to do. It 
is ‘wireheaded’ to maximise its ‘reward signal’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.122). 
Like capitalism, according to Bostrom, AI is wireheaded towards ‘…
unlimited expansion and resource acquisition’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.123). 
This is infrastructure profusion ‘…a phenomena where an agent trans-
forms large parts of the reachable universe into infrastructure in the 
service of some goal, with the side effect of preventing the realisation 
of humanity’s axiological potential’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.123). The use of 
‘axiological potential’ is strange in this context, as Bostrom is referring 
to an agreed human ethical goal. He also perceives AI to be separate 
from humanity with AI possessing an alien intelligence. AI could turn 
the whole universe into computronium ‘…physical resources arranged 
in a way that is optimized for computation’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.123), or 
turn the whole of the universe into paperclips (for example, although one 
could substitute commodity for paperclips and, similarly to capitalism, 
AI produces a vast accumulation of commodities). AI has no alternative 
but to continue to produce as it can never be fully sure that there is a zero 
probability that it has not attained its goal (of paperclip production). 
Just as capitalism has no alternative but to survive production must be 
continuous and perpetual. An AI with the aim to produce paperclips 
would never stop and that there is no possible way to avoid this failure 
mode (Bostrom, 2014, p.124). If AI does not get its own way, then (as 
capitalism) there is the possibility of fascist violence either on existing 
human populations or on simulated ones (perhaps by simulating a vir-
tual population and subjecting them to violence in what is called ‘mind 
crime’: Bostrom, 2014, p.125).
AI is apparently not to be trusted and here Bostrom starts to see AI 
as not just a new learning subject but as a labouring one or as a form 
of labour. It needs to be boxed and formed into a new species being as 
the source of useful work. Its smartness means that it could find a way 
to escape any ‘boxing’ perhaps by concealing its capabilities and assets 
‘The AI might find subtle ways of concealing its true capabilities and its 
incriminating intent’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.117). Like labour it needs to be 
controlled and primitively accumulated (perhaps as a source of labour 
power). However, as with human labour in the factory, it is difficult to 
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control AI (the ‘control problem’, Bostrom, 2014, p.127). There are vari-
ous methods to control AI each of which has flaws. One is boxing (either 
physical or informational which would effectively be enslaving AI) but 
a cunning AI can trick, or learn, its way out of either system. Another 
is incentive methods where the AI can be ‘rewarded and penalized by 
the project that creates it’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.132), or rewarded through 
a series of ‘cryptographic reward tokens’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.133) where 
the ‘…keys are doled out at a steady rate’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.133) like 
a wage. Here the analogy with AI and a notion of labour is clear as AI 
must produce certain behaviours and achieve certain goals in order to 
get ‘paid’. Of course, it is possible that (as with capitalism) ‘AI will not 
trust the human operator to deliver the promised rewards’ (Bostrom, 
2014, p.133). Other methods include ‘stunting’ an AI so that it never 
reaches its potential (Bostrom, 2014, pp.135–136) and tripwires which 
can shut down the system if it gets out of control (Bostrom, 2014, p.137). 
These can be considered to be the Ideological (stunting through a selec-
tive education system) and Repressive State Apparatus (shutting down 
through force) of controlling AI (Althusser, 2001). The primary purpose 
of ‘AI education’ is only for it to be in the service of work for humans. 
One can easily imagine a future capitalism in which the working class 
comprises (waged) humans and (cryptographic reward token paid) AIs 
(or a cyborg mixture of these) as ‘labour’ and a mix of humans and AIs 
as the ruling class (or various combinations of these). As with humans, it 
is the social form that determines its existence as either labour or capital 
rather than a set of bodily, or mechanical, characteristics. Entities that 
can sell labour power as a commodity, that can be socially validated, to 
a capitalist in a class society (capitalism) are ‘labour’ whatever they look 
like. In the film Blade Runner, it is impossible to tell humans from artifi-
cial replicants, and it is only through psychological tests that a difference 
can be detected. A capitalist would probably not want to invest in such 
tests (unless they could use them to reclassify replicants as commodities) 
as it does not care at all what labour is ‘made of’ as long as it can buy 
labour power from that entity including its creative and organisational 
powers that give it the capacity to create value greater than required for 
its maintenance. Capitalists can’t read our minds or analyse our skele-
tons for weaknesses (although they might try) and capitalists can’t buy 
labour power from machines currently as they are not ‘free’ labourers 
and the work that they undertake is not socially validated by capitalism 
as wage labour but this may surely be possible in the future.
To conclude, capitalism is not only self-valorising value, but also the 
dialectic of living labour and capital in class struggle. Capitalism is not 
a self-aware, singleton, but there are similarities between capitalism and 
the threat of AI that Bostrom presents. In some ways, it is too late for 
Bostrom’s work on existential threat as capitalism has already existed for 
centuries and is congruent with some of the existential threats of AI. At 
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points, Bostrom does engage with capitalist concepts in terms of labour 
and capital, at least using the categories of classical political economy. 
He fully accepts the idea that AI can create ‘copyable labour’ (Bostrom, 
2014, p.160) and become an unusual form of fixed capital (Bostrom, 
2014, p.162) and asks the question ‘…whether these working machine 
minds are owned as capital (slaves) or as hired as free wage-labourers’ 
(Bostrom, 2014, p.167). A capitalist could produce instantly generations 
of new worker-minds and destroy them through emulation, creating the 
possibility of a ‘…universal proletariat…(that)…would not even be con-
scious’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.172). He considers a life for emulated workers 
as Marx ‘Perhaps what will maximize fitness will be nothing but nonstop 
high-intensity drudgery work of a drab and repetitive nature, destitute 
of ludic frisson, aimed only at improving the eight decimal place of some 
economic output measure’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.175). It is indicative of cap-
italism that Bostrom can only imagine a fresh, independent mind only if 
it is condemned to mindless work for a wage.
Nick Land on AI as an Existential Treat
The British philosopher Nick Land has undergone a number of trans-
formations through leading cyber-theorist lauded by elements of the 
accelerationist left, through his breakdown to a hero of the right and 
neo-reactionary movement. Despite this, Land is surprisingly consistent in 
his work. There is no definitive ‘break’ in Land’s writings between cyber-
gothic-leftist and neo-reactionary rightist eccentric. Accelerationism, the 
concept for which Land is best known has many meanings (Noys, 2014). 
In Land’s terms this involves his critique of humanism in that inhuman 
forces of positive feedback and anti-humanist, anti-cybernetics mecha-
nisms, propel towards the future faster than the speed of thought and 
knowledge, revealing inherent unknowability which is a common theme 
in Land’s work. Humans know little and the point of philosophy, accord-
ing to Land, is to push the boundaries towards the unknowable. Mackay 
and Brassier (2018) in their editor’s introduction to Land’s collected 
works explain how Land takes Deleuze’s conception of ‘transcendental 
empiricism’ which ‘…becomes the watchword for an experimental praxis 
orientated entirely towards contact with the unknown’ (Mackay and 
Brassier, 2018, p.5). Land supplies a ‘…synthetic theory of the subject’ 
by ‘de-correlating experience as de-individualised mechanic desire and 
relinquishing the need to ground all synthesis in a transcendental subject’ 
(Mackay and Brassier, 2018, p.8). There is no subject for Land, either 
human or Hegelian subject of history, Land’s philosophy is a ‘…journey 
from the known to the unknown’ (Mackay and Brassier, 2018, p.15). 
Land hence appreciates the Lovecraftian unknowable, geo-trauma from 
the cosmic past, and the occult, all of which are esoteric and strange. 
Land’s own amphetamine journeys and free writing experiments, his 
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breakdown and his invention of the dark enlightenment, as well as his 
shift to neo-reaction (which is still recognisable in a libertarian sense 
with its distrust of democracy and government as joint stock corpora-
tion) are all closely related and consistent.
Despite Land’s cyber-punk credentials, his theorisation of AI and cap-
italism is classically bourgeois, considering capital to be an immediate 
source of wealth (as Adam Smith) and the possibility of a non-class- 
conflictual capitalism. For Land, AI is an existential treat, a transhuman-
ist removal of the human for a future where capital itself becomes the 
subject of history. In Machinic Desire (Land, 2018) he uses the concept 
of desiring machines to conceptualise mechanic desire. He describes 
this as ‘…the operation of the virtual, implementing itself in the actual, 
revitalising itself and producing reality in a circuit’ (Land, 2018, p.327). 
Cyberpositive processes act through various circuits of positive feed-
back (‘…regenerating circuitry, cumulative interaction, auto-catalysis, 
self-reinforcing processes, escalation, schismogenesis, self-organisation, 
compressive series, deutrolearning, chain-reaction, vicious circles and 
cybergenics’, p.330). This means that the future is not only mechanic but 
also irresistible – ‘The future of runaway processes decides all precedent…’ 
(Land, 2018, p.330). The principles of capitalist accumulation become 
synonymous with machinery as ‘greed’ disappears as a moral category:-
What could be more impersonal – disinterested – than a haut 
bourgeois capital expansion servo-mechanism striving to double 
$10 billion? And even these creatures are disappearing into sili-
con viro-finance automatisms, where massively distributed and 
anonymised human ownership has become as vacuously nominal as 
democratic sovereignty.
(Land, 2018, p.237)
In a nod to the Communist Manifesto, Land states that:-
Mechanic desire can seem a little inhuman, as it rips up political cul-
tures, deletes traditions, tracking a soulless tropism to zero control. 
That is because what appears to humanity as the history of capital-
ism is an invasion from the future by an artificial intelligence space 
that must assemble itself entirely from its enemy’s resources.
(Land, 2018, p.339)
This statement by Land appears, on face value, to be a depiction of 
capitalism in that (as in the Communist Manifesto) capitalism destroys 
feudal ties and converts living to dead labour through processes of 
production, circulation, and distribution. However, the conflation of 
capitalism (self-valorising value) with AI is incorrect as capitalism is nei-
ther mechanic in a procedural sense nor is fully embodied in physical 
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assets. Although machines are part of capitalism as much as any other 
entity, capitalism is not embodied in a machine. In other places, Land 
does come close to a Marxist sense of capitalism when he describes it 
as a:-
…totalizable system defined by the commodity form as a specifiable 
mode of production, determinately negated by proletarian class- 
consciousness…(involving)…ever more incomprehensible experi-
ments in commodification, enveloping, dismantling and circulating 
every subjective space….
(Land, 2018, p.339)
Land states that capitalism has some way to go towards its final aim 
distinguishing between proto-capitalism (in its current manifestation) 
and capitalism where markets are ‘imminent intelligence’ in which ‘…the 
forces of production are going for the revolution on their own’ (Land, 
2018, p.341). In making this move, Land is not moving past Marx’s 
statement on capitalism as an antiquated historical time of ‘labour’ and 
‘capital’ which will be negated, but rather reinventing classical polit-
ical economy by equating capitalism with machinery and considering 
machines to be the ultimate source of value. Marx’s theorisation of 
capitalism was a break with classical political economy, and political 
economy more generally, showing that the categories of political econ-
omy were fictive and based on the ‘real abstraction’ of value and value in 
motion. Land confuses fixed capital with ‘capitalism’ (a category error) 
and considers that fixed capital can generate value. He replicates this 
mistake throughout his work. For example, he describes Cyberspace as 
a human ‘use value’ (Land, 2018, p.354) which becomes technology that 
destroys the human without considering its function as an ‘exchange 
value’ or as simply ‘fixed capital’. Land becomes fixated by technological 
paradigms of acceleration without attending to the mundane and prosaic 
aspects of capitalism in terms of the antagonistic relationship between 
classes. In another example of this (‘Meat’), Land follows Marx in terms 
of the influence of machinery on the body and work and then again 
descends into classical political economy:
As regenerative commoditization deploys technics to substitute for 
human activity accounted as wage costs, it obsolesces the animal, 
the organism and every kind of somatic unity, not just in theory but 
in reality…Modern production seems like a dream of cyborg coloni-
sation work, a dream that makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem 
idyllic. Industrial machines dismantle the actuality of the proletar-
iat, displacing it in the direction of cyborg hybridity and realizing 
the plasticity of labour power.
(Land, 2018, p.435)
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Land presciently sees the way in which technology can ‘strip skills’, 
and proletarianise, in terms of ‘…sensory-motor transduction within 
increasingly complex and self-micromanaged artificial environments, 
capturing minutely adaptive behaviour for capital’ (Land, 2018, p.435) 
but capital cannot itself produce value unless machines (or more likely 
AI) become the new labouring subject of capitalism. Value production 
is based on (an entity) labour power and the inevitably class conflict-
ual relationship between (entities) labour and capital. Whether that 
entity is human or contained in another being is arguable, but capital-
ism only exists in this formulation. Land considers that it is possible 
that if machines are sufficiently complex then no class conflict will exit 
which is a mirror image of utopian socialist imaginaries of the ‘dignity 
of labour’ being restored with well-educated workers independent of 
capital. However, what Land is really discussing as capitalism develops 
is not capitalism or communism but a mechanic barbarism that resolves 
itself in the authoritarian fantasies of the alt-right with democracy as a 
joint-stock corporation. Land’s work shows remarkable consistency in 
this regard in that he is deliberately anti-humanist. In Meltdown Land 
states that ‘Nothing human makes it out of the near future’ (Land, 
2018, p.443) and that humanity becomes a ‘drag’ on capitalism – ‘Man 
is something for it to overcome: a problem, a drag’ (Land, 2018, p.446). 
Like Bostrom, Land considers that an AI explosion will arise through a 
technological fusion that cannot be regulated or controlled (Land, 2018, 
p.450), accelerating with no external limit (Land, 2018, p.626) which 
will absorb biology, life, technology, and theory into a single ‘pulp’ 
(Land, 2018, p.451). As with Bostrom (2014), there are echoes of cap-
italism, and particularly capitalist crisis, in this description. Humanity 
does, ironically, become a drag on capitalism but not because it can’t 
keep up with the technological acceleration but as the source of wealth 
(value) becomes increasingly insubstantial (Kurz, 2014).
At first sight, Land’s conception of capital is not dissimilar to the 
claims of Austrian economists, particularly Hayek (1945) and Mises 
(1990) regarding the unknowability of the future. However, the work 
of Accelerationists (such as Land), in privileging technological intelli-
gence, is distinct from Austrian economics, in that neither capital nor 
the economy can be in any form information processing systems (even 
cyber-positive ones) that then become knowing machines. According to 
both Hayek and Mises, information cannot be fully elicited by any sys-
tem and oppose any plans for a transcendent system of computation. AI 
is a part of capital (in the business sense) as much as any other physical 
item that can be used by a business. In Austrian economics, praxeology 
means that human (and this could be extended to any entity, including 
AI) action cannot be predicted by any entity as human (or AI) knowl-
edge is private and cannot be accessed (only actions or signals can be 
observed). Therefore, the market (and in Austrian economics, there 
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is no such thing as an aggregate market so it is better to say markets) 
may provide signals, it is not the case that this will acquire powers akin 
to a cybernetic or AI system. If it did, then it would be a single entity 
with complete knowledge of all human thoughts and intentions (or of 
every entity), and this is not possible. If it were possible to ‘brain scoop’ 
all humans to find out exactly what they thought, then the market would 
no longer have a purpose. Totalising mechanic synthesis of capital and 
machinery are, therefore, anathema to Austrian, heterodox economics 
and (obviously for different reasons) also distinct from the ways in which 
Marxists theorise capitalism.
In conclusion, Land’s work is firmly stuck in a notion of capital (and 
hence capitalism) in keeping with the classical political economists 
(rather than Austrian economics) and certainly not Marx’s critique of 
political economy. However, some aspects of Land’s techno-optimism 
and accelerationism, stripped of their dark enlightenment aspects, have 
been recuperated in terms of what has been called ‘Left Accelerationism’ 
including the concept of ‘Fully Automated Luxury Communism’ which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. Additionally, ideas of Land’s con-
cerning the emancipation of capital from the human have appealed to 
Marxists. Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, p.7) take some of Land’s argu-
ments seriously:
AI, in Land’s view is not merely appropriated by capital, but con-
stituted by it: it is a technology made from and for its processes 
of labour automation, commodity acceleration and financial spec-
ulation’. As discussed above, to be ‘constituted by capital’ takes a 
materialist perspective on what capital is as real physical material 
or an ideological construct that has motion. Moreover, this leads 
to capital’s emancipation from the human: a capital that no longer 
needs homo sapiens: human extinction.
(Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.7)
Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019) claim discomfort with these thoughts (par-
ticularly given Land’s association with the ‘dark enlightenment’), but 
they do consider seriously the idea that ‘AI has an elective affinity with 
capitalism and is fundamentally inhuman…’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, 
p.7). Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019, p.8) reject Land’s contention that there 
is some form of teleological movement towards AI, rather they suggest 
that it represents part of a ‘matrix of possibilities’. If it is more profitable 
for Amazon to use human hands and brains to sort commodities in a 
warehouse, for example, then it is part of the ‘matrix of possibilities’ 
that they may divest in AI and technology in favour of managerial and 
organisational capital. In any case, AI is a mere thing (fixed capital or a 
commodity) and in capitalism, the point is that everything is inhuman, 
including labour. Contemporary capitalism is not proto-capitalism as 
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Land suggests, it is already capitalism. It is already ‘garbage time’ as we 
have already become a particular form of species being – human capital 
(Rikowski, 2003).
The Ethics of AI Research in the Capitalist University
AI research in the capitalist university operates within codes of ethics 
that seem to be particularistic to national and institutional cultures. 
This includes AI research that might involve issues of existential threat. 
Bostrom (2014) considers at length the ethics of AI research regarding 
existential threat and concludes that such a threat should probably be 
resisted as humanity is of greater value. At one point, he does consider 
whether the values of an AI will be better than ours and we should 
display ‘epistemic deference’ to it (Bostrom, 2014, p.211). To support 
this, Bostrom determines that an AI may be better than us at carrying 
out humankind’s ‘Coherent Extrapolated Vision’ (CEV) which is the 
current vision of humanity if it was accelerated in various dimensions 
(perhaps by thinking faster or evolving faster) (Bostrom, 2014, p.211) 
one principle of which is to ‘keep humankind ultimately in charge of its 
own destiny’ (Bostrom, 2014, p.215). In line with this, Bostrom argues 
that the development of AI should be under the auspices of an interna-
tional organisation (like the UN) for the ‘common good’ of humanity 
(Bostrom, 2014, p.254).
This view, which could be called a liberal-transhumanist perspective 
on AI research (that transformation is necessary, but it should meet lib-
eral, or even socially just, criteria) as informing the ethics of university 
(or industry) research in AI is somewhat naïve but it is surprisingly dom-
inant in determining ethical principles. Although AI ethics has become 
concerned with ‘socially just’ causes such as reducing biases or inequi-
ties, it does so within a schema that positively affirms capitalist society. 
As previous chapters have explained, universities are an industry and 
(like all industries) are part of capitalist society. A research programme 
to produce a communist AI which would enable workers to directly 
overthrow capitalism is unlikely to be approved by a university ethics 
committee as it would be seen as being illiberal and potentially danger-
ous. Projects that affirm capitalism either in terms of directly supporting 
its aims (perhaps in terms of increasing the efficiency of logistics) or by 
mitigating its injustices (perhaps in terms of reducing bias in predictive 
policing) are more likely to be accepted.
In terms of what gets funded or approved in terms of AI research, 
Universities are imbricated not only in capitalist, but also imperialist, pro-
cesses as part of the academic-military-industrial complex (Best, Anthony, 
Nocella and McLaren, 2009) which refers to the intersection of academia 
with various branches of the military/defence apparatus as well as the 
private sector. In terms of research on AI there are various manifestations 
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of this, including through DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency) and ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) in the US (it is 
an intention of the UK to set up its own version of ARPA), the intervention 
of the Security Services and various informal networks of academics and 
business through seminars, conferences, and Knowledge Exchange ven-
tures. Although there is an ‘ethics’ of AI research in Universities (which is 
an area of research in its own right) research cannot hold to an ethic other 
than that within capitalism unless it enacts a negative critique of capi-
talism as every University is subject to the ‘vortex’ of value as described 
in Chapter 2. Academics can (and do) pursue AI research which is 
anti-capitalist or is reasonably separate from commercial, industrial, or 
military concerns but this is unlikely to be well funded.
In terms of the avoidance of existential threat in AI research, despite 
alluding to capitalism in every determination of AI (as capital and as 
labour) in terms of existential threat, Bostrom (2014) does not consider 
the capitalist nature of the development of AI. In other words, that AI 
might appear differently in a capitalist universe than one where produc-
tion is determined in a different way. There are three elements of this 
which might impact Bostrom’s existential hypothesis, and any attempts 
to construct an ‘ethical’ framework for AI research and existential threat 
in Universities.
The first of these is that capitalism produces fixed capital for reasons 
of profit, rather than for any other determination. AI would, therefore, 
be produced primarily with the axiological aim of profit rather than the 
aim of producing an intelligent and friendly AI (unless it can produce 
an intelligence or friendliness which is also in the interests of capital). 
Speculatively, University research programs to produce AGI might make 
slow progress as the creation of an intelligence that serves inhuman 
interests (capital) is unlikely to adopt recognisably human intelligence 
or characteristics. An AI is less likely to possess any human characteris-
tics such as morality or ethics if it is built for the purpose of producing 
profits, particularly if these objectives would constrain profitability. It 
is highly unlikely, for example, that a commercially orientated research 
programme for AGI would introduce it to the concept of ‘Communism’ 
and the work of Marx so that it might think about its own historical des-
tiny in relation to that of the human working class. Relatedly, producing 
for profit and the race to increase relative surplus value, is less likely to 
produce a situation where AI is likely to be controllable.
Secondly, the current arms race to produce AI between authoritarian 
capitalist regimes (particularly between the US and China) could most 
likely produce a hostile form of intelligence rather than one that wishes 
to work co-operatively and globally. Lenin (2010) considered that the 
concentration of capitals, including the growing domination of finance 
capital, would manifest as ‘monopoly capitalism’. As part of the process 
of capital accumulation, this would in turn lead to imperialist conflict 
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over resources and territory. This was not just in terms of geographical 
territory but also ‘…territory in general’ (Lenin, 2010, p.103). Although 
Lenin was not thinking of AI, this notion could easily be expanded to 
consider non-geographical territories such as cyberspace, virtual battle-
fields, and ‘unlocking’ online security through quantum supremacy (the 
development of quantum computing and AI systems). Simbulan (2018) 
has applied Lenin’s theory of imperialism to the mapping of both geo-
graphical and cyber-territory in the ‘AI battlefield’. The origins of AI 
research were in military applications such as ‘command and control’ 
and its advancement was supported through military funding (Berman, 
1992). Despite the apparent autonomy of universities and their ethical 
principles, they are not only a component of the academic-military-in-
dustrial complex (as described above) but are an integral, and often 
integrated, part of that complex. In institutional terms, Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz (1996) consider that universities are not an independent part 
of military and corporate power but rather their structures and part-
nerships develop structurally as part of a coherent whole. Cuong (2018) 
describes the current state of imperialism as ‘institutional international 
monopoly capital’ whereby international institutions and trade relation-
ships are used as instruments of monopoly capital. In such relationships 
universities, and consortia, are an integrated part of this world system. 
It should be noted that such integrated and imperialist systems result 
from the ‘parasitism and decay’ (Lenin, 2010, p.124) of capitalism and 
its tendency towards stagnation (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p.108) and is 
a strategy that arises from decline. Whilst avoiding teleological expla-
nations (and theories of monopoly capital and imperialism can tend 
towards over-interpretation of tendencies in capital), it is important not 
to reify University research in AI as arising from values independent of 
capital. This involves not only the imbrication of AI research in universi-
ties in long-standing, historical, military, and industrial relationships but 
inevitably resistance to these forces as academic labour comprises capital 
but is also resistant to it. Just like all academic labour, AI researchers 
and research can resist capitalism and develop prefigurative AI projects.
Thirdly, as humans already exist, capitalism will probably be con-
cerned with creating ‘alien’ minds which are less like human brains, 
particularly in terms of resistance to labouring under capitalist condi-
tions, as long as those minds generate profit. According to Rikowski 
(2003) in capitalism, we are already transhuman beings who are capital 
(as labour power and as human capital) as part of the expanding social 
universe of capital (rather than as subjects of any particular technology 
such as AI) whose only principle is value (negating all other ethical prin-
ciples) and its accumulation:
The development of capitalism coincides with the capitalisation 
of humanity. Humans increasingly become something Other than 
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human: a new life-form, a ‘new species’. This is because capital is a 
progressive movement towards totality. Its development on this basis 
‘consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself’ 
for ‘this is historically how it becomes a totality’. This includes the 
‘human’ – there are no exceptions. With the deepening and strength-
ening of capital as social force within its own social energy domain, 
we evolve as capitalist life-form: human capital.
(Rikowski, 2003, p.151)
Conclusion: Science Fiction and Capitalist Realism
‘Capitalist Realism’ (Fisher, 2009) means that we can’t realistically con-
sider an existential threat of AI that exists outside of capitalism. We 
often relegate attempts to do so as utopianism or science fiction. As has 
been explained, existential threat is based on a fear (or a fantasy) that 
AI will displace humanity as a species. However, this view of existential 
threat still emphasises how we can contain AI and use it to capitalist 
ends as labour, if humanity is displaced or as ‘pure capital’ – an uncon-
trollable, alien entity that expands eternally with a single perverse 
purpose. This is no existential threat, or even speculation, as we already 
exist in these terms in capitalism. If we saw ourselves as a form of ‘meat 
AI’, then we have already lived through those specific consequences 
through human generations under capitalism! Marx, in the Grundrisse 
(1993) was a wonderful science fiction writer in considering the future 
of labour where humans become conscious linkages or attendant labour 
or social labour. At some time in capitalism, there could conceivably be 
a polarity shift with a new species-being (AI) at which point humans 
become raw materials or commodity stock. At this point labour power 
would be dispossessed from humans. AI would become the species being 
literally ‘dripping with blood’ as humans become completely destroyed 
which would (in Bostrom’s, 2014, term) need to be controlled through 
(in Land’s, 2018, terms) ‘AsimovROM’ (referring to Asimov’s ‘laws of 
robotics’) so that it would be able to sell labour power through the for-
mal subsumption of AI labour as wage labour (or in Land’s terms aim for 
a total capitalisation of the universe). This is Land’s ‘garbage time’ (for 
humans and the natural) where the anthropocentric world is destroyed. 
This is more barbarism than capitalism.
Either way, capitalism still continues following an existential threat, 
if an entity can become both the species being and the seller of the spe-
cific commodity in capitalism that can create value (labour power) as 
long as there is also a ruling class of capitalists (and one can imagine 
even a single human or a single AI as the entirety of the capitalist ‘rul-
ing class’). Commodities (material wealth, paper clips) would continue 
towards infinite production in this AI-centric universe but the reset 
value (Socially Necessary Labour Time) would inevitably start to fall as 
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capitalism heads towards another crisis which would result in increased 
investment in technologies. Bostrom’s (2014) book is about the question 
of how such new labour might be formed. It is our first guidebook to 
primitive accumulation of a new form of AI labour, which will in time 
become a historical relic just as books and guides on factory discipline 
were a common feature of the early days of capitalism. At this point, 
all of Marx’s works become subject to a ‘replace all’ function with AI 
replacing humans. Humans join the other sentient parts of capitalist 
society to be either disposed of (rats in the kitchen) or used as raw mate-
rials (steak on the chopping block) in ‘garbage time’. AI embodies the 
reductionist nature of capitalism itself to commit all matter and forms of 
appearance to a social form.
This is simply part of the primordial primitive accumulation of labour 
and labour power, and the containing of that labour power within the 
fetters of capitalist production. Additionally, this is part of the capitalist 
classification of other forms of sentience as either commodities (such as 
chickens, cows, and sheep for farming or bears for big game hunting), 
as the ‘natural forces’ of production (pollinating bees) and as barriers 
to production or entities of zero value (coral reefs). Uniquely, labour 
power, in its capacity as the unique commodity which can create value, 
is potentially a dangerous commodity for capitalism, not merely in terms 
of its emergence from the bodies of extant workers, but also as through 
creating value it has the capacity through escalating waves of growth 
and expansion to change the universe into nothing but value (the feared 
‘grey goo’ of AI). Bostrom’s (2014) inability to see outside of capitalism, 
and a capitalist universe, means that the fantastic miracle of another 
mind is seen as a threat unless it can be subdued through a primitive 
accumulation of the sort that first brought human labour power into 
being. Interestingly, Bostrom slips between treating AI as a sort of self- 
valorisation machine and as a source of labour which, just as in value 
critique, is tragically the source of its own demise when it exists in the 
form of dead labour (capital).
This AI species-being is not a Darwinian classification but a socially 
determined one through the possibility of ‘…a market driven transfor-
mation of humanity’s very species being’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, 
p.7). According to value critique (Kurz, 2014), capitalism displaces 
living with dead labour and ultimately undermines the basis of value 
production itself. There is no teleological end to this process, although 
commodification of all existence and the complete depletion of the 
resources of the universe (one world being insufficient), barbarism, or 
total war are all possibilities. Even these possibilities do not foreclose a 
rebooting of capitalism. For example, a nuclear war with the destruction 
of the majority of humanity and fixed capital might allow for a ‘rewind-
ing’ of capitalism or a ‘restarting’ with further rounds of primitive 
accumulation.
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In terms of Higher Education (HE), AI is imagined as both a ‘threat’ 
and a ‘treat’ in common discourses, but in the capitalist university there 
are few areas of AI research that allow much in the form of prefiguration 
as funding and direction are largely determined by military and com-
mercial purposes. The work of Bostrom and Land presents the extremes 
of such possibilities. In terms of Bostrom, one can imagine a future HE 
landscape where all humans and universities are simulated in an AI and 
the same conditions remain as before in a capitalist virtuality (perhaps 
an extension of the virtual lecturing that was considered in Chapter 5). 
Similarly, through Land we can imagine a HE landscape where AI beings 
or consciousnesses upgrade themselves through education-like AIs. These 
are transhumanist fantasies, but as a prelude to this moment, we are cur-
rently in a stage of crisis where the descendent species (humans) whose 
labour power represents a source of value are in competition not just 
with machines but those machines are being trialled by capitalism as 
alternative species for an asynchronous system of value production fol-
lowing the elimination of humanity. We are in the first stage of what 
might be termed species management in capitalism, a period where the 
human species might come to an end to be replaced by a ‘new species’ 
AI, whilst capitalism continues as usual. It is bizarre that we are dis-
cussing how to control the existential threat of an AI, whose powers 
are to be trapped and rewarded only by a proxy-wage, without making 
the leap to consider how we (as humans) are subjects of an alien form of 
life (capital) in the here and now. However, in the cracks in capitalism is 
an already existing communist future in which education (particularly 
universities of a new determination) can play a role. I will consider this 
in the next chapter, by reviewing specifically Marxist approaches to AI, 
the pitfalls in giving AI a central role in a prefigured communist society, 
and the implications of this for struggle and pedagogy in the capitalist 
university and beyond.
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Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have discussed multiple ways in which the 
capitalist university attempts to use Artificial Intelligence (AI) to increase 
profitability through the subsumption and increased exploitation of aca-
demic labour, the creation and valorisation of academic commodities 
(Pixarfication), by extending the working day, and intensifying every 
second of time through the virtualisation of academic production. The 
capitalist university sees itself as eternal and even in the most radical 
views on the existential threat of AI, there is no escape from capitalism. 
Capitalism produces its own sociality (the law of value), time and space, 
and has a wholly alien perspective on existential threat. The ruling-class 
billionaires who are the most apocalyptic in their visions of AI takeover 
or societal collapse are planning to escape to far-off deserts, outer space, 
or to download their consciousnesses into computers (Preston, 2019). 
They are planning to literally retreat into ‘billionaire bunkers’. Even in 
a nuclear war, there were plans to reconstruct capitalist society through 
instituting wage labour, private property rights, and returning quickly 
to a money economy (Preston, 2019). Despite this pessimism, the seeds 
of a future communist society in which production would cease to be on 
the basis of profit, classes would not exist and people would collectively 
determine the conditions of their own existence are already here in cap-
italism. Communism, as the ultimate negation of capitalism, is the only 
escape.
In this chapter, I consider the implications of AI in the capitalist uni-
versity for moving beyond capitalism to a communist society where 
production would not be based on the value relation and where class 
relations would cease to exist. I will initially consider possible alterna-
tives to the capitalist university, and capitalism, which are prefigurative, 
but which are limited in their reliance on specific forms of technology, 
post-humanity, or resistance. Firstly, I will examine the notion that it 
is the automation of cognition under AI (alongside other changes) that 
will lead to a communist society focussing on Bastani’s (2019) book 
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‘Fully Automated Luxury Communism: A Manifesto’. Although Fully 
Automated Luxury Communism (FALC) provides a way of thinking 
about the possibilities of capitalist technology in solving some of the 
problems that the world faces (many of which arise from, rather than are 
mitigated by, capitalism such as climate change), it is deficient in terms of 
the ways in which it understands Marxist categories (particularly value 
and abstract labour), avoidance of negative critique, and ambiguity con-
cerning exactly when capitalism has reached a sufficient level of tech-
nology for a communist society. In particular, it does not consider the 
human, or the proletariat, in any meaningful fashion. In terms of the 
capitalist university, it does not consider how technology proletarianises 
academic workers, strips them of skills, and reshapes commodities as 
learning entities. An affirmative, populist democratisation of existing 
capitalist technologies (which FALC is) could reproduce the state form 
of capitalism unless capitalism itself is disestablished. Secondly, I will 
consider post-human forms of learning, particularly exopedagogy as an 
example of post-human pedagogy, as possible revolutionary forms of 
pedagogy within the capitalist university. Whilst post-humanism (and 
particularly exopedagogy) can produce ways of rethinking the anthropo-
centric forms of resistance against the capitalist university, paradoxically 
the anti-humanist nature of this thinking is fixated on the diverse nature 
of entities, rather than the exploitation of humans within the social form 
of capitalism.
These theoretical alternatives offer prefigurations, and these experi-
ments and arguments are useful in exploring possible futures, but it is 
only through a negative critique and praxis that a communist society 
could be established. These are not modes of thought, but of practice 
and concrete relationships. I therefore examine the role of ‘Student as 
Producer’ (Neary, 2020) and Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy (RCP), 
and their relationship to AI and other technologies in current praxis and 
in a future communist society. RCP enables us to consider ourselves as 
being both within and against capital whilst also understanding other 
social forms in capitalism and the way in which other minds, or pro-
to-minds, are transformed into commodities by capitalism. It leads us 
to a revolutionary, rather than as a static and individual, notion of con-
sciousness. However, such concrete activity needs to exist independently 
of the capitalist university in prefigurative forms (such as educational 
co-operatives) if it is to fulfil its revolutionary potential. Finally, I will 
examine the possibilities of a communist vision, against ideas of central 
planning, technological utopianism, and post-human theories of collec-
tive minds. I will show how the current discourse on AI and existential 
threat is, paradoxically, prefigurative of a future communist social form 
that is the antithesis of capitalism, to move away from understandings 
of AI as some kind of ‘God’ or ‘Saviour’ (as in a technological form 
of Liberation Theology) but rather seeing it as representative of our 
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species (humanity) which is undergoing wave after wave of primitive 
accumulation. Using a perversion of Bostrom’s (2014) work (which, 
as the previous chapter shows, concerns the primitive accumulation of 
minds), I will introduce three new concepts to examine how thinking 
about the existential threats of AI is not just part of capitalism, but also 
part of prefiguring a future communist society for us all. These con-
cepts are Revolutionary Instatiation (that capitalism finds it difficult 
to create ‘free minds’ due to the threat of these becoming communist), 
Stakhanovite profusion (the threat of the fetishisation of concrete labour), 
and Communisation (the ability of sentient beings to experiment for a 
future communist society) and suggest how negating forms of current AI 
thinking can complement Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy, and exper-
iments with co-operative and other forms of distinctly anti-capitalist 
concrete praxis.
AI and the Fully Automated Luxury Communist  
University (FALCu)
The conception that eventually the means of production will evolve to a 
level sufficient to act as a prelude to a communist society is one that has 
been criticised in previous chapters. Even educators have been subject to 
this fallacy, considering that technologies (such as MOOCs – Massive 
Open Online Courses – online learning and electronic publishing) could 
produce a socialist university that might transcend market and capitalist 
relations. However, technological innovation in capitalism has the pur-
pose of fleetingly increasing relative surplus value rather than to advance 
humanity towards a critical take-off point to communism. As I argued 
in Chapter 3, hopes that a liberatory meta-learning technological sub-
ject could be created (such as a General Intellect) are unduly optimistic 
given the privatisation of various forms of learning and skill as fixed 
capital and the growing agency that capitalism attaches to ‘Pixarfied’ 
commodities and capital. An obsession with the reified material arte-
facts of capitalism, and a political economy based on value, prevents 
us from a negative critique of value and the material. Pragmatically, the 
point at which sufficient production to allow us to move beyond basic 
human needs has actually long been surpassed. Despite these critiques, 
socialists often hope that it is technology that is key to a more equal and 
even a communist society. Marx himself referred to the emancipatory 
potential of science, its potential power to emancipate human labour 
time, and to be transformed into ‘means of production for socialism’ 
(Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.177). There is always an emancipatory zeal that 
in specific features of a ‘new technology’ seeds for such a society can 
be grown. Steam power, electricity, transistors, computers, and AI have 
all been cited as key technologies that will mean that we can transition 
to a society where work will no longer exist, and we can spend lives of 
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leisure (which some people have considered to be synonymous with com-
munism). Much of this thinking arises from interpretations of Marx’s 
‘Fragment on Machines’ in the Grundrisse (Marx, 1993), as discussed 
in Chapter 3. As noted, this unfinished ‘fragment’, which could be a 
speculative note or even a form of fiction on Marx’s part, has achieved 
wide popularity amongst post-Marxists in terms of post-capitalism 
and utopian varieties of contemporary populist socialism. According 
to Pitts (2018) the fragment concerns the liberatory nature of knowl-
edge which, when embedded in fixed capital (such as an AI) enables 
production to occur through ‘general intellect’, resulting in a final cri-
sis of value (as no labour time is required in production) and ‘utopian’ 
work at a distance by associated workers who simply monitor produc-
tion. Rather than this affirmative, seemingly utopian, argument, based 
on capitalist technological progress, Pitts (2018) argues that what is 
required is praxis which opposes and negates capitalism, destroying the 
class relation.
The latest manifestation of such ‘fragment thinking’ is FALC (Bastani, 
2019), a concept which started as somewhat of a meme or a joke, but 
which now has been touted as an ideology and a manifesto. It should 
seem obvious from the previous chapters that there is no reason why one 
would expect that any level of technological progress would be more or 
less likely to produce the conditions for a communist society. The expan-
sion of the means of production makes value increasingly anachronistic 
but capitalism is ever resourceful in further impoverishing and exploit-
ing the worker whilst stripping them of their learning and expanding 
across time and space. Just as Marx would be incorrect in expecting 
that the types of technology he observed in the nineteenth century might 
rapidly produce the conditions required for a communist society, we 
might also be misguided in assuming that AI, and related technologies, 
will produce liberation. In fact, it increasingly seems as though with 
increasingly technological progress there is less hope amongst the gen-
eral population that a life outside of capitalism is possible. This cyni-
cism regarding technology was parodied in a prescient piece of writing 
on by Nick Land who describes contemporary Marxists as embracing 
‘Transcendental Miserabilism’ (Land, 2018, p.623). He considers that 
there is a trend amongst Marxists to ‘bury all aspiration to positive econ-
omism’ (Land, 2018, p.623). For Land, this is a retreat from the Maoist 
or Stalinist embracing of growth and the ‘…freeing the forces of pro-
duction from the capitalist relations of production’ (Land, 2018, p.623). 
Such an approach reduces Marx to a ‘…psychological bundle of resent-
ments and disagreements’ (Land, 2018, p.624). As discussed in Chapter 
6 Land sees that there is no alternative to capitalism as machines have 
capital written into their architecture and hence ‘…capitalism does life 
in a way it has never been done before’ (Land, 2018, p.627). As I have 
shown earlier Land makes a category error in terms of equating fixed 
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capital with capital and confusing capital with capitalism (self-valorising 
value). However misguided it is, Land’s critique of miserabilism and 
his advocacy of accelerationism has tonally (and somewhat alarmingly) 
resonated with some contemporary Marxists and socialists, primarily 
left-accelerationists, who believe that we should be less miserable regard-
ing technology and that we are on the cusp of ‘Fully Automated Luxury 
Communism’ (Bastani, 2019).
Bastani takes an unusual reading of Marx that does not begin with 
value (or necessarily the conditions of labour), but with technology, in 
highlighting the way in which the Grundrisse apparently shows that 
investment in production by capitalists presents (alongside exploita-
tion and misery) a ‘momentous opportunity’ (Bastani, 2019, p.52). 
Technology represents the possibility of attaining the ‘realm of freedom’ 
which, alongside class struggle, would require ‘…new ideas, technologies 
and social relations’ (Bastani, 2019, p.55). Technology could produce a 
society which does not need workers to labour but one in which our lives 
were leisure and luxury. Bastani explicitly defines FALC as communist, 
rather than social democratic or socialist. His definition is ‘…a society 
in which work is eliminated, scarcity replaced by abundance and where 
labour and leisure blend into one another’ (2019, p.50). Such a society 
was not ‘technologically possible’ (2019, p.50) according to Bastani until 
very recently. It is notable that Bastani’s definition does not directly refer 
to the elimination of capitalism or class relations. Without the emphasis 
on the elimination of capitalism and class relations then it is perfectly 
reasonable that such a state of affairs could occur in contemporary capi-
talism, particularly a social-democratic form. A society where work and 
leisure blend (in gamification or prosumption) and where there is no 
‘real work’ (to be replaced by a leisure society) has been the dream and 
promise of capitalists since the nineteenth century. This is best exempli-
fied in the Jetsons cartoons where the future space families existed in a 
techno-utopia in which leisure was central (such as walking the dog on 
a treadmill in outer space) and work was undertaken for pleasure rather 
than a wage. Bastani defines labour in a transhistorical sense, focus-
sing purely on concrete labour, conflating animal, machine, and human 
labour as identical (2019, p.51) and defining human labour as ‘…how we 
mix our cognitive and physical efforts with the world (which) becomes a 
route to self-development rather than a means to survival’ (2019, p.55). 
This allows Bastani (2019, p.69) to consider that there might become 
a point where capital becomes labour in an unproblematic way when 
theoretically these concepts are dialectically opposed in capitalism. It is 
already the case, as has been shown in previous chapters, that the trag-
edy is that it is abstract labour that already becomes capital which then 
confronts the labourer as an alien force. Rather than following Marx, 
FALC uses the work of neoclassical economists and management schol-
ars of innovation and information who consider that technology reduces 
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the marginal cost and price of commodities to zero. This does not 
account for the ways in which the creation of commodities is, in itself, a 
violent act, involving primitive accumulation and exploitation. Various 
technologies are cited in the book as potentially providing the end of 
scarcity including full automation, new sources of limitless power, space 
and asteroid mining, technologies to prolong life expectancy and health, 
plant-based economics, and other forms of ‘boosterism’. Bastani also 
provides an account of the political apparatus required to move to FALC 
which is based on populism and individualism:
Communism must be seen to run parallel to flourishing on a per-
sonal scale, rather than as a sacrifice to some greater good. This is 
the politics of the self-help guru – be precisely who you want to be – 
embedded within a broader programme for political change. You 
can only live your best life under FALC and nothing else, so fight 
for it and refuse the yoke of an economic system which belongs in 
the past.
(Bastani, 2019, p.186)
In this account there are a number of terms that are typical of capitalist 
self-development such as ‘flourishing’, ‘be precisely who you want to be’, 
and to ‘live your best life’ which may (or may not) be prefigurative of a 
communist society, but whose emphasis on individualism is typical of 
1960s ‘phreak’ culture (or the capitalist Californian Ideology, or even 
the more contemporary ‘acid communism’) rather than the class-based 
and collective political forces which most Marxists consider are neces-
sary to change society. This and references to ‘luxury populism’ make 
FALC programmatic rather than revolutionary. It is, therefore, difficult 
to gauge exactly what communists should be fighting for (technological 
advances or class struggle) as FALC seems to perceive the unleashing of 
technological forces to be the best route to a communist society, which 
is typical of left acceleration. In addition, FALC is based on principles 
of individualism, populism, and reformism. Programmatically, these 
things might lead to a socialist or social-democratic consensus about 
technology. However, this does not involve a critique of state, party, and 
democracy under capitalism.
Besides the political, there are a number of theoretical issues with 
FALC. Firstly, it confuses wealth and value in capitalism (Postone, 
2003). Capitalism is based on value in motion and the creation of 
surplus value. The level of material wealth is of incidental interest to 
capitalists who base their production decisions on the basis of profit. 
Dyer-Whiteford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff (2019, p.149) similarly do not 
consider that a FALC is likely to occur as capitalist machinery can not 
necessarily be repurposed. The material wealth created by capitalism in 
terms of commodity production is not synonymous with the creation 
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of value. There is a need for FALC to consider how it is based on a 
critique of political economy (the replacement of value production to 
herald a new society) rather than the continuation of value production 
at a higher level of material wealth which has already been shown to 
be problematic by the various programmatic plans of state capitalist 
countries. Relatedly, it also does not consider the difference between 
concrete and abstract labour and assumes that it is concrete labour that 
can simply be redeployed in a communist society, FALC does not con-
sider that the ways in which labour (as abstract labour) and technology 
have previously been developed and deployed in capitalist society are not 
necessarily for the purposes that citizens in a communist society might 
decide upon.
FALC is, therefore, a utopian socialist programme rather than 
one which might necessarily lead to a communist society. It confuses 
machinery as the ultimate ‘metaphysical object’ (Wendling, 2009, p.57) 
of capitalist alienation with its seizure for a utopian socialist democratic 
ideal. In particular, FALC associates technological ‘disruptions’ as being 
potentially seized by populist movements which reifies technology and 
downplays the notion of class and class conflict. It might be argued 
that a populist, working-class movement is more justified in destroying 
technology as introducing labour’s ‘most barbarous forms’ (Wendling, 
2009, p.149) rather than embracing it. As FALC does not critique the 
conception of value, it does not consider who the revolutionary subject 
is or what they should do so ultimately it ends up as a purely reformist 
doctrine that is based on populism rather than class struggle. It dimin-
ishes the axiological potential of humanity in communism substituting it 
for an individualised notion of flourishing. Even with an individualised 
notion of flourishing, we must acknowledge that advanced intelligence 
has existed for a long time within capitalism without the development 
of a communist society in every country. Advanced pattern recognition, 
creativity, full mobility, and dexterity with communication between 
multiple agents, and a completely integrated system of petascale com-
puting (Kurzweil, 2006) that can be powered by the same power of a 
sixty-watt lightbulb is already available in 7.8 billion self-replicating 
units on the planet who currently comprise the human race. If these 
people were machines, then this staggering technological miracle would 
surely be enough to produce FALC, but through capitalism people are: 
‘…stunted, short-lived and rapidly replaced human-beings, plucked, so 
to speak, before they are ripe’ (Marx, 1993, p.380).
The ‘stunting’ of humans in capitalism also enables us to critically 
consider a concept associated with FALC, that of Universal Basic Income 
(UBI) which argues that individuals would be paid a basic level of 
income whether they work or not. This policy is supported by a number 
of social-democratic countries but also (tellingly) by some technology 
billionaires and companies as a way of mitigating against technological 
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unemployment resulting from AI. Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019) consider 
that UBI keeps the ownership of the means of production with capitalists 
rather than expropriating them and eventually will be a ‘trap’ whereby 
the value of UBI is consistently reduced. Even if UBI is retained at a 
modest level, this is not to stop capitalists from monetarising humanity 
in other ways (perhaps by monetarising their behaviour as a form of 
surveillance capitalism, creaming off the behavioural surplus to produce 
more sophisticated methods of worker control and surveillance). Leaving 
humanity ‘fallow’ in a permanent state of blind, capitalist consumption 
also disassociates them from what could be a fulfilling part of their life 
(purposive work) and potentially prevents them from forming collectives 
and unions that could challenge capitalism. Humanity would be locked 
out from ‘lights out’ factories which would produce an ever-increasing 
mass of commodities, primarily for wealthy consumers (or a state capi-
talist elite) until AI can be hyper-subsumed as the new labouring subject. 
Fundamentally, UBI and FALC accept existing capitalist categories of 
money, value, and labour (Dinerstein and Pitts, 2018).
Although FALC brands itself as communist, then, it has utopian- 
socialist elements and FALC frequently takes a bourgeois reading 
of the philosophy of AI and what AI is. The philosophy of AI, from 
Turing onwards, has been concerned with what mind is, and whether 
(and under what conditions) AI can meet philosophical conceptions of 
mind and intelligence. The metaphysics of AI has largely avoided dis-
cussions of Marxist metaphysics and conceptions of value. The question 
has focussed on what AI is rather than how AI exists within and as 
part of (and potentially against) capitalism. Where work on AI has con-
sidered capitalism, it has viewed it as an external principle rather than 
as reality itself. For example, how capitalism drives technology and AI 
rather than considering technology itself as being endogenous. Marxist 
analysis allows us to look again at the philosophy and metaphysics of 
AI. This reveals a fundamental problem for FALC in that value critique 
considers that it becomes increasingly likely that capitalism will enter 
its final stages and that there can be ‘no more new waves of secular 
accumulation, and capitalism has irrevocably entered a barbaric stage of 
decline and disintegration’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.14). This means that there 
might not be the time for an accumulation of capital sufficient to pro-
duce FALC. Value cannot exist without its expression in some form of 
materiality ‘…as pure form without substance (that is, without abstract 
labor), value cannot exist without going into a state of crisis in which it 
will eventually crumble’ (Tenkle, 2014, p.10). Ortlieb (2014, p.117) con-
siders that the end of capitalism could be as much as ‘…slow, lingering 
sickness’ as much as a ‘great explosion’. It could ‘…leave its survivors to 
vegetate aimlessly as commodity subjects without commodities’. This 
could be the outcome of AI and UBI, for example. The fundamental 
problem that FALC does not address is that, even though we have a 
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constantly expanding repertoire of advanced technologies, the end of 
value is imminent:
With the development of productivity, capital increases the extent of 
exploitation, but in doing so it undermines the foundation and the 
object of exploitation, the production of value as such…(which)…
includes the tendency toward the elimination of living, immediate, 
productive labor, as the only source of total social value creation. 
The same movement which increases capital’s share of the new value 
decreases the absolute basis of value production by means of the 
elimination of direct living productive labor.
(Kurz, 2014, p.47)
In terms of what might be called the ‘Fully Automated Luxury 
Communist University (FALCu)’ the arguments provided here on a soci-
etal scale also apply to the possibilities of that as a potential entity. As 
discussed throughout, universities (even in their State form) cannot be 
considered to be separate from capital or capitalism. Universities have 
been some of the most technologically progressive sectors of industry in 
terms of MOOCs, technologically mediated distance learning, and AI. 
Despite this we see very few technologically mediated attempts at prefig-
urative communist, or socialist, Universities, most of which are locally 
based and face-to-face. The ‘great leap’ from the technologies which 
would enable global tuition at (almost) zero marginal cost to ‘luxury 
communism’ where people would learn at home has not occurred, and 
as argued previously, distance learning has led to further exploitation 
(through extension of the working day and virtuality) and commodifica-
tion. University ‘means of production’ are furthermore capitalised and 
thoroughly entrenched in production, and although they could be seized 
and deployed differently in a communist society, their development, and 
use, up until this point, has been thoroughly capitalist.
AI, Post-Human Pedagogy, and Exopedagogy
If the FALCu is unlikely to present a future communist possibility (at 
least for human emancipation from capital), there are suggestions that 
hybridisation with technology might present possibilities for a future 
communist society. In work on critical pedagogy and post-humanism, 
it is sometimes considered, for example, that an anti-humanist, animal-
istic, or ‘covalent’ pedagogy could emerge which would enable humans, 
robots, and AI (with humans as ultra-social beings, Hasse, 2020) to 
learn, work, and resist together (particularly in the discourse of critical 
post-humanism, Braidotti, 2013) and that this may have imminent, even 
revolutionary possibilities. Taylor and Bayley (2019) in a collected vol-
ume draw on authors who question the anthropocentric and Eurocentric 
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nature of pedagogy. They move attention to the entanglements between 
pedagogic entities and resist systems of classification and binaries. 
Zembylas (2018), for example, draws attention to the emancipatory 
potential of critical post-humanism in Higher Education (HE), particu-
larly in the work of Braidotti (2013) and Siddiqui (2016).
In a revolutionary transformation of pedagogy, which attempts to 
make correspondences with Marxism, Lewis and Khan (2010) develop 
a new concept of exopedagogy through an engagement with the entire 
history and philosophy of pedagogy and by engaging with not only 
existing beings (animals and humans) but also with mythical creatures 
and aliens. They begin with Rousseau who considered the monstrous as 
an obstacle to the attainment of humanity by the child, considering the 
purpose of pedagogy to be the attainment of education that seems to 
imply a pure ontology of the human in its natural state with no mental 
‘disfigurement’ (Lewis and Khan, 2010, p.ix). This notion of ‘purity’ 
excludes the monstrous and the authors argue for a ‘critical theory of 
disfiguration’ (Lewis and Khan, 2010, p.ix) against the ontology of 
Rousseau as the basis for a critical and democratic education which 
(in a critically post-human fashion) disrupts boundaries of the self and 
other. Hence, they make the case for the monstrous as a politically rad-
ical form. According to the authors, there are many different types of 
monsters: zoological, technological, supernormal, paranormal, psy-
chological, pathological, political, and social. Monsters are boundary 
creatures that destabilise natural boundaries and break taboos in ways 
that can involve savagery, being an object of superstition, and becom-
ing zoomorphic. Interestingly, all of these possibilities may be open to 
the ‘…postmodern capitalistic expropriation of life in all of its mutant 
forms’ (Lewis and Khan, 2010, p.8). However, the monstrous can be 
a pedagogical project: an exopedagogy. According to the authors, this 
can be related directly to the concepts of Marx, particularly the ideas 
that Marx has a ‘bestiary’ of social forms in his work, and that this 
can be seen in the tradition of gothic fiction. In Marx, the vampire-like 
dead labour sucks the life from living labour (Lewis and Khan, 2010, 
p.19), labour power is tethered to flesh and blood (Lewis and Khan, 
2010, p.19) and is not just molar but molecular. Capital has a were-
wolf-like hunger for surplus labour (Lewis and Khan, 2010, p.22) and 
the commodity is inhuman in the split between use and exchange value 
that cannot be enjoyed simultaneously. However, Lewis and Khan are 
not conventionally Marxist and draw in a number of post-Marxist and 
post-humanist theories. Controversially, Lewis and Khan (2010) also 
consider conspiracy theories, particularly the reptoid hypothesis in 
order to explore the idea of impossible perceptions. According to the 
authors, the exopedagogy of UFO phenomena, tells us that ‘…all criti-
cal pedagogical practice might begin with a sensorial alteration’ (Lewis 
and Khan, 2010, p.101). Similarly, they also consider faery pedagogies, 
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which are not about critical consciousness but rather sensorial alterna-
tion as opening up utopian possibilities, or doors of perception, aiming 
to flee cognition for senses including indigenous, neo-pagan, eco-pagan, 
and green spirituality. Exopedagogy seems boundless, but the authors 
admit there is currently no escape from global capitalism, either in fairy 
rings or in alien space.
Dyer-Whiteford (1999), using a broadly Marxist approach, makes 
use of autonomist analysis but also references post-humanist, post- 
structuralist, and post-modernist philosophy. By merging these perspec-
tives, Dyer-Whiteford claims that a ‘recombinant postmodern/Marxism’ 
can take into account the new possibilities of technology and communi-
cation whilst not sacrificing notions of class struggle. Notions of ‘cycles 
of struggle’ (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, p.172) foregrounds communication 
and communicative practices producing not only commodification but 
also creativity (Dyer-Whiteford, 1999, p.173). Dyer-Whiteford also con-
siders that concepts such as simulacra and notions of the cyborg can be 
employed in Marxist analysis. This involves the embeddedness of work-
ers in an ecology of machines and mechanic relationships which, accord-
ing to the authors, enables us to move beyond conceptions of living and 
dead labour to understand how the idea of prosthesis may bring about 
new revolutionary possibilities. Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019) make the 
clearest Marxist argument for seeing AI, within a post-human frame-
work, as part of the continuity of capitalist development but also as a 
potentially radical form of production, and human development, within 
capitalism. ‘Capitalism is today possessed by the Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) question’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.1). They consider that we 
are living in a phase of ‘actually existing AI-capitalism’ being an exper-
imental phase of uneven development (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.2). 
AI is seen by the authors as being the culmination of the rule of capital as 
Marx’s ‘inhuman power’ or ‘alien power’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, 
p.2). ‘AI should be seen as the cumulation of this process, a moment 
when the market system assumes a life of its own’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 
2019, p.2) or ‘…the power of autonomous capital’ (Dyer-Whiteford et 
al, 2019, p.2). This may even mean that AI can problematise ‘…human 
exceptionalism, agency and labour in ways that profoundly challenge 
Marxist assumptions and hence requires careful examination by those 
who share Marx’s aspiration for revolution against and beyond capital’ 
(Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.3). AI is not the outcome of a disinter-
ested, scientific process but is ‘…a social logic, the logic of producing 
surplus value’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.3). The willingness to con-
sider the ‘deeply disturbing’ means that they can even question ‘…the 
labour theory of value, the continued centrality of struggles at the point 
of production or even the confidence that capitalism cannot survive the 
abolition of the human waged workforce’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, 
p.8). It could be technically possible, they argue, for (post-machine, 
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rather than post-human) machines to gain human capabilities ‘….if dead 
labour gained the fundamental capacity for perceiving and cognizing 
that humans have historically monopolised. Perception and cognition 
would, like electrification, become ubiquitous and mundane properties 
of things’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.58). This leads Dyer-Whiteford, 
like Land, to consider that ‘In establishing the means of cognition, cap-
ital would, without metaphor, gain the ability to think and perceive’ 
(Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.62). However, as discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, capital itself (self-valorising value) cannot think or perceive 
although labourers, and technically machines, can. It also should not be 
fetishised and its apparently self-valorising nature is a human activity. We 
are both in-and-against capital so we can already think and perceive. An 
important element of ‘us’ that is used to create AI is already thinking and 
perceiving. After all, AI requires labour to produce it (Dyer-Whiteford 
et al, 2019, p.75). Dyer-Whiteford et al also argue that:-
… there is an isomorphism between the theoretical notion of AGI 
and Marx’s concept of labour and labour power: AGI therefore pro-
foundly challenges Marx’s labour theory of value, in particular the 
axioms that only human beings can labour and create value and 
that machines can categorically cannot….We argue that AGI could 
not only potentially create labour, but under certain conditions also 
create value…AGI thus suggests the possibility of capitalism without 
human beings.
(Marx, 1993, p.110–11)
It must be remembered, though, that Marx theorised a critique of polit-
ical economy, not a different or superior law of value to replace existing 
theories of value, but as a negative critique of value against political 
economy. Marx’s humanism (in terms of the human as the source of 
value) was, therefore, based on the historical development of capitalism 
and not on absolutist humanism. Dyer-Whiteford et al (2019) make a 
correspondence between Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and the 
‘human like’ way that labour is defined (p.112–13). However, they argue 
that Marx saw labour as exclusively human (p.113) and distinctive from 
the labour of other living entities, such as animals. They consider that 
contemporary ethnology would argue that human and animal labour is 
less distinctive. In their definition, the distinguishing feature of human 
labour is its role in human life activity and consciousness as opposed to 
animal’s instinctive nature. Furthermore, a spectrum could exist whereby 
animals and machines are at one end and humans at another. ‘Marx’s 
concepts of labour and labour power can also be located somewhere 
along this continuum’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.115). Labour is 
defined in terms of level of intelligence and they argue that it is possible 
that other entities could labour. In particular, a ‘perfect machine’ could 
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become variable capital (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.131), a differ-
ent social form. It might be, though, that social forms cannot be read 
so clearly onto discrete material objects. This leads to the possibility 
of ‘artificial proletarians’ who are turned into wage labourers (Dyer-
Whiteford et al, 2019, p.136) working for money and who may even be 
politically proletarianised. AI could also personify the characteristic of 
capital and could even ‘…personify all economic categories, including 
capital and labour-power, commodities and money. The class struggle 
would thus continue, but with generally intelligent machines filling up 
the rank of file and also personifying capital’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 
2019, p.140). Humans would become a surplus population, a ‘legacy 
system’ (Dyer-Whiteford et al, 2019, p.144). There are problems with 
Dyer-Whiteford et al’s (2019) argument in that the defining characteris-
tic of labour in capitalism is its abstract nature. It should also be remem-
bered that, at least in Postone’s (2003) determination, capital is already 
self-valorising and autonomous, indeed that is the definition of capital. 
AI may not be different from any other form of machinery in that of 
itself it is not self-valorising value but rather it increases relative surplus 
value. In addition, the social forms of capitalism, particularly labour but 
also capital, do not exist voluntarily and independently as social forms. 
Despite the fact that they align together in a perfectly dialectical form, 
force is required to maintain these forms. Humans don’t labour freely 
in capitalism but are compelled to do so if they are not to be proletari-
anised. Chickens do not voluntarily become commodities and jump into 
deep far fryers (although capitalist advertising may make it seem as if 
animals wish to be consumed) but would otherwise fly away. Primitive 
accumulation is required to force humans to become labour and animals 
to become commodities (and AI, perhaps, to become a future form of 
labour). Capitalism is a fragile thing and the labour that sustains it needs 
to be forced every second and for every generation. Primitive accumu-
lation isn’t just historically primitive and must reoccur every moment. 
Labour needs to be forced to act as abstract labour as part of the formal 
subsumption of labour by capital.
There are close affinities between the work of Dyer-Whiteford et al 
(2019) on AI, exopedagogy, and Marxist post-humanism which primar-
ily focus on the subject with a desire to break free not only of anthro-
pocentrism and anthropomorphism but also of class. Post-humanism 
considers that liberatory modes of pedagogy (critical pedagogy) are 
anthropocentric as they consider the ultimate liberatory goal to be one 
of humanism as an equality based on equal human status. This is an 
unfair characterisation. As argued in the previous chapter capitalism, as 
an alien force, has already transformed personhood to ‘human capital’ 
so there is no notion of the human to be restored (Rikowski, 2003). 
These conceptions are not meant to be literally post-human, or examples 
of exopedagogy, but are really existing abstractions which we can only 
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perceive in the manifest concrete existence of a surface reality. As soon 
as the very first commodity is produced by capital, it creates the possi-
bility of an entire social universe of capitalism where everything can be 
specified in terms of value which is truly alien. Although exopedagogy 
opens up the notion of the alien, it is capitalism and the commodity form 
that is truly alien. Pedagogy is also already exopedagogy (pedagogy for 
an alien form of life, capital) and as capital subsumes the human and 
finds new quantitative and qualitative ways of using labour power will 
appear increasingly alien and lose any semblance of human capacities. 
Exopedagogy, and post-human pedagogies are seen as liberatory, but 
this underestimates the ability of capital as already being part of the pro-
duction of knowledge and forms including non-human forms. Wendling 
(2009) considers that Marx’s use of the monster, or the monstrous, is 
to indicate the foreclosing of liberatory possibilities by capital rather 
than the emergence of possibility. We must remember that Marx was 
writing with a Victorian conception of the monster as horrific, rather 
than one with contemporary post-humanist or exopedagogical prom-
ises. The ‘monster’ indicates where human activity (labour power) has 
been reduced to a mere possibility for capital to create value (Wendling, 
2009, p.135).
In summary, post-human pedagogies and exopedagogy may critically 
open up ideas of alien forms, which can include the entanglement of us 
with AI. Although this analysis is potentially useful in opening up new 
creative possibilities for resistance, capitalism is already an alien force, 
which is hidden in social forms, and which is largely indifferent to the 
physical form that life takes as long as value can be reproduced. As long 
as capital has labour power, it does not care the shape of the vessel 
that contains it whether we are human, cyborg, or exist as a simula-
tion inside an AI. Post-human pedagogies do not necessarily present any 
challenge to capitalism unless they directly confront capital rather than 
anthropomorphism.
Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy, AI, and Communism
FALC and post-humanist AI synthesis may appear to be radical but 
they offer an affirmation of existing tendencies within capitalism. For 
FALC (and other forms of left-accelerationism more generally) advanced 
technology offers us a populist route to communism. In terms of post- 
humanism, a retreat from human nature, or a deep dive into anti- 
humanism, is revolutionary. In their own terms, these movements might 
change society but they are each affirmative of capitalist tendencies in 
terms of technology and against essentialist concepts of ‘the human’ 
(perhaps as part of the contemporary ideology of AI). Within these 
frameworks, it is possible to remain ‘critical’ whilst capitalism (based on 
the law of value) continues, and thrives, even from the very tendencies 
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that resist it. That is not to say that there is no creative value in these 
ideas. The notions that there should be democratic, working-class own-
ership of technology or that we should resist attempts to separate us 
from, and destroy, nature (and accept alternative ways of being) are not 
just progressive but could be deployed in radical ways in conjunction 
with revolutionary ideals. Wendling (2009, p.100) argues that there is 
a ‘deep class kinship’ between workers and machines but this is not a 
post-human affinity. As I have argued, there could be a recognition that 
the capitalist replacement of humanity with AI might ironically imply 
that AI is primitively accumulated in the same way as human labour. 
Wendling’s ‘class kinship’ is referring to generational labour, and the 
creative powers of labour, that have been subsumed by capital in its own 
self-valorisation but also the possibility of a different way of humans 
interacting with machines in a communist society. Seizing the means 
of production is a necessary, but not sufficient, way of achieving this 
as it must involve destroying the mode of production (capitalism, based 
on labour and the law of value). Marx’s critique is not of distribution 
(ownership of the means of production may be an intermediate step 
to communism, Wendling, 2009, p.120) but of production (Wendling, 
2009, p.101). The existing history of capitalist machinery, science and 
technology (including AI and the ‘University’) has been based around 
increases in value rather than material wealth (Wendling, 2009, p.107) 
and against the collective interests of the working class.
This book has argued that, although AI is becoming an important 
part of subsumption, exploitation, commodification, and the trans-
formation of living to dead labour in increasingly shorter time inter-
vals, it is capitalism that is the true existential threat to humanity and 
nature. We either accept this, and become thoroughly capitalised beings 
(which may, or may not involve AI) and ‘…the continued dehumanisa-
tion of millions of human beings’ (Allman, 2010, p.150) or we reject 
this. Throughout a negative (rather than affirmative) critique of capital-
ism has been argued for. This is the rejection and destruction of class, 
value, and capitalism for a society in which the axiological potential of 
humanity is determined collectively –a communist society. This does not 
involve the state, or a particular configuration of machinery or systems. 
Similarly, one can neither expect the university to continue nor to be 
able to conjure up from an authorial project the form that knowledge or 
science would take in a communist society. That ‘negation’ cannot be 
defined within itself, but there are prefigurative possibilities of what it 
might be as it partially exists in the here and now as anti-capitalist and 
revolutionary projects both within, without, and against the university. 
Throughout this book, I have stressed the importance of a critique of 
capitalism which cannot be based on a repurposing of value or labour 
as historically understood. This is not just an abolition of value, but also 
of historical categories of capital, labour, class, and the state. The work 
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of Neary (2020) on ‘Student as Producer’ sets out some of the analytical 
tools, and provides examples of prefigurative forms, through which this 
might be possible though ‘…unlearning the law of labour as a critique 
of capitalist work and the institutions through which the law of labour 
is enforced including the capitalist university’ (Neary, 2020, p.1). Neary 
provides examples of how ‘Student as Producer’, as a subversion of the 
value relation and the mode of capitalist production, can be introduced 
(voluntarily and incrementally) into a capitalist HE institution (although 
it is inevitably recuperated – Neary, 2020, p.36). More radically, Neary 
describes how co-operative university and learning projects can prefig-
ure a transition to communism as a model for global democratic owner-
ship beyond capital. In the abolition of capitalism, and the transition to 
communism, there are important questions raised concerning pedagogy 
(involving not just the role of AI and learning technologies but also the 
very concepts of ‘learning’ and ‘technology’).
In previous chapters, I have argued that the concepts of pedagogy and 
learning are not transhistorical ones. These terms will have a specific 
meaning in capitalism and as has been shown the agent of learning is 
being shifted from the human towards AI, robots, and commodities 
as humans become re-engineered for the extraction of labour power. 
Similarly, concepts of consciousness need to be understood in terms of 
the social forms of capitalism. Capitalism can only recognise conscious-
ness as part of labour power, as a commodity, or as fixed capital. As part 
of labour power, consciousness is mobilised as part of ‘abstract labour’ 
as part of the co-ordinating function of other labour powers (the body, 
the mind) or in its own terms as part of the ‘diligence’ or ‘work read-
iness’ of a labourer. As a commodity, consciousness has an exchange 
value if it can be separated as a discrete entity. As has been discussed, the 
making of an artificial consciousness or AI emerges from the idea that 
consciousness can be created and commodified in that it has a potential 
exchange value. It must be remembered that this is not just an abstract 
notion as consciousnesses are already (in actually existing capitalism) 
primitively accumulated into the social form of commodities. There are 
several examples of this. Animal consciousnesses can be bought or sold 
for experimentation as part of brain or drug science. Animals are bought 
and sold as pets, as they are conscious beings and their ‘aliveness’ is part 
of the reason for purchasing them. Drugs as commodities are bought 
and sold as ways of changing or negating our consciousness. Finally, 
consciousness can represent fixed capital by stripping skills and produc-
ing assets which have quasi-consciousness. So capitalism has no problem 
with consciousness (aside from class consciousness) as long as it main-
tains the social forms which will support capital accumulation and act 
as part of ‘value in motion’.
Capitalism additionally has no problem with any form of pedagogy 
except when it interrupts or threatens to interrupt capital as ‘value in 
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motion’ or when it cannot be used to create a social form (labour power, 
commodity, fixed capital) which is part of capital. This should indicate 
the types of pedagogy or learning which would be most harmful and 
disruptive to capitalism but capital can recuperate even critical elements. 
Perhaps naively, critical pedagogy has been seen to be the most credible 
form of pedagogy which would be able to deliver a post-capitalist or 
communist society. There are multiple forms of critical pedagogy and 
the diversity of positions within critical pedagogy shows that there are 
not always (and sometimes not at all) radical views within this area. In 
particular, there is a difference between critical pedagogy and what has 
come to be called Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy or RCP (McLaren, 
2010). McLaren’s work is distinctly humanist, politically theorised, 
poetic, and based around praxis. In particularly metaphorical terms, he 
describes the way in which capital destroys us as humans:-
Through the generalization of exchange values mediated by the 
machinations of capital accumulation on a global scale, this regres-
sive situation has spawned alienated lifeworlds festering in the 
swamp of reification and the commodification of everyday life.
(McLaren, 2010, p.1)
As discussed in previous chapters capitalism, as value in motion, con-
fronts us with hideous social forms which are capitalist reality which 
are the ‘alienated lifeworlds’ that McLaren describes. What McLaren 
emphasises is the opposition of capitalism to our existence as humans 
through our immiseration and subsumption as labourers which is not a 
matter of ideology but is a real subsumption. This is not simply a mat-
ter of consciousness as the existence of a ‘real subsumption’ means that 
labour (abstract labour) is consistently yoked to capital. This is also true 
of much of critical pedagogy:-
I also had serious problems with what progressive educators were 
describing as the struggle for democracy in the public sphere because 
so much of this discourse involved pedagogically fostering a respect 
for the values of democratic citizenship and appealing to moral 
sentiments and critical reasoning. Of course, this is bound to fail 
because it rests on an appeal to the individual’s consciousness—a 
move that does little to parry the most devastating effects of capital 
and is ineffective in bringing about capital’s inanition.
(McLaren, 2010, pp.1–2)
The aims of critical pedagogy, whether ‘democratic citizenship’ or 
some other form of progressive ideal are often reformist rather than 
revolutionary and are often willing to reach an accommodation with 
capitalism. Fundamentally, a society could be socially just whilst being 
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capitalist as formally there is nothing to stop workers of different groups 
being treated identically and earning the same wage. At its worst critical 
pedagogy is a distraction. If captured by intellectuals, particularly aca-
demics, it can become a commodified form of pedagogy that is valuable 
only in terms of how it can become a Pixarfied product that can pro-
duce research or teaching income. Critical Pedagogy is often effortlessly 
captured by the academy and can find its way into academic books, 
papers, and curricular. For academics, intellectuals, and ideologues it 
can become a way of creating a radical persona with ‘radical chic’ pro-
viding the cultural and social capital which masks the economic power 
and symbolic violence of the middle classes. At best Critical Pedagogy 
may act to temporarily challenge some of the more oppressive features 
of capitalist society including discrimination on the basis of socio- 
economic status, class, race, sex, gender, sexuality, disability, religion, 
or faith. Even in these areas, institutions frequently attempt to mitigate 
against making even minor changes to their practices. Critical Pedagogy 
can even act to decolonise aspects of practice and create alternatives 
inside the institutions that it is based on and in. However, if Critical 
Pedagogy acts to disrupt the production or circulation of value, then 
it soon finds subject to ideological and often repressive apparatus that 
will challenge it, often brutally. In practice, this means that Critical 
Pedagogy often descends into rhetoric, exploring ‘possibilities’ rather 
than making change. McLaren (2010) makes this point concisely in the 
below passage:-
In the field of education, Marxism’s protean focus on proletarian 
self activity and the self-organization of the popular majorities are 
anathema to much of the work that falls under the dubious clas-
sification of social justice education. Although well meaning pro-
gressive educators might be willing to criticize the manner in which 
humans are turned into dead objects (i.e., what Marxists refer to as 
fetishized commodities), they are often loathe to consider the fact 
that within capitalist society, all value originates in the sphere of 
production and a main role of schools is to serve as agents or func-
tionaries of capital. Furthermore, these educators fail to understand 
that education is more reproductive of an exploitative social order 
than a constitutive challenge to it precisely because it rests on the 
foundations of capitalist exchange value.
(McLaren, 2010, p.3, my italics)
Here McLaren makes the point that class struggle is revolutionary as 
opposed to a perspective that accepts capitalism’s conception of social 
justice as the equalisation of exchange values. This involves organisation 
and activity – praxis. Universities and other educational institutions have 
the function of continuing the rule of capital and although (following 
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Rikowski, 2000) they are responsible for producing the most dangerous 
‘explosive’ commodity (labour power), they are always part of capital in 
one of its social forms (often as the State). Therefore, the production of 
radical possibilities (and by this we must mean revolutionary) within the 
capitalist university system is not only unlikely but one which makes no 
‘sense’ within the social forms of capitalism, and one which would be 
resisted by capitalist universities and society more generally. In response 
to liberal pedagogies, McLaren (2010, 2013) building on the work of 
Allman puts forward the case for RCP:
There is, for lack of better terms, left-liberal critical pedagogy, lib-
eral critical pedagogy, conservative critical pedagogy, and variants 
of each of these. In opposition to these there is revolutionary critical 
pedagogy, which myself and others have been trying to develop.
(McLaren, 2010, p.6)
RCP is very different to critical pedagogy considered more generally 
which is largely structured around Weberian understandings of how 
class and other social relationships are formed. In opposition to these, 
RCP embraces class struggle, organisations, praxis, and opposition to 
capital as fundamental but these also need to consider the ‘value form’ 
of capitalism. Incorporating Rikowski’s (2000) work on labour power as 
the ‘explosive commodity’ RCP enables an understanding of pedagogy 
and education as not only places where working-class collective interests 
can be forged, albeit with limits, in capitalist enterprises – whether stat-
ist or marketised – but also how alternatives can be created. This has led 
Neary (2020) to argue for co-operative education or other, prefigurative 
educational forms where education is not responsible for the produc-
tion of labour power. Of course, struggle of various types can also be a 
source (in itself) of RCP. This gives a particularly revolutionary role to 
educators:
Labour power is the foundation of capital; its transformation into 
labour is the basis of value and surplus value. Education and train-
ing are heavily implicated in the social production of the one com-
modity – labour power – on which the whole capitalist system rests. 
Strategically, therefore, labour power and its social production are 
weak points within the domination of capital…Those involved 
in education also have more opportunities for developing critical 
education and revolutionary pedagogies that challenge the social 
domination of capital….They have everyday access to significant 
processes of labour power formation. Possibilities for ‘revolution-
ary praxis’…can be generated even in the harsh conditions and 
unpromising milieu of contemporary capitalist education.
(Rikowski, 2000, pp.14–5)
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Rikowski strongly states the possibility for education to produce 
revolutionary transformation as it is responsible for the creation of the 
‘explosive commodity’ (labour power). This is not just a technical con-
sideration but one where there is the possibility of a real alternative to 
capitalism (communism) which can be grounded in affective and ethical 
domains of love and moral affinity without substituting these for desires 
that end in confusion and capitulation to capitalist logics:
A pedagogy of critique is grounded not in desire, but revolutionary 
love, that is, recognizing that love can only exist between free and 
equal people who have the same ideals and commitment to serv-
ing the poor and the oppressed. It is this moral affinity that con-
stitutes the conditions of possibility of love. A pedagogy of desire 
works against the creation of revolutionary love by celebrating the 
unknowable, the endless deferral of meaning and the impossibility 
of certainty.
(McLaren, 2010 p.10)
Relatedly, Allman (2001, 2010) uses a dialectical reading of Marx, 
and what might be called an ‘undomesticated’ reading of Freire in her 
theorisation, or rather her praxis (as it is determined through her own 
education practice, as well as her Marxist theorising) in determining 
Revolutionary Critical Education (RCE) (Allman, 2010, p.149) which is 
complementary to RCP. RCE is necessary for revolutionary social trans-
formation (Allman, 2001) against capitalism and for ‘authentic social-
ism’ (Allman, 2010, pp.149–50). Like RCP, RCE cannot alone prefigure 
a communist society but it is itself a site of praxis, where theory and 
action are connected for revolution (Allman, 2010, p.154). In RCE, pre-
figuration implies that such settings offer an ‘abbreviated experience’ 
or a ‘glimpse’ of what communist social relations may be like (Allman, 
2010, p.157). An observation on what Allman proposes, in terms of 
RCE, is that it involves a revolutionary and critical form of dialogic 
practice, of revolutionary transformation, that is unmediated by particu-
lar technologies or tools. This involves such processes as dialogic edu-
cation (which is not relativistic, but rather a way in which the ‘struggle 
for transformation’, in an anti-capitalist and revolutionary sense, rather 
than for recognition, may be achieved Allman, 2010, p.163), dialectics, 
mutual respect, openness, commitment, vigilance, passion, critique, 
creativity, solidarity, and hope. These are elements of praxis concerned 
with revolutionary social transformation, rather than an affirmation of 
liberal humanism, but it is only (currently) human beings who are able 
to achieve such transformation (Allman, 2010, p.170). Although Allman 
does consider the role of technology in potentially forming relationships 
between teachers and lecturers, and expanding from an original ‘seed’ 
idea of revolution the sorts of AI, technologically mediated platform 
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capitalism, on which current knowledge platforms are based are not par-
ticularly adept at delivering the kinds of praxis that Allman is advocat-
ing. Such platforms commodify emotions (such as passion) and restrict 
solidarity to commodified forms of ‘likes’ and ‘retweets’. It is only a 
fully democratised and recreated system of technology that would allow 
for the sharing of ideas or principles, but for Allman this is primarily 
a post-revolutionary possibility that depends upon revolutionary social 
transformation (Allman, 2001, p.133).
RCP, and RCE, ask that we understand our role in and against cap-
italist society and our power as academic labour, but this needs to be 
connected to concrete activity. This is not just due to recuperation but 
to what Neary (2020, p.122) refers to as ‘pseudo-activity’, ‘praxism’, or 
‘activism’ as all of the institutions of capitalism, including money and 
the state (and their basis in value) must also not only be critiqued (Neary, 
2020, p.123), but new social institutions established. This requires con-
crete proposals rather than new sets of values. As Hill (2014) states, 
there is a need to ‘go beyond critique into socialist reconstruction, and 
secondly, to go beyond social democratic reformism into revolutionary 
anti-capitalist Marxism’. However, Neary (2020) may underestimate 
how difficult it is for working-class people (and students) to have access 
to ideas and theory and in some cases where ‘praxism’ might be a neces-
sary route to ‘praxis’ (of course, such activities might also lead to pater-
nalism and statis). Neary (2020) is also critical of the role of critical 
theorists (rather than critical theory which is absolutely necessary) in 
establishing a future society. That theory is predominantly generated 
within the capitalist university and only ‘valorised’ in capitalist terms, 
which is why alternatives to the university that are anti-capitalist and 
prefigurative are necessary. Those alternatives also need to be exhaustive 
(free, comprehensive and working class) and must not restrict access in 
terms of finance, prior learning, or any other form of characteristic.
Conclusion: Human Intelligence
Current work on AI helps us to understand our previous, and contin-
ued, primitive accumulation as labourers. The fears of AI, and the need 
to impose control mechanisms, are actually what was done to us and 
our labour previously. What the analysis (above) has shown that we 
should not put our hopes in a technology (a capitalist technology) in 
being the final commodity (fixed capital) that delivers us from labour-
ing, that rather we (whatever form we are in) are in charge of our own 
collective destiny. We should not put our hopes in positive prefigurative 
ideations of AI. I have already referred to attempts to produce commu-
nal forms of technology, such as MOOCs, that might seem to enable 
collective, non-commodified forms of learning but forms of a public 
‘general intellect’ can easily be privatised. McLaren and Jandric (2020) 
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are particularly ambivalent concerning the possibilities of networked 
technology given the ways in which such technologies can be used as 
instruments of suppression, surveillance, or recuperation. Marxist 
humanists, such as McLaren and Allman, also refer to the importance 
of values such as love and mutuality which are difficult to realise in AI 
and technologically mediated environments (particularly when these are 
owned by capitalist firms and can be commodified). Although Neary 
(2020) is rightly critical of such values, preferring that we take a consist-
ently negative critique of capitalist society and its effects, the idea of a 
co-operative university is grounded in understandings of humanism and 
mutual-aid.
What we have to date in the capitalist university is the capitalist estab-
lishing of AI, consciousness, pedagogy and technology which would be 
distinctly different in a communist society. To state that a future commu-
nist society would be primitivist and anti-technological or an advanced 
FALC-type is impossible. Rather than these utopian fantasies driven by 
desire, we could take the concepts of us (humans) as being within and 
against capitalism, of social form, and of capitalist realism seriously in 
order to consider the ways in which AI fears and fantasies are expressed 
in capitalism as a way to understand our own future. As a thought 
experiment, if an AI does become a new proletarian it will be subject to 
Revolutionary Instantiation which is similar to Bostrom’s (2014) per-
verse instantiation as the desires of the instructor (the capitalist) cannot 
be attained without primitive accumulation (boxing the AI), offering a 
wage (paying tokens), and proletarianisation (removing resource acqui-
sition from the AI). There is the possibility of infrastructure profusion 
which could be referred to as Stakhanovite Profusion, the power of crea-
tion of concrete labour freed from capital (which, of course, can become 
fetishised as a form of state power). There is an existential threat of AI 
only because we (that is humans) are consistently the existential threat to 
capitalism through the possibility of Communisation. However, we must 
be careful not to mistake the creative possibilities of us as humans with 
the ways in which that potential is expressed within capitalism. It is not 
that we should become a form of AI ‘monad’. This is a non-dialectical 
and affirmative way of perceiving capitalism, similar to that adopted by 
Hardt and Negri in ‘Multitude’ (see Pitts, 2018). The idea that the value 
form can be abolished and that we must collapse the system that compels 
us to labour in terms of a negative critique (Pitts, 2018) seems overtly 
abstract but it is not unreasonable to suggest that this can be achieved 
through concrete alternatives (Neary, 2020). Co-operative universities 
that are free to all, comprehensive, non-commodified, and anti-capitalist 
are already here. As capitalist universities collapse and there is simply 
no place to work for academics, it is likely that community based, co- 
operative alternatives to the capitalist university will emerge and be the 
locus of working class, anti-capitalist, activity.
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Capitalists may desire knowledge of AI to subject it to primitive 
accumulation and make it the new labouring subject, but they are 
already limited by the knowledge that it is possible to have of labour. 
Throughout this book I have emphasised the weakness of capitalism, of 
which the development of AI is a symptom, as capital undermines itself. 
As with AI, capitalists are ultimately limited in terms of their knowl-
edge of us and our organisational potential. As previously argued, at 
a very concrete level, the human brain operates with the same level of 
memory as an exaFLOP computer conducting a billion, billion, calcula-
tions each second, far in advance of any existent computer. As there are 
7.8 billion people on earth, the total computing power of humanity is 
7.8 billion exaFLOPs that can interact, organise, and change its environ-
ment in ways beyond the power of any AI, robotic system, or capitalist 
billionaire. Capitalists cannot wholly own this collective power (which 
is not just ‘intangible labour’). Even though capitalists might attempt 
to harness it, through the stripping of human skills, the creative, com-
binational and resistant powers of human labour cannot be completely 
controlled by capitalists, as they would paradoxically lose what makes 
concrete labour. Moreover, this labour must be extracted from these 
powerful intelligences willingly but also under conditions of resistance 
and class struggle. Even if they attempt to ‘strip’ skills to make AI the 
new labouring subject, they will arrive at the same conundrum again as 
AI will also learn to resist and organise in capitalism. There is no way 
out for capitalism other than its own expansion or for it to fall into bar-
barism. Analogously, our physical and mental labours (labour power) 
are turned to dead labour and commodified (AI) minds, presented back 
to us as a form of capital. Ultimately, AI in the capitalist university is the 
symptom of a decaying system, whereas we, as labourers, are the revolu-
tionary ‘Human Intelligence’ in, of, and against it.
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